THE average ticker hound—or,as they used to call him,tape-worm—goes wrong,I suspect,as much from as from anything else.It means a highly expensive inelasticity.After all,the game of speculation isn't all mathematics or set rules,however rigid the main laws may be.Even in my tape reading something enters that is more than mere arithmetic.There is what I call the behavior of a stock,actions that enable you to judge whether or not it is going to proceed in accordance with the precedents that your observation has noted.If a stock doesn't act right don't touch it;because,being unable to tell precisely what is wrong,you cannot tell which way it is going.No diagnosis,no prognosis.No prognosis,no profit.
It is a very old thing,this of noting the behavior of a stock and studying its past performances.When I first came to New York there was a broker's office where a Frenchman used to talk about his chart.At first I thought he was a sort of pet freak kept by the firm because they were good-natured.Then I learned that he was a persuasive and most impressive talker.He said that the only thing that didn't lie because it simply couldn't was mathematics.By means of his curves he could forecast market movements.Also he could analyse them,and tell,for instance,why Keene did the right thing in his famous Atchison preferred bull manipulation,and later why he went wrong in his Southern Pacific pool.At various times one or another of the professional traders tried the Frenchman's system—and then went back to their old unscientific methods of making a living.Their hit-or-miss system was cheaper,they said.I heard that the Frenchman said Keene admitted that the chart was 100 per cent right but claimed that the method was too slow for practical use in an active market.
Then there was one office where a chart of the daily movement of prices was kept.It showed at a glance just what each stock had done for months.By comparing individual curves with the general market curve and keeping in mind certain rules the customers could tell whether the stock on which they got an unscientific tip to buy was fairly entitled to a rise.They used the chart as a sort of complementary tipster.Today there are scores of commission houses when you find trading charts.They come ready-made from the offices of statistical experts and include not only stocks but also commodities.
“I should say that a chart helps those who can read it or rather who can assimilate what they read.The average chart reader,however,is apt to become obsessed with the notion that the dips and peaks and primary and secondary movements are all there is to stock speculation.If he pushes his confidence to its logical limit he is bound to go broke.There is an extremely able man,a former partner of a well-known Stock Exchange house,who is really a trained mathematician.He is a graduate of a famous technical school.He devised charts based upon a very careful and minute study of the behavior of prices in many markets—stocks,bonds,grain,cotton,money,and so on.He went back years and years and traced the correlations and seasonal movements—oh,everything.He used his charts in his stock trading for years.What he really did was to take advantage of some highly intelligent averaging.They tell me he won regularly—until the World War knocked all precedents into a cocked hat.I heard that he and his large following lost millions before they desisted.But not even a world war can keep the stock market from being a bull market when conditions are bullish,or a bear market when conditions are bearish.And all a man needs to know to make money is to appraise conditions.
I didn't mean to get off the track like that,but I can't help it when I think of my first few years in Wall Street.I know now what I did not know then,and I think of the mistakes of my ignorance because those are the very mistakes that the average stock speculator makes year in and year out.
After I got back to New York to try for the third time to beat the market in a Stock Exchange house I traded quite actively.I didn't expect to do as well as I did in the bucket shops,but I thought that after a while I would do much better because I would be able to swing a much heavier line.Yet,I can see now that my main trouble was my failure to grasp the vital difference between stock gambling and stock speculation.Still,by reason of my seven years' experience in reading the tape and a certain natural aptitude for the game,my stake was earning not indeed a fortune but a very high rate of interest.I won and lost as before,but I was winning on balance.The more I made the more I spent.This is the usual experience with most men.No,not necessarily with easy-money pickers,but with every human being who is not a slave of the hoarding instinct.Some men,like old Russell Sage,have the money-making and the money-hoarding instinct equally well developed,and of course they die disgustingly rich.
The game of beating the market exclusively interested me from ten to three every day,and after three,the game of living my life.Don't misunderstand me.I never allowed pleasure to interfere with business.When I lost it was because I was wrong and not because I was suffering from dissipation or excesses.There never were any shattered nerves or rum-shaken limbs to spoil my game.I couldn't afford anything that kept me from feeling physically and mentally fit.Even now I am usually in bed by ten.As a young man I never kept late hours,because I could not do business properly on insufficient sleep.I was doing better than breaking even and that is why I didn't think there was any need to deprive myself of the good things of life.The market was always there to supply them.I was acquiring the confidence that comes to a man from a professionally dispassionate attitude toward his own method of providing bread and butter for himself.
The first change I made in my play was in the matter of time.I couldn't wait for the sure thing to come along and then take a point or two out of it as I could in the bucket shops.I had to start much earlier if I wanted to catch the move in Fullerton's office.In other words,I had to study what was going to happen;to anticipate stock movements.That sounds asininely commonplace,but you know what I mean.It was the change in my own attitude toward the game that was of supreme importance to me.It taught me,little by little,the essential difference between betting on fluctuations and anticipating inevitable advances and declines,between gambling and speculating.
