菲德?tīng)?bull;卡斯特羅(Fidel Castro)希望自己出生在一個(gè)比古巴更大的國(guó)家。他知道古巴經(jīng)濟(jì)無(wú)論怎樣發(fā)展都無(wú)足輕重,但他清楚如何讓古巴和自己引起注意。當(dāng)今時(shí)代,沒(méi)有一個(gè)人在塑造一個(gè)國(guó)家方面趕得上菲德?tīng)枴.?dāng)他說(shuō)“這一次革命是當(dāng)真的”時(shí),他真的是那個(gè)意思。這一切都發(fā)生在1959年。如今,古巴失去了最出名的孩子。
The difference is that Fidel, his ideas and methods stayed around for more than 50 years. Unlike Nelson Mandela, he never stepped down to give others a chance. And in the past decade his brother Raúl has been left to try to make Fidel’s system work in the 21st century.
差別在于,菲德?tīng)?、他的思想和道路延續(xù)了50多年。和納爾遜•曼德拉(Nelson Mandela)不同,他從未卸下權(quán)力把機(jī)會(huì)留給別人。過(guò)去10年,他的弟弟勞爾(Raúl)受命嘗試讓菲德?tīng)柫粝碌闹贫仍?1世紀(jì)繼續(xù)運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)。
For Cubans, Fidel was how they learnt the alphabet — F for Fidel, Y for Yanqui. He was how they thought, how they saw the outside world and how they earned their living. His government made them dependent because they all worked for it. It was Fidel or nothing. Socialism or Death. He never suggested he would ask the people what they wanted. He told them and they believed. Now it is not clear what the ‘or’ is for Cuba.
對(duì)古巴人來(lái)說(shuō),菲德?tīng)柺撬麄冏钕葘W(xué)會(huì)的字母——F代表菲德?tīng)?,Y代表美國(guó)佬(Yanqui)。他們?nèi)绾嗡伎?、如何觀察外部世界、如何謀生,都要通過(guò)菲德?tīng)枴K恼屓藗冏兊靡蕾?lài),因?yàn)樗麄內(nèi)紴檎ぷ鳌R磽碜o(hù)菲德?tīng)?,要么一無(wú)所有。要么選擇社會(huì)主義,要么選擇死亡。他從未提出他會(huì)問(wèn)古巴人民想要什么。他說(shuō)什么,他們就得相信什么?,F(xiàn)在不清楚古巴的“另一種選擇”是什么。
Fidel proved a small country could stand up to its big neighbour and make a difference in spreading an ideology that offered hope to the poor. The leaders attending his funeral will show that many still remember those days. His imagination was matched by his ruthlessness. Just as he improved life for the poor and illiterate, he ruined the lives of many other Cubans who had something to lose. Their choice was to accept repression or leave — many did. And Fidel’s major problem was that he never engineered a national economy prosperous enough to provide for his big plans. He used other countries’ money to fund his revolution, first the Soviet Union, and latterly Venezuela. He used the US embargo to garner international sympathy. So the question now about the ‘or’ is where does the money come from?
卡斯特羅證明了,一個(gè)小國(guó)可以對(duì)抗強(qiáng)大的鄰國(guó),可以在傳播給予窮人希望的意識(shí)形態(tài)方面有所作為。出席卡斯特羅葬禮的各國(guó)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人將證明,許多人仍然記得那些日子。他的冷酷無(wú)情和想象力一樣突出。在改善了窮人、文盲的生活水平之際,他也毀掉了其他許多有點(diǎn)資產(chǎn)的古巴人的生活。他們只能選擇接受壓制或是離去——許多人選擇離開(kāi)。卡斯特羅的主要問(wèn)題在于,他從未使古巴國(guó)民經(jīng)濟(jì)繁榮到足以實(shí)現(xiàn)他的宏大計(jì)劃。他利用別國(guó)的資金為自己的革命買(mǎi)單——首先是蘇聯(lián),近年是委內(nèi)瑞拉。他利用美國(guó)對(duì)古巴的貿(mào)易禁運(yùn)博取國(guó)際同情。因此,現(xiàn)在關(guān)于古巴的“另一種選擇”的問(wèn)題是,未來(lái)錢(qián)從哪里來(lái)?
Cuba in 2016 offers little of the freshness and ambition that filled the air in 1959. Though Cuba’s education and healthcare are still widely admired in the developing world, Fidel has bequeathed a country that is not projecting a clear vision. Its main earners of foreign currency are tourism, medical services and remittances from families mainly in the US. That is not enough to fund socialist largesse. And the only alternative seems to be a dismantling of some revolutionary controls, promoting foreign investment and the private sector to allow ordinary Cubans to get rich and build their lives. Fidel always knew this would lessen their dependence on the government.
