“普京模式”會(huì)盛行嗎？

Vladimir Putin will look back on 2016 as an annus mirabilis. Isolated and straining under the impact of western sanctions 12 months ago, the president has managed to transform Russia’s international fortunes thanks to an extraordinary run of good luck. Brexit, the migration crisis and the current surge of right-wing populism have enfeebled Europe and weakened its resolve to maintain a tough collective stance towards Russia. Putin’s military intervention in support of Bashar al-Assad has put his ally within sight of victory in the Syrian civil war. Best of all, Donald Trump is about to enter the White House on a promise to repair US-Russia relations on the Kremlin’s terms. On every front, the tide of events appears to be flowing strongly in Putin’s direction.

弗拉基米爾•普京(Vladimir Putin)將會(huì)把2016年視為奇跡迭出的一年。得益于一輪不尋常的好運(yùn)氣，在12個(gè)月前尚由于西方制裁的影響而陷于孤立、面臨巨大壓力的俄羅斯總統(tǒng)，成功實(shí)現(xiàn)了該國國際運(yùn)勢的轉(zhuǎn)向。英國退歐、難民危機(jī)以及右翼民粹主義異軍突起，令歐洲孱弱無力，削弱了歐洲維持共同的對俄強(qiáng)硬立場的決心。普京為支持巴沙爾•阿薩德(Bashar al-Assad)而進(jìn)行的軍事干預(yù)，讓他的這位盟友在敘利亞內(nèi)戰(zhàn)中勝利在望。最棒的是，唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)將帶著修復(fù)美俄關(guān)系的承諾入主白宮，還將按照克里姆林宮的條件這么做。在各個(gè)方面，時(shí)勢的潮流似乎都朝著有利于普京的一邊滾滾涌來。

The new mood was apparent last month when he met Rodrigo Duterte, his counterpart in the Philippines, at the Asia-Pacific summit. Duterte used the occasion to complain about western “bullying” and declared his desire to be part of a “new order” led by Russia and China. When you consider that the remarks come from the leader of a country that has been a mainstay of the US alliance system in Asia since the early years of the Cold War, it is clear that something significant is afoot. Putin is managing to extend Russia’s diplomatic reach beyond its traditional constituency among the world’s radical and anti-American regimes.

上月，當(dāng)普京在亞太峰會(huì)上會(huì)晤菲律賓總統(tǒng)羅德里戈•杜特爾特(Rodrigo Duterte)時(shí)，這種新的情緒袒露無遺。杜特爾特利用那個(gè)場合抱怨西方“恃強(qiáng)凌弱”，并公開宣布他希望加入由俄中主導(dǎo)的“新秩序”。考慮到菲律賓自冷戰(zhàn)之初以來一直是美國在亞洲的盟國體系的支柱，該國領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人作出這樣的表態(tài)顯然說明某種具有重大意義的事情正在發(fā)生。普京正在成功地延伸俄羅斯的外交影響力，超越由世界上激進(jìn)和反美政權(quán)組成的傳統(tǒng)群體。

The source of this appeal is not difficult to understand. Putin has pioneered a style of government that corresponds with the needs and interests of the power elites in many emerging countries. He has shown how politics and the media can be manipulated to guarantee governments a permanent monopoly of power while maintaining a veneer of electoral competition and normal constitutional practice. More importantly, he has provided a justification for rejecting established democratic principles by insisting that every country has the right determine its own path. Putin calls this mix of post-modern authoritarianism and assertive nationalism “sovereign democracy”.

這種吸引力的來源不難理解。普京開創(chuàng)的政府風(fēng)格符合許多新興國家權(quán)力精英的需求和利益。他展示了如何操縱政治和媒體，以便在確保政府對權(quán)力永久壟斷的同時(shí)，維持一層選舉競爭和正常憲政活動(dòng)的表象。更重要的是，他通過堅(jiān)稱每個(gè)國家都有權(quán)決定自己的道路，為拒絕成熟的民主原則提供了理由。普京把這種后現(xiàn)代威權(quán)主義和強(qiáng)硬民族主義的混合體稱為“主權(quán)民主”。

The attraction of this model is all the stronger for having little to do with ideology. It is based principally on naked self-interest. For ruling politicians, senior state officials and the circles of private wealth and influence that surround them, sovereign democracy offers power without responsibility. Opposition can be suppressed and marginalised to the point where there is no effective scrutiny, the rule of law ceases to apply and those with the right connections can act with impunity. Rising authoritarianism brings rising corruption as the opportunities provided by access to public resources are exploited for personal gain. Indeed, it is a feature of such regimes that those close to them often find ways to monetise the results of political repression by seizing the assets of their opponents.