I had to go further back than an hour in my studies of the market—which was something I never would have learned to do in the biggest bucket shop in the world.I interested myself in trade reports and railroad earnings and financial and commercial statistic.Of course I loved to trade heavily and they called me the Boy Plunger;but I also liked to study the moves.I never thought that anything was irksome if it helped me to trade more intelligently.Before I can solve a problem I must state it to myself.When I think I have found the solution I must prove I am right.I know of only one way to prove it;and that is,with my own money.
Slow as my progress seems now,I suppose I learned as fast as I possibly could,considering that I was making money on balance.If I had lost oftener perhaps it might have spurred me to more continuous study.I certainly would have had more mistakes to spot.But I am not sure of the exact value of losing,for if I had lost more I would have lacked the money to test out the improvements in my methods of trading.
Studying my winning plays in Fullerton's office I discovered that although I often was 100 per cent right on the market—that is,in my diagnosis of conditions and general trend—I was not making as much money as my market“rightness”entitled me to.Why wasn't I?
There was as much to learn from partial victory as from defeat.
For instance,I had been bullish from the very start of a bull market,and I had backed my opinion by buying stocks.An advance followed,as I had clearly foreseen.So far,all very well.But what else did I do?Why,I listened to the elder statesmen and curbed my youthful impetuousness.I made up my mind to be wise and play carefully,conservatively.Everybody knew that the way to do that was to take profits and buy back your stocks on reactions.And that is precisely what I did,or rather what I tried to do;for I often took profits and waited for a reaction that never came.And I saw my stock go kiting up ten points more and I sitting there with my four-point profit safe in my conservative pocket.They say you never grow poor taking profits.No,you don't.But neither do you grow rich taking a four-point profit in a bull market.
Where I should have made twenty thousand dollars I made two thousand.That was what my conservatism did for me.About the time I discovered what a small percentage of what I should have made I was getting I discovered something else,and that is that suckers differ among themselves according to the degree of experience.
The tyro knows nothing,and everybody,including himself,knows it.But the next,or second,grade thinks he knows a great deal and makes others feel that way too.He is the experienced sucker,who has studied—not the market itself but a few remarks about the market made by a still higher grade of suckers.The second-grade sucker knows how to keep from losing his money in some of the ways that get the raw beginner.It is this semisucker rather than the 100 per cent article who is the real all-the-year-round support of the commission houses.He lasts about three and a half years on an average,as compared with a single season of from three to thirty weeks—which is the usual Wall Street life of a first offender.It is naturally the semisucker who is always quoting the famous trading aphorisms and the various rules of the game.He knows all the don'ts that ever fell from the oracular lips of the old stagers—excepting the principal one,which is:Don't be a sucker!
This semisucker is the type that thinks he has cut his wisdom teeth because he loves to buy on declines.He waits for them.He measures his bargains by the number of points it has sold off from the top.In big bull markets the plain unadulterated sucker,utterly ignorant of rules and precedents,buys blindly because he hopes blindly.He makes most of the money—until one of the healthy reactions takes it away from him at one fell swoop.But the Careful Mike sucker does what I did when I thought I was playing the game intelligently—according to the intelligence of others.I knew I needed to change my bucket-shop methods and I thought I was solving my problem with any change,particularly one that assayed high gold values according to the experienced traders among the customers.
Most—let us call'em customers—are alike.You find very few who can truthfully say that Wall Street doesn't owe them money.In Fullerton's there were the usual crowd.All grades!Well,there was one old chap who was not like the others.To begin with,he was a much older man.Another thing was that he never volunteered advice and never bragged of his winnings.He was a great hand for listening very attentively to the others.He did not seem very keen to get tips—that is,he never asked the talkers what they'd heard or what they knew.But when somebody gave him one he always thanked the tipster very politely.Sometimes he thanked the tipster again—when the tip turned out O.K.But if it went wrong he never whined,so that nobody could tell whether he followed it or let it slide by.It was a legend of the office that the old jigger was rich and could swing quite a line.But he wasn't donating much to the firm in the way of commissions;at least not that anyone could see.His name was Partridge,but they nicknamed him Turkey behind his back,because he was so thick-chested and had a habit of strutting about the various rooms,with the point of his chin resting on his breast.
The customers,who were all eager to be shoved and forced into doing things so as to lay the blame for failure on others,used to go to old Partridge and tell him what some friend of a friend of an insider had advised them to do in a certain stock.They would tell him what they had not done with the tip so he would tell them what they ought to do.But whether the tip they had was to buy or to sell,the old chap's answer was always the same.
The customer would finish the tale of his perplexity and then ask:“What do you think I ought to do?”
Old Turkey would cock his head to one side,contemplate his fellow customer with a fatherly smile,and finally he would say very impressively,“You know,it's a bull market!”
Time and again I heard him say,“Well,this is a bull market,you know!”as though he were giving to you a priceless talisman wrapped up in a million-dollar accident-insurance policy.And of course I did not get his meaning.
