穆斯林融入西方社會有多難

No reasonable person would claim that theintegration of Muslims into western societies iswithout problems. As the team of social scientistsbehind Why Muslim Integration Fails in Christian-Heritage Societies reports, 43 per cent of peopleinterviewed in a poll for the newspaper Le Figaro in2012 considered that the country’s Muslimcommunity constituted a “menace to the identityof France”, while in a German survey conducted in2013 51 per cent thought Islam posed a threat totheir way of life. That year, of a thousand 18- to 24-year-olds in Britain interviewed by Radio 1, 27 per cent said they did not trust Muslims(compared with 16 per cent concerning Hindus or Sikhs, 15 per cent for Jews, 13 per cent forBuddhists and 12 per cent for Christians).

合理的人不會斷言穆斯林在融入西方社會方面沒有問題。撰寫《為什么傳統(tǒng)基督教社會的穆斯林融合會失敗》(Why Muslim Integration Fails in Christian-Heritage Societies)一書的社會學家團隊寫道：在法國《費加羅報》(Le Figaro) 2012年所做的一項調(diào)查中，43%的受訪者認為該國的穆斯林群體構(gòu)成“對法國國家認同的威脅”，而2013年德國的一項調(diào)查顯示，51%的受訪者認為伊斯蘭教對他們的生活方式構(gòu)成威脅。同年，在BBC廣播一臺(BBC Radio 1)對1000名英國18至24歲的青年進行的調(diào)查中，27%的受訪者稱自己不信任穆斯林(相比之下，不信任印度教徒或錫克教徒的比例為16%，不信任猶太人的比例為15%，不信任佛教徒的比例為13%，不信任基督徒的比例為12%)。

Disentangling the complex of attitudes behind such findings is the project of Claire Adida,David Laitin and Marie-Anne Valfort in this book — no easy task in the case of the French,among whom most of the research was undertaken. France’s culture of laïcité, a type of radicalpublic secularism with roots in the absolutism of the ancien régime and the anticlericalcampaigns that followed the revolution, means that the investigation of faith and religiouspractice poses methodological challenges far greater than would be met in a more explicitlypluralist society such as the US or even Britain, where ethnic backgrounds and public religiosityare better understood and celebrated. As the authors explain, French republican ideology hasno interest in “knowing the ethnic past of any of its citizens”, an attitude that applies — afortiori — to their religious beliefs or backgrounds.

解讀此類調(diào)查結(jié)果背后的復(fù)雜態(tài)度是克萊爾•阿迪達(Claire Adida)、大衛(wèi)•萊廷(David Laitin)及瑪麗-安妮•瓦爾福特(Marie-Anne Valfort)在本書中的課題，但要在這方面分析法國人(本書的多數(shù)研究是在法國人中進行的)絕非易事。相對于美國、甚至英國等更加明顯多元化的社會(這里的種族背景和公共宗教得到更好的理解和贊美)，法國的政教分離文化(一種激進的公共世俗主義，源自舊制度的絕對主義及大革命后的反教權(quán)運動)意味著，對法國信仰和宗教活動的調(diào)查會遭遇更大的方法論方面的挑戰(zhàn)。正如三位作者解釋的，法國的共和主義意識形態(tài)對“了解任何公民的種族過往”毫無興趣，這種態(tài)度更加適用于他們的宗教信仰或背景。

The idea of “equality through invisibility” is partly a consequence of the shame at thetreatment of Jews under the Vichy régime that “republicans do not let their nation forget”. A1978 law that remains in force, with some amendments, prohibits the collection or processingof data that reveal a person’s racial or ethnic origins, while class actions, common in the US,are not recognised under the French law of torts. Halde (La Haute Autorité de lutte contre lesdiscriminations et pour l’égalité), the state-funded anti-discrimination body that existed from2005 to 2011, was unable to establish general trends regarding discrimination based onethnicity due to lack of data, leaving its lawyers to deal with individual cases without supplyingmaterial pointing to general trends.

“通過無形實現(xiàn)平等”的理念在一定程度上是對維希政權(quán)治下猶太人的遭遇感到恥辱的后果，“共和主義者不讓他們的國家忘記”這一點。盡管做了部分修正，但1978年頒布的一項法律仍然有效，該法禁止收集或處理任何表明個人種族或民族本源的數(shù)據(jù)，而法國的侵權(quán)法不承認在美國很常見的集體訴訟。由于缺乏數(shù)據(jù)，國家資助的打擊歧視維護平等高級監(jiān)督機構(gòu)Halde(2005年至2011年間存在)無法掌握族裔歧視的總體趨勢，使該機構(gòu)的律師只能處理個案，而不能提供指明總體趨勢的材料。

These caveats, dealt with somewhat oddly in an extended appendix, help to explain thescrupulous way the researchers approached their task of isolating attitudes concerningreligion, while discounting issues such as racial stereotyping or prejudices arising from France’scolonial history. For example, the researchers measured differences of response between twogroups of Senegalese participants, one Christian and one Muslim, vis-à-vis a sample of “rooted” (or third-generation) French people chosen randomly in the affluent 19th arrondissement ofParis. The two Senegalese groups, belonging to communities that became established inFrance in the 1970s, were alike in every respect save their religion, enabling researchers totease out attitudes that could be attributed to religion exclusive of race or ethnicity.