與意識(shí)形態(tài)沒什么關(guān)系令這種模式更具吸引力。它主要是建立在赤裸裸的自我利益基礎(chǔ)上。對于居統(tǒng)治地位的政客、高級(jí)政府官員、私人財(cái)富圈子以及他們周圍的影響力來說，主權(quán)民主提供了無需承擔(dān)責(zé)任的權(quán)力。反對派可以被壓制和排擠，以至于不存在有效的審查，法治不再適用，背景深厚的人能夠?yàn)樗麨槎皇軕土P。隨著與公共資源“近水樓臺(tái)”的機(jī)遇被用來牟取私利，愈演愈烈的威權(quán)主義帶來越來越猖獗的腐敗。的確，這種政權(quán)的特色之一，就是與體制關(guān)系密切的人們往往會(huì)想到辦法，通過攫取對手資產(chǎn)來獲利于政治壓迫的結(jié)果。

Thailand is good example of what happens when a country follows this path. Although a longstanding US ally, it has been openly pursuing closer ties with Moscow since the army seized power in a coup two years ago. Trade and diplomatic relations have been upgraded and Russia is supplying weapons currently denied to the junta by the US. Preparations for a return to civilian rule under a new constitution next year resemble a Thai version of sovereign democracy. Elections to the lower chamber of parliament will be restored but the army will retain de facto control through a wholly appointed senate and ‘commissions’ that will oversee the work of government departments. Military tribunals regularly target opposition supporters using draconian lèse-majesté laws that leave those deemed to have insulted the monarchy liable to sentences of up to 15 years in prison.

一個(gè)國家走上這條道路后會(huì)發(fā)生什么?泰國就是一個(gè)很好的例子。雖然泰國是美國的長期盟友，但是自兩年前軍隊(duì)通過政變掌權(quán)后，該國一直在公開尋求加強(qiáng)與莫斯科方面的關(guān)系。雙方的貿(mào)易和外交往來已經(jīng)升級(jí)，俄羅斯正在向泰國提供美國現(xiàn)在拒絕向軍政府提供的武器裝備。明年，泰國將按照新憲法向文官統(tǒng)治回歸。而這一回歸的籌備過程很像是泰國版的主權(quán)民主。議會(huì)下院的選舉將會(huì)恢復(fù)，但軍隊(duì)將通過完全由任命產(chǎn)生的上議院和監(jiān)督政府部門運(yùn)作的“委員會(huì)”，保留實(shí)質(zhì)上的控制權(quán)。軍方的特別法庭時(shí)不時(shí)用嚴(yán)厲的《欺君法》(lèse-majesté law)對付反對派支持者，該法律會(huì)讓那些被視為對君主不敬的人面對長達(dá)15年的監(jiān)禁。

This suits the interests of the Bangkok elite, whose members enthusiastically backed the 2014 coup. Those belonging to this privileged caste have put themselves above the law, using violence against their opponents and evading justice when they commit criminal acts. Others have used their status to seize property. When Nopporn Suppipat, one of Thailand’s leading entrepreneurs and an advocate of democracy, was driven out of the country after being charged with lèse-majesté, a whistle-blower alleged that a member of the elite took control of his company and misappropriated some of its funds. Since the coup, Thailand has recorded the worst economic performance in Southeast Asia and the business environment continues to deteriorate.

這種做法符合曼谷精英階層的利益，這些人在2014年熱情支持政變。這一特權(quán)階層的人們把自身置于法律之上，他們用暴力對待反對者，并在實(shí)施犯罪行為后逃避法律制裁。其他人利用自己的地位攫取財(cái)產(chǎn)。泰國領(lǐng)先企業(yè)家之一、民主的倡導(dǎo)者諾蓬•素比巴(Nopporn Suppipat)在受到《欺君法》指控后被逐出泰國后，據(jù)一名告密者指控，泰國精英階層的某個(gè)成員接管了他的企業(yè)，并盜用了該公司部分資金。自政變以來，泰國已錄得東南亞最糟糕經(jīng)濟(jì)表現(xiàn)，商業(yè)環(huán)境持續(xù)惡化。

Turkey is another formerly solid US ally that seems to have embraced the Putin model, despite a brief rift with Russia over Syria and the shooting down of a Russian warplane. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s authoritarian lurch, which had already produced a sustained attack on media freedom, has become even more pronounced following the attempted coup in July. The government has arrested 37,000 people, including MPs and journalists, sacked or suspended around 100,000 state employees and closed down 170 media enterprises. The assets of people accused of supporting the coup have been seized by presidential decree. A total of 252 enterprises worth an estimated $13bn have been taken over, transforming the state into Turkey’s largest conglomerate almost overnight. Wait to see how these businesses are disposed of and who benefits. One businessman close to the ruling AKP party has already applied to buy Koza Ipek Holding, Turkey’s largest gold mining company, which was seized as part of the crackdown.