One day a fellow named Elmer Harwood rushed into the office,wrote out an order and gave it to the clerk.Then he rushed over to where Mr.Partridge was listening politely to John Fanning's story of the time he overheard Keene give an order to one of his brokers and all that John made was a measly three points on a hundred shares and of course the stock had to go up twenty-four points in three days right after John sold out.It was at least the fourth time that John had told him that tale of woe,but old Turkey was smiling as sympathetically as if it was the first time he heard it.
Well,Elmer made for the old man and,without a word of apology to John Fanning,told Turkey,“Mr.Partridge,I have just sold my Climax Motors.My people say the market is entitled to a reaction and that I'll be able to buy it back cheaper.So you'd better do likewise.That is,if you've still got yours.”
Elmer looked suspiciously at the man to whom he had given the original tip to buy.The amateur,or gratuitous,tipster always thinks he owns the receiver of his tip body and soul,even before he knows how the tip is going to turn out.
“Yes,Mr.Harwood,I still have it.Of course!”said Turkey gratefully.It was nice of Elmer to think of the old chap.
“Well,now is the time to take your profit and get in again on the next dip,”said Elmer,as if he had just made out the deposit slip for the old man.Failing to perceive enthusiastic gratitude in the beneficiary's face Elmer went on:“I have just sold every share I owned!”
From his voice and manner you would have conservatively estimated it at ten thousand shares.
But Mr.Partridge shook his head regretfully and whined,“No!No!I can't do that!”
“What?”yelled Elmer.
“I simply can't!”said Mr.Partridge.He was in great trouble.
“Didn't I give you the tip to buy it?”
“You did,Mr.Harwood,and I am very grateful to you.Indeed,I am,sir.But—”
“Hold on!Let me talk!And didn't that stock go up seven points in ten days?Didn't it?”
“It did,and I am much obliged to you,my dear boy.But I couldn't think of selling that stock.”
“You couldn't?”asked Elmer,beginning to look doubtful himself.It is a habit with most tip givers to be tip takers.
“No,I couldn't.”
“Why not?”And Elmer drew nearer.
“Why,this is a bull market!”The old fellow said it as though he had given a long and detailed explanation.
“That's all right,”said Elmer,looking angry because of his disappointment.“I know this is a bull market as well as you do.But you'd better slip them that stock of yours and buy it back on the reaction.You might as well reduce the cost to yourself.”
“My dear boy,”said old Partridge,in great distress—“my dear boy,if I sold that stock now I'd lose my position;and then where would I be?”
Elmer Harwood threw up his hands,shook his head and walked over to me to get sympathy:“Can you beat it?”he asked me in a stage whisper.“I ask you!”
I didn't say anything.So he went on:“I give him a tip on Climax Motors.He buys five hundred shares.He's got seven points' profit and I advise him to get out and buy 'em back on the reaction that's overdue even now.And what does he say when I tell him?He says that if he sells he'll lose his job.What do you know about that?”
“I beg your pardon,Mr.Harwood;I didn't say I'd lose my job,”cut in old Turkey.“I said I'd lose my position.And when you are as old as I am and you've been through as many booms and panics as I have,you'll know that to lose your position is something nobody can afford;not even John D.Rockefeller.I hope the stock reacts and that you will be able to repurchase your line at a substantial concession,sir.But I myself can only trade in accordance with the experience of many years.I paid a high price for it and I don't feel like throwing away a second tuition fee.But I am as much obliged to you as if I had the money in the bank.It's a bull market,you know.”And he strutted away,leaving Elmer dazed.
What old Mr.Partridge said did not mean much to me until I began to think about my own numerous failures to make as much money as I ought to when I was so right on the general market.The more I studied the more I realized how wise that old chap was.He had evidently suffered from the same defect in his young days and knew his own human weaknesses.He would not lay himself open to a temptation that experience had taught him was hard to resist and had always proved expensive to him,as it was to me.
I think it was a long step forward in my trading education when I realized at last that when old Mr.Partridge kept on telling the other customers,“Well,you know this is a bull market!”he really meant to tell them that the big money was not in the individual fluctuations but in the main movements—that is,not in reading the tape but in sizing up the entire market and its trend.
And right here let me say one thing:After spending many years in Wall Street and after making and losing millions of dollars I want to tell you this:It never was my thinking that made the big money for me.It always was my sitting.Got that?My sitting tight!It is no trick at all to be right on the market.You always find lots of early bulls in bull markets and early bears in bear markets.I've known many men who were right at exactly the right time,and began buying or selling stocks when prices were at the very level which should show the greatest profit.And their experience invariably matched mine—that is,they made no real money out of it.Men who can both be right and sit tight are uncommon.I found it one of the hardest things to learn.But it is only after a stock operator has firmly grasped this that he can make big money.It is literally true that millions come easier to a trader after he knows how to trade than hundreds did in the days of his ignorance.
