全球化與技術(shù)進(jìn)步摧毀老工人階級(jí)

Globalisation is failing in advanced westerncountries, where a process once hailed for deliveringuniversal benefit now faces a political backlash.Why? The establishment view, in Europe at least, isthat states have neglected to forge the economicreforms necessary to make us more competitiveglobally.

在西方發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家，全球化正在失敗。這一曾被譽(yù)為可以帶來(lái)普遍好處的進(jìn)程，如今正遭遇政治上的反彈。為什么會(huì)這樣?至少在歐洲，主流的看法是，這是因?yàn)槲鞣礁鲊?guó)疏于推進(jìn)提升我們?nèi)蚋?jìng)爭(zhēng)力所需要的各項(xiàng)經(jīng)濟(jì)改革。

I would like to offer an alternative view. The failure of globalisation in the west is in fact downto democracies failure to cope with the economic shocks that inevitably result fromglobalisation — such as the stagnation of real average incomes for two decades. Another shockhas been the global financial crisis — a consequence of globalisation — and its permanentimpact on long-term economic growth.

我想提供另外一種看法。實(shí)際上，全球化在西方失敗的原因，在于各個(gè)民主國(guó)家未能應(yīng)對(duì)好全球化必然會(huì)帶來(lái)的各種經(jīng)濟(jì)上的沖擊——例如，實(shí)際平均收入20年來(lái)的停滯。另一沖擊是全球金融危機(jī)(全球化的后果)及其對(duì)長(zhǎng)期經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的永久性影響。

In large parts of Europe, the combination of globalisation and technical advance destroyedthe old working class and is now challenging the skilled jobs of the lower middle class. Sovoters’ insurrection is neither shocking nor irrational. Why should French voters cheer labourmarket reforms if it could result in the loss of their jobs, with no hope of a new one?

在歐洲大部分地區(qū)，全球化與技術(shù)進(jìn)步的結(jié)合已經(jīng)摧毀了老的工人階級(jí)，如今又對(duì)中產(chǎn)階級(jí)下層的技術(shù)性工作構(gòu)成了挑戰(zhàn)。因此，選民的造反并不令人震驚，也并不荒謬。如果勞動(dòng)力市場(chǎng)改革可能導(dǎo)致法國(guó)選民失去工作(又無(wú)望獲得新工作)，他們?yōu)楹芜€要為此歡呼呢?

Some reforms have worked, but ask yourself why. Germany’s acclaimed labour marketreforms[OF THE 2000S?] in 2003 succeeded in the short term because they raised the country’scost competitiveness through lower wages relative to other advanced countries. The reformsproduced a state of near full employment only because no other country did the same. If othershad followed, there would have been no net gain.

有些改革收到了成效，但請(qǐng)捫心自問(wèn)一下是為什么。德國(guó)2003年受到贊譽(yù)的勞動(dòng)力市場(chǎng)改革在短期內(nèi)取得了成功，因?yàn)楦母锿ㄟ^(guò)低于其他發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家的工資水平提升了德國(guó)的成本競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力。德國(guó)的改革之所以實(shí)現(xiàn)了近乎充分就業(yè)，僅僅是因?yàn)楫?dāng)時(shí)沒(méi)有其他國(guó)家這樣做。如果當(dāng)時(shí)有其他國(guó)家效仿這種做法的話，德國(guó)改革的結(jié)果將不會(huì)是利大于弊。

The reforms had a big downside. They reduced relative prices in Germany and pushed up netexports in turn generating massive savings outflows, the deep cause of the imbalances that ledto the eurozone crisis. Reforms such as these can hardly be the recipe for how advancednations should address the problem of globalisation.

德國(guó)的改革還有一大弊端。改革降低了德國(guó)產(chǎn)品的相對(duì)價(jià)格，推高了凈出口，從而引發(fā)大規(guī)模儲(chǔ)蓄外流(儲(chǔ)蓄外流是導(dǎo)致了歐元區(qū)危機(jī)的各種失衡的深層原因)。此類改革很難成為發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家解決全球化問(wèn)題的良方。

Nor is their any factual evidence that countries that have reformed are performing better orare more able to cope with a populist insurrection. The US and the UK have more liberalmarket structures than most of continental Europe. Yet the UK may be about to exit the EU;in the US the Republicans may be about to nominate an extreme populist as their presidentialcandidate. Finland leads all the competitiveness rankings but the economy is a non-recovering basket case — and it has a strong populist party. The economic impact of reforms isusually subtler than its advocates admit. And there is no straight connection between reformsand support for established political parties.

也沒(méi)有任何事實(shí)證據(jù)表明，已進(jìn)行改革的國(guó)家表現(xiàn)得更好或者更有能力應(yīng)對(duì)民粹主義的崛起。美英兩國(guó)的市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)比多數(shù)歐洲大陸國(guó)家都更自由。然而，英國(guó)可能將要退出歐盟(EU)，而美國(guó)共和黨或許將要提名一個(gè)極端民粹主義者為本黨總統(tǒng)候選人。芬蘭在所有競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力排名中都處于領(lǐng)先位置，但其經(jīng)濟(jì)已陷入復(fù)蘇無(wú)望的窘境——該國(guó)還有一個(gè)強(qiáng)大的民粹主義政黨。改革在經(jīng)濟(jì)上的效果通常比支持改革者愿意承認(rèn)的還要不明顯。而且，改革與民眾對(duì)老牌政黨的支持之間沒(méi)有直接聯(lián)系。

My diagnosis is that globalisation has overwhelmed western societies politically and technically.There is no way we can, or should, hide from it. But we have to manage the change. This meansaccepting that the optimal moment for the next trade agreement, or market liberalisation, maynot be right now.