這些注意事項(有些奇怪地放在長篇附錄中說明)有助于解釋幾位研究者所采用的細致方式——一方面隔離有關(guān)宗教的各種態(tài)度，另一方面考慮法國殖民歷史帶來的種族成見或偏見。例如，研究者衡量了兩個人群的回復(fù)差異：一個人群由兩組塞內(nèi)加爾移民(一組基督徒和一組穆斯林)組成，另一個人群是在巴黎富裕的19區(qū)隨機選取的“土生土長”(或第三代)法國人。兩組塞內(nèi)加爾移民都屬于上世紀70年代在法國落戶的社區(qū)，除了宗教信仰不同，他們在其他方面都很相像，這使研究人員能夠甄別哪些態(tài)度可以歸因于宗教，而非受到種族或民族的影響。

The results, while hardly surprising, are disturbing, to say the least. Their research, say theauthors, “confirms that Muslims qua Muslims are discriminated against” in France. In responsesto job applications, for example, one comparison revealed a 13-percentage-point difference incallback rates, suggesting that despite official laïcité, French employers “rely on signals aboutthe religious heritage of applicants and systematically discriminate against those — in thiscase Muslims — who are from a different religious heritage from that of the majority”.

結(jié)果至少可以說令人不安(盡管算不上出人意料)。三位作者表示，他們的研究“證實了穆斯林在法國受到歧視”。以對求職申請的回應(yīng)為例，一項對比數(shù)據(jù)顯示回復(fù)率方面有13個百分點的差距，這似乎表明，盡管官方實行政教分離，但法國雇主還是“依靠有關(guān)求職者的宗教傳統(tǒng)的信號，并對那些在宗教傳統(tǒng)方面有別于主流的的人(在這項研究中是穆斯林)進行系統(tǒng)化的歧視”。

Part of the prejudice, the authors argue, may be “rational” to the degree that the HRpersonnel perceive a threat to their company’s productivity or esprit de corps in Muslimreligious practices. But “non-rational” Islamophobia, based on “grotesquely exaggerated”feelings about Muslims, is just as important, indicating that “even if French recruitersconsidered Muslim candidates as strictly identical to Christian candidates in terms ofproductive characteristic, they would still discriminate against Muslims, out of puredistaste”. As a consequence, Muslim families in France are “significantly less endowed withincome than matched Christians”. The status quo is thus a “discriminatory equilibrium”,defined by the authors as “a vicious circle in which both [“rooted” French] and Muslims inFrance are acting negatively toward one another in ways that are mutually reinforcing”.

三位作者主張，這種偏見在某種程度上——人事部門認為穆斯林的宗教習俗會對公司的生產(chǎn)率或團隊精神構(gòu)成威脅——是“理性的”。但是，基于對穆斯林“嚴重夸大”的看法的“非理性”伊斯蘭恐懼癥也同樣重要，這說明“即便法國招聘人員認為穆斯林求職者在能力方面與基督徒求職者完全相同，他們?nèi)詴兇獬鲇诜锤卸缫暷滤沽?rdquo;。其后果之一是，法國的穆斯林家庭“收入顯著低于同等條件的基督徒家庭”。所以，目前現(xiàn)狀是一種“歧視性均衡”，三位作者將之定義為“一種惡性循環(huán)，即“土生土長的”法國人與穆斯林以相互強化的負面態(tài)度對待彼此”。

While some of this book’s description of workplace issues affecting Muslims are clearlyrelevant beyond France’s borders, the title seriously oversells its thesis. The religious culturesand church-state relations of countries in Europe and North America vary too greatly to becaptured by the all-embracing category of “Christian-heritage societies”. For example, whilethe authors make the case that Arab-Americans who are Muslims may face more prejudicethan their Christian counterparts, they make no reference to Muslims of mainly South Asianorigin who — along with Sikhs and Hindus — enjoy among the highest household incomes ofany immigrant group in the US. Canada, a “Christian-heritage society” where the Muslim SouthAsian minority expelled from Uganda in the 1970s has been highly successful, does not evenrate a mention in this book.

雖然本書描寫的一些影響穆斯林的工作場所問題在法國之外也明顯具有參考意義，但書名過分吹噓了其命題。歐洲、北美各國之間的宗教文化及政教關(guān)系差異太大，以至于“傳統(tǒng)基督教社會”這種寬泛歸類無法捕捉到其中的不同。例如，三位作者舉例稱，穆斯林阿拉伯裔美國人遭遇的偏見可能比基督徒阿拉伯裔美國人更多，但他們并未提及南亞裔穆斯林，后者(同錫克教徒、印度教徒一道)是美國移民中家庭收入最高的群體之一。在“傳統(tǒng)基督教社會”加拿大，上世紀70年代被烏干達驅(qū)逐出境的南亞裔穆斯林少數(shù)族裔取得了巨大成功，但本書只字未提加拿大。

Nevertheless, the authors propose remedies that make obvious sense in France itself, such asimproving educational prospects for Muslims through affirmative action programmes. Whethersuch initiatives can be considered a realistic prospect in the wake of last year’s jihadi atrocitiesis another question; right now, the political climate is far from auspicious.

然而，三位作者提出的補救措施對法國本身顯然很有道理，例如通過平權(quán)計劃提升穆斯林受教育的前景。這些倡議在去年的恐怖暴行發(fā)生后是否還有可能實現(xiàn)是另一個問題;當前的政治氣氛對此顯然不利。