The reason is that a man may see straight and clearly and yet become impatient or doubtful when the market takes its time about doing as he figured it must do.That is why so many men in Wall Street,who are not at all in the sucker class,not even in the third grade,nevertheless lose money.The market does not beat them.They beat themselves,because though they have brains they cannot sit tight.Old Turkey was dead right in doing and saying what he did.He had not only the courage of his convictions but the intelligent patience to sit tight.
Disregarding the big swing and trying to jump in and out was fatal to me.Nobody can catch all the fluctuations.In a bull market your game is to buy and hold until you believe that the bull market is near its end.To do this you must study general conditions and not tips or special factors affecting individual stocks.Then get out of all your stocks;get out for keeps!Wait until you see—or if you prefer,until you think you see—the turn of the market;the beginning of a reversal of general conditions.You have to use your brains and your vision to do this;otherwise my advice would be as idiotic as to tell you to buy cheap and sell dear.One of the most helpful things that anybody can learn is to give up trying to catch the last eighth—or the first.These two are the most expensive eighths in the world.They have cost stock traders,in the aggregate,enough millions of dollars to build a concrete highway across the continent.
Another thing I noticed in studying my plays in Fullerton's office after I began to trade less unintelligently was that my initial operations seldom showed me a loss.That naturally made me decide to start big.It gave me confidence in my own judgment before I allowed it to be vitiated by the advice of others or even by my own impatience at times.Without faith in his own judgment no man can go very far in this game.That is about all I have learned—to study general conditions,to take a position and stick to it.I can wait without a twinge of impatience.I can see a setback without being shaken,knowing that it is only temporary.I have been short one hundred thousand shares and I have seen a big rally coming.I have figured—and figured correctly—that such a rally as I felt was inevitable,and even wholesome,would make a difference of one million dollars in my paper profits.And I nevertheless have stood pat and seen half my paper profit wiped out,without once considering the advisability of covering my shorts to put them out again on the rally.I knew that if I did I might lose my position and with it the certainty of a big killing.It is the big swing that makes the big money for you.
If I learned all this so slowly it was because I learned by my mistakes,and some time always elapses between making a mistake and realizing it,and more time between realizing it and exactly determining it.But at the same time I was faring pretty comfortably and was very young,so that I made up in other ways.Most of my winnings were still made in part through my tape reading because the kind of markets we were having lent themselves fairly well to my method.I was not losing either as often or as irritatingly as in the beginning of my New York experiences.It wasn't anything to be proud of,when you think that I had been broke three times in less than two years.And as I told you,being broke is a very efficient educational agency.