土耳其是另一個(gè)似乎已熱情擁抱普京模式的美國前堅(jiān)定盟友——盡管該國曾因敘利亞問題和擊落俄羅斯一架戰(zhàn)機(jī)而與俄羅斯短暫翻臉。本已持續(xù)壓制媒體自由的土耳其總統(tǒng)雷杰普•塔伊普•埃爾多安(Recep Tayyip Erdogan)，在今年7月的未遂政變之后變本加厲，進(jìn)一步走上威權(quán)道路。土耳其政府已逮捕包括議員和記者在內(nèi)的3.7萬人，解雇或停職約10萬名政府雇員，關(guān)閉了170家傳媒企業(yè)。被控支持政變的人士的資產(chǎn)依照總統(tǒng)令被沒收?？傆?jì)252家企業(yè)被接管，其價(jià)值估計(jì)為130億美元。此舉幾乎在一夜之間令政府變成土耳其規(guī)模最大的企業(yè)集團(tuán)。至于這些企業(yè)將如何處置，誰將從中受益，世人就等著看吧。與執(zhí)政的正義與發(fā)展黨(AKP)關(guān)系密切的一位商人已申請買下土耳其最大金礦企業(yè)Koza Ipek Holding，該公司正是在此次鎮(zhèn)壓中被沒收的。

Much the same can be said of Egypt since its first democratically elected government was overthrown in a military coup in 2013. Censorship, rigged elections and controls on civil society have gone hand in hand with efforts to build closer relations with Moscow. The Egyptian foreign minister has angrily rejected what he calls western “tutelage” over human rights. As in Turkey and Thailand, the assets of those considered hostile to the regime have been targeted for seizure. By early 2016, the Egyptian authorities had confiscated the assets of more than 1,300 people. Although the measures were supposed to target members of the Muslim Brotherhood, the list included liberals, socialists and human rights defenders. In September, a court upheld an earlier ruling to freeze the assets of five human rights activists and three organisations, including, the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies.

自埃及首個(gè)民選政府在2013年被軍事政變推翻以來，可以說埃及的情況也十分類似。與審查制度、被操縱的選舉以及管控公民社會(huì)相伴出現(xiàn)的，是與莫斯科方面打造更密切關(guān)系的努力。埃及外長憤怒地拒絕了他所稱的西方人權(quán)“說教”。與土耳其和泰國類似，那些被認(rèn)為對政權(quán)懷有敵意的人們的資產(chǎn)，已了沒收的目標(biāo)。截至2016年初，埃及當(dāng)局已沒收逾1300人的資產(chǎn)。盡管這些舉措理應(yīng)是以穆斯林兄弟會(huì)(Muslim Brotherhood)的成員為目標(biāo)，但被沒收財(cái)產(chǎn)的人員名單也包括自由派人士、社會(huì)主義者和人權(quán)衛(wèi)士。今年9月，一家法院維持了早先的判決，凍結(jié)五名人權(quán)活動(dòng)人士和開羅人權(quán)研究所(Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies)等三個(gè)組織的資產(chǎn)。

For Putin, imitation may be the sincerest form of flattery but sooner or later the limitations of his model will become apparent, for Russia and for those who seek emulate it. Russia is stuck in a rut of stagnation and dependency on oil exports because it cannot attract the investment and technology needed to modernise its economy. That weakness will continue to limit its progress even after the oil price recovers. It’s not that business can’t flourish under authoritarian regimes – countries like China and Singapore prove that it can. The problem arises when authoritarianism provides cover for a predatory elite to overturn property rights and loot the national wealth with impunity. Business needs the kind of predictable investment climate that Putinism is unable to provide. Without the benefit of natural resources to cushion the impact, Putin’s new admirers may find that out sooner than most.

對普京來說，效仿或許是最真誠的奉承方式，但他這種模式的局限性遲早會(huì)暴露出來，無論對俄羅斯還是對那些試圖模仿俄羅斯的國家來說都是如此。由于無法吸引經(jīng)濟(jì)現(xiàn)代化所需的投資和技術(shù)，俄羅斯陷入了經(jīng)濟(jì)停滯和依賴石油出口的糟糕狀態(tài)。即使油價(jià)復(fù)蘇，這種弱點(diǎn)也依然會(huì)局限俄羅斯的發(fā)展。這并不是說威權(quán)體制下商業(yè)不會(huì)繁榮——中國和新加坡等國證明那是可能的。出問題的情況是，威權(quán)體制為一個(gè)掠奪性的精英階層提供掩護(hù)，讓他們可以無視產(chǎn)權(quán)制度、攫取國家財(cái)富而不受處罰。企業(yè)需要的是那種可預(yù)測的投資環(huán)境，而普京主義提供不了這種環(huán)境。若沒有自然資源方面的優(yōu)勢來緩沖這種影響，普京的新崇拜者也許會(huì)比多數(shù)人更快發(fā)現(xiàn)這一點(diǎn)。

David Clark is chair of the Russia Foundation.

本文作者戴維•克拉克(David Clark)是俄羅斯基金會(huì)(Russia Foundation)主席。