2016年的古巴早已沒(méi)有了1959年那種彌漫全國(guó)的生機(jī)和雄心。雖然古巴的教育和醫(yī)療仍受到發(fā)展中世界的廣泛敬佩,但卡斯特羅留下的是一個(gè)不能投射清晰愿景的國(guó)家。古巴獲取外匯主要依靠旅游、醫(yī)療服務(wù)以及主要旅居美國(guó)的古巴人給家人的匯款。這不足以支撐慷慨的社會(huì)主義事業(yè)。唯一的出路似乎在于解除部分革命控制措施,推動(dòng)外商投資和私營(yíng)部門(mén),允許普通古巴人致富,打造自己的美好人生。菲德?tīng)柈?dāng)然知道,這樣將減少他們對(duì)政府的依賴(lài)。
Raúl has said there will be no shock therapy in Cuba. He knows that Fidel’s revolution would perhaps crumble under a scramble to make up for the years of economic decline. He has vowed to step down in 2018 but that may now be rethought. Without Fidel, Raúl could decide that the government’s shackles are holding Cuba back, and accepting new ideas would no longer be an embarrassment. But the one-party system with thousands of bureaucrats trained to stifle change is not fitted to promote a smooth transition to a new economic rule book.
勞爾已表示,古巴不會(huì)采取休克療法。他知道,急于在短時(shí)間內(nèi)扭轉(zhuǎn)多年來(lái)的經(jīng)濟(jì)衰敗,可能讓菲德?tīng)柕母锩鼩в谝坏?。他曾誓言?018年卸任,但現(xiàn)在或許會(huì)重新考慮這一決定。菲德?tīng)柸ナ篮?,勞爾可能得出結(jié)論:政府的枷鎖正在阻礙古巴進(jìn)步,接受新思想將不再令人尷尬。但是,擁有成千上萬(wàn)依靠扼殺變革為生的官僚的一黨制,不適合推進(jìn)向著新經(jīng)濟(jì)模式的平穩(wěn)過(guò)渡。
Cuba is not yet Castroless. Beyond Raúl there are sons, sons-in-law and a daughter, Mariela. For years to come there will always be the Fidel effect. Somehow Cuba has to emerge from all that and find new ideas that will not betray the revolution’s legacy. Fidel detested the Chinese model and Raúl has not accepted that it is good for Cuba and for ordinary Cubans to get rich. But without Fidel, Cuba will be less likely to be given a free pass with other countries. Cuba will lose its allure and will have to talk the international language of business.
古巴尚未實(shí)現(xiàn)去卡斯特羅化。除了勞爾,還有他的兒子、女婿以及女兒瑪麗拉(Mariela)。菲德?tīng)柕挠绊憣⒃谖磥?lái)延續(xù)很多年。古巴必須設(shè)法擺脫這一切,同時(shí)找到不會(huì)背叛革命遺產(chǎn)的新思想。菲德?tīng)柌幌矚g中國(guó)模式,勞爾也并未認(rèn)可中國(guó)模式對(duì)古巴及普通古巴人致富有好處。但菲德?tīng)柸ナ篮?,其他?guó)家將不太可能再讓古巴搭便車(chē)。古巴將失去吸引力,不得不學(xué)會(huì)用國(guó)際商業(yè)語(yǔ)言商談。
Fidel has left a country trying to disentangle itself from its over-dependence on Venezuela and use the new US relationship to help revive its economy. He opposed both of these options. Now Donald Trump, despite the widespread popularity of the Obama measures, seems keen to undo the Obama effect and side with Fidel. Just when Cuba has a chance to move ahead a familiar scenario looms. Fidel would have been amused and perhaps rather pleased.
菲德?tīng)柫粝碌墓虐?,正嘗試擺脫對(duì)委內(nèi)瑞拉的過(guò)度依賴(lài),并利用與美國(guó)新建立的關(guān)系幫助重振國(guó)內(nèi)經(jīng)濟(jì)。對(duì)于這兩個(gè)選項(xiàng),菲德?tīng)柹岸急硎痉磳?duì)。如今,雖然奧巴馬政府的措施受到了廣泛歡迎,但唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)似乎熱衷于逆轉(zhuǎn)奧巴馬的政策,站在菲德?tīng)栆贿叀>驮诠虐陀袡C(jī)會(huì)向前邁進(jìn)之際,熟悉的一幕正在浮出水面。菲德?tīng)枌?duì)此應(yīng)會(huì)感到好笑,或許還會(huì)相當(dāng)高興。
The writer is a former UK ambassador to Cuba and is a senior lecturer at Boston University’s Frederick S Pardee School of Global Studies
本文作者是英國(guó)前駐古巴大使、波士頓大學(xué)弗雷德里克•帕迪全球問(wèn)題研究院(Boston University’s Frederick S Pardee School of Global Studies)高級(jí)講師