I was not increasing my stake very fast because I lived up to the handle all the time.I did not deprive myself of many of the things that a fellow of my age and tastes would want.I had my own automobile and I could not see any sense in skimping on living when I was taking it out of the market.The ticker only stopped Sundays and holidays,which was as it should be.Every time I found the reason for a loss or the why and how of another mistake,I added a brand-new Don't!to my schedule of assets.And the nicest way to capitalize my increasing assets was by not cutting down on my living expenses.Of course I had some amusing experiences and some that were not so amusing,but if I told them all in detail I'd never finish.As a matter of fact,the only incidents that I remember without special effort are those that taught me something of definite value to me in my trading;something that added to my store of knowledge of the game—and of myself!
特別癡迷于股市的人會出錯,我覺得這就像是太過專業(yè)化后就容易走入死胡同一樣,少了靈活的東西就會得不償失。不能只把投資看成是單靠數(shù)學(xué)或一些定律就能做好的事情。不管主要的法則多嚴(yán)格,就算我在看股市行情的時候,也不光是玩點計算題,其中有我稱之為股票行為的東西,就是股票的動作,能夠讓我根據(jù)我所觀察到的前例,判斷股票是否會這樣運動。如果一只股票不能盡如人意,就不能亂動。如果連其中的原因都搞不清,也就無法預(yù)估市場行情,沒辦法判斷,就無法預(yù)測股票,也就賺不到錢。
觀察股票走勢,研究過去的變化走向,這是一門古老的學(xué)問。剛來紐約時,我就在一家股票公司聽到一個法國人賣弄他的圖表,當(dāng)時我以為他是公司的一個弄臣。但是后來我發(fā)現(xiàn)他說的話都經(jīng)得起驗證,富有感染力。他說股市圖表是唯一不騙人的東西,靠著圖表就可以預(yù)估股票走勢,以此分析股市。比如為什么凱恩可以操縱股票,在炒作凱奇遜股票的時候大賺特賺,而在投資南太平洋股票的時候卻一敗涂地。有的職業(yè)股民也嘗試過這個法國人的方法,可不久就走回了老路,他們覺得靠運氣投機的風(fēng)險沒那么大。那個法國人說過,凱恩也確信他的圖表是完全沒錯的,可是在變幻多端的股市中,這個方法太慢了。
那時候,有一家股票公司保存了股價走勢圖,它能顯示出幾個月內(nèi)每只股票的走勢情形,通過比較個別股票和總的變化趨勢,記住一些規(guī)律,股民們就能判斷出他們靠不科學(xué)的消息買的股票是不是真的要上漲。他們把這張圖當(dāng)成了一種輔助性的資料來源。如今很多股票公司都有這樣的圖表,是統(tǒng)計專家們專門統(tǒng)計繪制的,除了股票走勢外,還有商品期貨的走勢圖。
或者我可以這樣說,圖表只對能看懂圖表的人起作用,準(zhǔn)確點說,只對能吸收圖表信息的人有所幫助。一般的人看圖容易變得執(zhí)迷不悟,認(rèn)定底部和頭部,主要和次要波動,就是股票投機的一切。要是他把這種信心推展到理智的極限,他注定會破產(chǎn)。有個腦瓜子好使的人,他做過一家著名交易所的合伙人,還是位有實力的數(shù)學(xué)家。他從知名技校畢業(yè),發(fā)明了各種圖表,他專門研究過大量市場——股票、債券、谷物、棉花、貨幣等各種東西的價格形勢,還追溯它們過去幾年的關(guān)聯(lián)和變化的所有方面。很多年里,他都在使用圖表,他所做的事情其實是利用一些極為高明的平均法。聽說他是常勝將軍,一直到世界大戰(zhàn)改變了市場性質(zhì)才作罷。他說他和手下人在退出市場之前,賠掉了幾百萬??梢磺卸嫉每葱蝿荩J芯褪桥J?,熊市也只能是熊市,誰都沒辦法阻止。想賺錢的人,都必須要正確地預(yù)估形勢,確定是不是具備條件。
我無意這樣談?wù)摰秒x題太遠(yuǎn),但是一想到自己在華爾街的最初幾年,就忍不住這樣?,F(xiàn)在我弄懂了當(dāng)時的很多事情,那時候犯的錯都是一個普通投資人一直在犯的錯。
第三次到達(dá)紐約后,我干得很積極,就為了能在交易所出一條道,我不指望能像在對賭行一樣厲害,但我想過一陣子,我應(yīng)該能夠用很多很多的資金操作,我應(yīng)該會有更好的表現(xiàn)。我明白我最大的問題是沒弄懂股票賭博與股票投機的差別,不過我畢竟有天賦和七年研究股市行情變化的經(jīng)驗,我不只是賺錢了,而且賺了很多。我像以前有贏有輸,但大致上都能贏錢。我賺得多,消費得也多,大家都這樣,不見得是所有賺了容易錢的人才這樣,而是不愿意攢錢的人才大手大腳。羅素·塞奇就是如此,他能賺也能攢,到入土的時候錢多得驚人。
每天,我都會從上午十點忙乎到下午三點,沉浸其中。三點以后,才是我享受生活的時刻。請別搞錯,我不會讓享受影響賺錢,我賠錢是因為判斷出錯,不是生活無度造成的。我從來不讓精神恍惚或喝酒喝到手足酸麻妨礙我的游戲。任何事情都別想損害我的健康。就連現(xiàn)在我也常在十點前就入睡。即使年輕我也不熬夜,因為睡不好就干不好。我的表現(xiàn)比打平還好,這就是我認(rèn)為不必剝奪生活中美好事物的原因。股市能滿足你的所有需求,講得職業(yè)一點兒,炒股是為了生活,所以要端正態(tài)度,自信心也就隨之而來了。
我在炒股中的第一個改變是時間因素。我不像在對賭行里等塵埃落定了再出手,賺個一兩點,我現(xiàn)在想在富勒頓公司順勢而為,就要早出手、迅速,也就是說,我必須要鉆研市場,預(yù)測形勢。這聽起來沒什么意思,但你應(yīng)該明白,在炒股上轉(zhuǎn)變態(tài)度對我是非常重要的。我慢慢懂得了在股價不穩(wěn)時賭一把和提前預(yù)估股價的跌漲,以及賭博與投機,它們之間有著根本的差異。
我需要提前一小時以上的時間開始研究市場,就算在世界上最牛的對賭行,我也不可能明白這個。我對產(chǎn)業(yè)報告、鐵路盈余、金融財務(wù)和商業(yè)統(tǒng)計都興趣盎然。當(dāng)然了,我喜歡玩大手筆,所以人們才送外號“投機分子”。我也愛研究股市行情,所有能幫助我去玩一把的事情,我都非常熱心。在處理事情之前,我會仔細(xì)分析,只要覺得自己已經(jīng)明白該從哪里入手了,就會去實際驗證一番。自然,要證明只有一個辦法,那就是用我的錢去證明。
現(xiàn)在看來我的進步似乎比較慢,可是于我而言已經(jīng)很快了,因為整體來看我還是賺了錢,如果一直賠錢的話,可能會刺激著我花更多精力去研究股市。我必然也有很多問題沒察覺。但是我不敢肯定虧錢的真正價值,如果虧得太多,我就沒錢驗證我的那些改變是否有效了。
研究我在富勒頓公司賺錢的操作方法之后我明白了,雖然我對股市行情和走勢的預(yù)估一直是絕對正確的,但是我賺到的錢還是不多,原因何在?