我的判斷是，全球化已經(jīng)在政治和技術(shù)上席卷了西方社會(huì)。我們既不可能、也不應(yīng)該逃避全球化。但我們必須設(shè)法控制住這種變化。這意味著我們要承認(rèn)，現(xiàn)在或許并非締結(jié)下一個(gè)貿(mào)易協(xié)定(或者說(shuō)市場(chǎng)自由化協(xié)議)的最佳時(shí)刻。

Over the weekend there were large protests in Germany against the Transatlantic Trade andInvestment Partnership , an agreement between America and the EU. One of its morecontroversial aspects, is that it would reduce the legal sovereignty of its participants.

不久前，德國(guó)爆發(fā)了反對(duì)美歐之間《跨大西洋貿(mào)易與投資伙伴關(guān)系協(xié)定》(TTIP)的大規(guī)模抗議活動(dòng)。該協(xié)定較具爭(zhēng)議的一點(diǎn)是，它將削弱參與國(guó)的法律自主權(quán)。

In the past two years, there has been a dramatic reversal of public opinion in Germany aboutthe benefits of free global trade in general, and TTIP in particular. In 2014, almost 90 percent of Germans were in favour of free trade, according to a YouGov poll. That has fallen to 56per cent. The number of people who reject TTIP outright has risen from 25 per cent to 33 percent over the same period of time. These numbers do not suggest that the EU should becomeprotectionist. But the fast shift in those figures should serve as a warning signal to politiciansto tread carefully.

過(guò)去兩年，針對(duì)全球自由貿(mào)易(尤其是TTIP)的好處，德國(guó)公眾輿論出現(xiàn)了戲劇性的逆轉(zhuǎn)。YouGov做的一項(xiàng)民調(diào)顯示，2014年，將近90%的德國(guó)民眾支持自由貿(mào)易。如今，這一比例已降至56%。同一時(shí)期，徹底反對(duì)TTIP的人所占比例已從25%上升至33%。這些數(shù)字并不表明，歐盟應(yīng)當(dāng)實(shí)行貿(mào)易保護(hù)主義。但這些數(shù)字的快速變化應(yīng)成為提醒政客們謹(jǐn)慎行事的警示信號(hào)。

I do not understand why Sigmar Gabriel, leader of Germany’s Social Democrats and economicsminister, is such an ardent advocate of TTIP. If he is serious about stopping the erosion ofsupport for his party, he should be more open-minded about the political costs of thisagreement. It is hardly surprising that a large number of supporters of the anti-immigrantAlternative für Deutschland party are former SPD voters.

我不明白德國(guó)社民黨(SPD)主席、經(jīng)濟(jì)部長(zhǎng)西格馬爾•加布里爾(Sigmar Gabriel)為何如此熱情地支持TTIP。如果他真的希望阻止本黨支持率下滑，他應(yīng)該更愿意考慮TTIP協(xié)定帶來(lái)的政治代價(jià)。難怪反移民的德國(guó)新選擇黨(Alternative für Deutschland)的大量支持者原先都曾是社民黨的支持者。

A no to TTIP would at least remove one factor behind the surge in anti-EU or anti-globalisation attitudes. The marginal economic benefits of the agreement are outweighed bythe political consequences of its adoption

對(duì)TTIP說(shuō)不，至少可以去除導(dǎo)致反歐盟或反全球化情緒高漲的一個(gè)因素。該協(xié)定微弱的經(jīng)濟(jì)上的好處，不足以抵消締結(jié)協(xié)定帶來(lái)的政治后果。

What advocates of global market liberalisation should recognise is that both globalisation andEuropean integration have produced losers. Both were supposed to produce a situation inwhich nobody should be worse off, while some might be better off.

全球市場(chǎng)自由化的支持者們應(yīng)該認(rèn)識(shí)到的是，全球化與歐洲一體化都造就了輸家。按照設(shè)想，全球化與歐洲一體化都本應(yīng)創(chuàng)造一種沒(méi)有人變窮、而有些人或許會(huì)變得更富的局面。

That did not happen. We are close to the point where globalisation and membership of theeurozone in particular have damaged not only certain groups in society but entire nations. Ifthe policymakers do not react to this, the voters surely will.

這種局面并未出現(xiàn)。我們已經(jīng)在接近這樣一個(gè)時(shí)刻：全球化——特別是歐元區(qū)成員身份——不僅對(duì)社會(huì)中的某些群體，還對(duì)整個(gè)國(guó)家造成了損害。如果政策制定者對(duì)此無(wú)所作為的話，選民們肯定會(huì)采取行動(dòng)。