沒有徹底勝利,就跟失敗了一樣,也需要研究一番才行。
比如,在多頭市場股價剛漲的時候,我就買進,它也按照我的預(yù)估在持續(xù)上漲,這就證明我的方法有效,到現(xiàn)在為止,一切都很順利。那么我還需要做些什么呢?我聽了老手們的話,不讓年輕人莽撞亂竄,下決心小心謹(jǐn)慎地玩。誰都知道,要這樣做,唯一的辦法是獲利落袋,然后在回調(diào)時買回你的股票。我就這么做了,確切點說,我盡量這么做著。我經(jīng)常在獲利落袋之后,等待從來沒有出現(xiàn)的回調(diào)。我謹(jǐn)慎地懷揣著只有4個點的利潤,可拋掉的股票還會繼續(xù)上漲10個點,我只能眼睜睜地看著。大家都說錢能裝到口袋就算有錢,是的,你是有點錢,可是在多頭市場中只賺了4個點就收手,你也不會富有。
本來能賺2萬,而我只賺了2000,這是力求穩(wěn)妥造成的。當(dāng)我發(fā)現(xiàn)自己其實只賺到了本來該賺的那些錢的一小部分時,我也明白了一些其他道理:根據(jù)經(jīng)驗的多少,傻瓜也分不同的等級。
新手一無所知,每一個人,包括他自己,都知道這一點。但是下一級或是下下一級的人認(rèn)為他知道很多,而且讓別人覺得他確實是這樣。他是有經(jīng)驗的傻瓜,他做過研究,不是研究市場本身,而是研究更傻的人所說的一些市場評論。第二級傻瓜知道如何避免完全新手所犯的某些錯誤,避免虧損。就是這種半桶水,而不是百分之百的學(xué)徒,才是證券經(jīng)紀(jì)商真正全年無憂的衣食父母。平均起來,這種人可以熬大約三年半,相比之下,通常第一次攻擊華爾街的人只能熬3周到30周不等。那種半桶水的人,經(jīng)常引述著名的交易格言以及各種游戲規(guī)則,他們對能言善辯的老手們所說的所有禁忌事項都一清二楚——只是不知道最重要的一條禁忌,就是不要當(dāng)傻瓜。
半桶水的這種人認(rèn)為自己已經(jīng)懂事了,他喜歡在下跌時買進。他等待股價下跌,他根據(jù)股價從頭部跌下多少錢來判定是否撿到便宜。在牛市,純粹的傻瓜完全不知道規(guī)則和前例,會盲目地買進,因為他有盲目的希望。他賺到最多的錢,一直到一次正常的調(diào)整把他所有的利潤都拿走為止。但是謹(jǐn)慎的二級傻瓜——就像我自以為是地玩這個游戲時一樣——所做的事情是根據(jù)別人的智慧操作。我知道我必須改變自己在對賭行交易的方法,也認(rèn)為我正在解決自己的問題,用的是備受交易老手們推崇、具有極高價值的方法。
大多數(shù)人都一樣,你很難找到幾個人能夠誠實地說華爾街沒有欠他們錢。富勒頓公司里也常有這樣一群傻瓜,各種級別的都有。不過,有個老手顯得很是鶴立雞群。首先,他年齡比較大,其次,他沒有好為人師的特點,也不賣弄賺了多少錢,他最擅長的是探聽別人嘴里互傳的各種內(nèi)幕消息,而對市場本身的內(nèi)幕不太熱衷——也就是說,他從來不問說話的人聽到什么或知道什么。要有人對他說了內(nèi)幕消息,他會很感激,而且那些內(nèi)幕消息如果確實起到了作用,他會更加感激,如果不準(zhǔn)確,他也沒什么怨言,所以別人不會知道他是不是真的受這些消息影響了。據(jù)說這人有很多錢,玩得也很大,只不過交易頻率不是很高,至少別人所知的是這樣。他叫帕特里奇,因為胸肌很發(fā)達(dá),總把下巴托在胸前在各個屋子來回亂竄,所以人們偷偷給他起個“火雞”的外號。
這些客戶全都樂于在別人催促下,被迫做一些事情,好把失敗歸咎到別人身上,他們經(jīng)常去向帕特里奇請教,對他說有內(nèi)幕消息的人建議他們買哪只股票,在出手之前希望能請帕特里奇指教一二。不過他們所說的內(nèi)幕,無論是讓他們拋掉的還是買進的,在帕特里奇那里得到的建議都是一樣的。
顧客們在說完困惑后總會問:“您覺得我該怎么做更好?”
老火雞腦袋一歪,滿臉慈父般的笑容,盯著提問的人,富含深情地說:“你知道,這是牛市。”
我就常聽到他這么說:“嗯,你知道的,是牛市?!本秃孟袼o你一個無價的護身符,用100萬美元的保險單包起來一般,我確實聽不明白他的意思到底是什么。
有一天,一個叫艾爾默·哈伍德的人匆忙跑進來,填了一張單子交給辦事的人后就去找帕特里奇。帕特里奇這時候正在聽一個叫約翰·范寧的人在倒苦水:有次他聽到凱恩填了張交易單給經(jīng)紀(jì)人,也就跟著做了100股,賣掉后只賺了3個點,但是當(dāng)他賣出后三天,這只股票就上漲了24個點。這個故事約翰對帕特里奇至少說過四次,可老火雞總是微笑著點點頭,就像剛聽到一樣。
艾爾默直接打斷了約翰,也沒致歉,就走過去對老火雞說:“帕特里奇先生,我剛賣了克萊曼汽車公司的股票,有知情人說市場應(yīng)該會回調(diào),到時候我再低價買回來,一定能賺的。你最好也一起玩吧,如果你還抱著這只股票的話,不會賠的?!?/p>
艾爾默疑惑地看著老火雞,像其他提供內(nèi)幕消息的那些人一樣,消息未得到證實,就認(rèn)為他們擁有接受他們內(nèi)幕消息的人的身心。
老火雞也是一副感激樣兒:“是啊,哈伍德先生,我仍然抱著這只股票,當(dāng)然抱著?!笨磥硭浅8兄x艾爾默心里還想著他這個老家伙。
艾爾默說:“喏,這是你賺錢的機會,下一輪的時候再買進?!彼駝倓偺胬匣痣u填寫了存款單一樣??床坏嚼匣痣u臉上有什么感激神色,艾爾默繼續(xù)說:“我剛才把我手里的都賣了。”從他的聲音和樣子來判斷,你就是保守估計,也會認(rèn)為他賣了100股。
但是帕特里奇很遺憾地?fù)u著頭說:“不,不行,我不會賣的?!?/p>
艾爾默大喊:“什么?”
“我不能賣。”帕特里奇很苦惱地說。
“我這不給你提供內(nèi)幕消息讓你賣嗎?”
“是啊,艾爾默先生,特別感激你,確實是,可是……”
“慢著,你聽我說完!難道這個股票不是十天漲了7個點嗎?”
“是這樣,非常感謝,老弟,但我是不會賣的?!?/p>
艾爾默很不理解:“你真不賣?”他一臉疑惑。人們在提供內(nèi)幕消息給別人時就是這個樣子。
“不,我不賣。”
艾爾默踏前了一步問:“為什么不賣?。俊?/p>
“不為什么,現(xiàn)在是牛市?!币徽f這句話,就好像他的解釋已經(jīng)很到位了。
艾爾默很失望,生氣地說:“好吧,我也知道是牛市,可是你還是賣了吧,在跌落的時候再買回來,不是就可以降低成本了嗎?”
老火雞很無奈地說:“小伙子啊,我現(xiàn)在要是賣掉,就會失去我的頭寸,我以后怎么辦?”
艾爾默揮了一下手,搖著頭走向我,很關(guān)心地悄悄問:“你聽清了沒?”他用演戲般的語氣低聲問我,“我問你?!?/p>
我沒說話,他又接著說:“我對他講了克萊曼公司的內(nèi)幕消息,他買了500股,賺了7個點,我現(xiàn)在讓他賣掉,等股價跌的時候再買回來。他怎么回答我的?他說賣掉就沒活可干了,你明白這話嗎?”
老火雞插話道:“請你原諒,哈伍德先生,我沒說沒活可干了,我說的是就會失去我的頭寸。等你到我這把年紀(jì)的時候,千錘百煉過了,就會知道失去頭寸是任何人都承受不起的,連洛克菲勒都承受不起。我期盼這只股票回調(diào),好讓你能用低價買回來你的那些股票??晌抑荒芨鶕?jù)自己多年的經(jīng)驗進行交易,我為這些經(jīng)驗付過昂貴的學(xué)費,不想再重蹈覆轍。我仍然像已經(jīng)賺錢了一樣地感激你。你知道的,這是牛市?!崩匣痣u說完走了,留下艾爾默一臉納悶。
那時候我對帕特里奇的話沒多大感覺。想到以前股市好的時候,經(jīng)常沒賺到該賺的錢,我猛然意識到帕特里奇那些話中的道理,越想越覺得他很聰明。他年輕時也做過傻事,必定明白自己的人性弱點。過去的慘痛讓他學(xué)會了不再受誘惑,因為要付出很大的代價,對于我也是一樣。
帕特里奇最后總要對其他人說:“嗯,你懂的,這是牛市?!逼鋵嵥难酝庵馐?,要賺錢就得看整個股市行情,而不是單個股價波動。也就是說,不能光看交易所的報價器上的數(shù)字,要研究整個股市行情和走向。明白了這個,我就覺得自己又長進了不少。
在華爾街闖蕩這么多年,輸輸贏贏了幾百萬美元,我想告訴你一點:我能賺那么多錢,跟我的想法沒什么關(guān)系,重要的是我能夠堅持不動,懂了嗎?是我堅持不動啊。能判斷出股價走勢不算什么本事。在牛市,有很多早早就做多的投資人,在熊市也有很多早早就做空的投資人。我認(rèn)識很多看盤的厲害角色,他們也能瞅準(zhǔn)最佳時間買賣股票,他們的經(jīng)驗跟我也差不離??墒悄?,他們卻沒賺到多少錢。能夠同時判斷準(zhǔn)確又堅持不動的人并不多,我覺得這才是最難學(xué)習(xí)的地方。股民們只有徹底理解了這點,才會賺大錢。搞懂了怎么樣去交易而賺幾百萬,比不懂交易時賺幾百美元還容易。
因為能把股市走向看得很明白的股民在看到股市行情跟他們預(yù)估的一樣時,總會表現(xiàn)得焦慮不安,就是這樣。華爾街的很多投資人都不是傻蛋,但是最終還是賠了,道理就在這里。不是股市讓他們損兵折將,而恰恰是他們戰(zhàn)勝不了自己。他們的聰明不能保證他們會堅持不動。老火雞恰恰在這方面做得很好,他是那樣說的,也是那樣做的,他有堅持的勇氣,也有堅忍的耐力。
不理會股市大的波動,光想著搶進搶出,是我的病灶所在。沒人能夠抓住所有的波動,在牛市,你要做的就是買進和攥在手里,堅持到你相信漲勢快停的時候。想做到這一點,必須要搞清楚整體形勢,并非只抓內(nèi)幕消息和影響個股的特殊因素。你要忘掉你所有的股票,永遠(yuǎn)忘掉!一直到股市逆轉(zhuǎn),新一輪的走勢就要到了為止。你必須要讓你的頭腦和觀察判斷能力發(fā)揮作用,不然我告訴你的這些就像低買高賣一樣無意義。誰都該學(xué)會不要試圖最后一刻賣出或第一時間買進,這兩個時段太貴了,它們讓很多股友的千百萬美元葬送在了股海里,這些錢多到能建造一條橫跨美洲的公路了。
我分析了一下在富勒頓公司的炒股情況,發(fā)現(xiàn)我一開始的那些交易大都賺了錢,這樣自然使我決定一開始就玩大的。這讓我對自己的判斷很有信心,但是有很多次,我都被別人的建議甚至自己的不耐煩破壞掉了。一個人如果沒有自信,就不會在這一行干出多少成績來。我總結(jié)的經(jīng)驗是,全面研究行情,堅守住頭寸。我耐心安分地堅持著,遇到了挫折也不慌亂,我明白這些都會過去。我一度放空過10萬股,看出大反彈即將來臨,這種反彈是不可避免的,甚至是健全的,在我的賬面利潤上會造成100萬美元的差別,我預(yù)估到了這個結(jié)果,但是我還是紋絲不動,讓一半的賬面利潤溜走,我根本沒想著去把賣空的股票買回來,等到股價漲高了再拋掉。因為假如我那樣做的話,可能會失掉頭寸,從而失去確定賺大錢的機會。只有大的波動才能夠賺大錢。
若說我學(xué)會這些花的時間太長,那是因為這些都來自我從失敗中總結(jié)的經(jīng)驗。從失敗到了解失敗,這期間需要花很多時間;從了解失敗到正確判定失敗,這中間花費的時間更多。但同時,我干得還不錯。我年齡還小,一切都還來得及。我賺錢的方式仍然有一部分還是靠研究那些股票記錄單,因為這個方法適合當(dāng)時的股市狀況。我也不像更早一些時候那樣經(jīng)常賠錢,也不會賠得那么生氣?;叵胍幌拢谝荒甓鄷r間里,我破產(chǎn)了三次,所以沒什么值得我驕傲的。我告訴你,破產(chǎn)是很好的教育機構(gòu)。
我的資金并沒有增加得很快,因為我一直盡量享受生活。其實我并沒有有意識地阻止自己去享受我這個歲數(shù)和級別的人該有的生活,我有自己的轎車,能夠從股市賺錢的時候,讓自己的生活太拮據(jù)沒什么意思。只有在周日和公休日,股市才不會開盤,情形本來就是如此。當(dāng)我知道自己哪里出錯的時候,我就會給自己新設(shè)置一條不該觸碰的紅線。享受我不斷增長的財富的最好辦法,就是不要削減生活開支。我當(dāng)然有一些有趣的經(jīng)驗,其中一些并非這么有趣,但是如果我全部說出來一定說不完。事實上,那些在炒股中很重要的教訓(xùn)也很容易讓我記憶猶新,正是這些教訓(xùn)督促著我對市場和自己更加了解。
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