特朗普抓住了貿易失衡的關鍵

Both US and European policymakers have misdiagnosed what ails the global economy. It is not a short-run, cyclical problem curable with textbook Keynesian stimuli (and exotics like quantitative easing). Rather, it is a long-term structural disequilibrium caused by chronic trade imbalances — the result, in turn, of manipulated currencies, mercantilist practices and poorly negotiated trade deals. Enter, stage centre, Donald Trump.

美國和歐洲的政策制定者都錯判了全球經濟的困境。它并非一個通過教科書般的凱恩斯式經濟刺激(以及量化寬松等不尋常舉措)就能解決的短期周期性問題，而是一個因長期貿易失衡導致的長期結構性失衡，而長期貿易失衡是匯率操縱、重商主義慣例和談判糟糕的貿易協(xié)議的結果。唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)站到了舞臺中央。

Before the era of globalisation, which began in earnest in the 1980s, US managers improved efficiency by substituting capital for labour in domestic factories. As globalisation has taken hold, executives have offshored entire factories as a more effective means of maximising profits.

在全球化(真正開始是在上世紀80年代)時代開啟之前，美國企業(yè)管理者通過在國內工廠用資本取代勞動力提高了效率。隨著全球化的推進，作為一種更有效的利潤最大化方式，企業(yè)高管們將整個工廠外包到海外。

This offshoring trend is mirrored in statistics that reveal a rapid narrowing of the US manufacturing sector. In the 1970s, manufacturing employed 20 per cent of the workforce. Today, that number has dropped to a mere 8 per cent — with more than 5m manufacturing jobs lost since 2000 alone.

這種外包趨勢在數據統(tǒng)計中得到了體現。數據顯示，美國制造業(yè)快速收縮。上世紀70年代，美國制造業(yè)聘用了全國20%的勞動者。如今，這一數字降至區(qū)區(qū)8%，僅自2000年以來制造業(yè)就損失了500萬個以上的就業(yè)崗位。

To those who would blame this decline primarily on automation, one need only point to Germany and Japan, which retain almost 20 per cent and 17 per cent of their labour force in manufacturing, respectively. These countries are worldwide leaders in robotics.

對于那些將這種收縮主要歸咎于自動化的人，我們只需讓他們看看德國和日本，這兩國分別將近20%和17%的勞動者留在了制造業(yè)，而這兩個國家是機器人領域的全球領袖。

As the US manufacturing base has narrowed, the rate of productivity has fallen. During the 1970s growth in US unit labour costs was 6.8 per cent a year but it dropped to 3.6 per cent in the 1980s, 1.6 per cent in the 1990s and to 1.2 per cent so far this century.

隨著美國制造業(yè)基礎的收縮，生產率一直下滑。上世紀70年代，美國的單位勞動成本每年增長6.8%，80年代降至3.6%，90年代降至1.6%，本世紀至今為1.2%。

This productivity decline is likewise mirrored in the rise of outward foreign direct investment. During the 1970s, total US FDI was a mere $109.2bn. With globalisation, FDI grew 59.2 per cent to $174.8bn in the 1980s, $1.1tn in the 1990s and $3tn in the first decade of this century. Today, FDI is sprinting ahead at a $4tn rate.

生產率下滑反映在了對外直接投資(FDI)增長上。上世紀70年代，美國的對外直接投資只有1092億美元。上世紀80年代，在全球化的推動下，美國的對外直接投資增長59.2%，至1748億美元，上世紀90年代和本世紀頭10年分別達到1.1萬億美元和3萬億美元。如今，對外直接投資正以4萬億美元的速度向前挺進。

Of course, not all outbound FDI has been due to offshoring. The decline in US manufacturing employment and the fall in US productivity — and associated slower US growth rates and stagnant wages — have, however, been greatly accelerated and amplified by a series of bad trade deals and chronic currency misalignments that prevent trade from coming back into balance.

當然，并非所有對外直接投資都是因為外包。一系列的糟糕貿易協(xié)議和長期匯率失調阻止貿易恢復平衡，加快并放大了美國制造業(yè)就業(yè)的減少以及美國生產率的下滑——還有相關的美國經濟增速放緩和薪資停滯。

This is hardly the conventional wisdom — whence the continued tilting at Keynesian windmills in both the US and Europe. New studies have, however, cast increasing doubt on the standard “gains from trade” arguments that have both justified and propelled globalisation. A joint study by Justin Pierce of the Federal Reserve and Yale School of Management’s Peter Schott attributes most of the 18 per cent decline in US manufacturing jobs from 2001 to 2007 to President Bill Clinton’s decision to grant China permanent normal trade relations status as part of Beijing’s accession to theWorld Trade Organisation in 2001. Other studies have concluded the “China trade shock” to be more of a zero-sum game, with American workers and the US economy on the minus side.

這很難說是傳統(tǒng)觀點。歐美的傳統(tǒng)觀點都繼續(xù)傾向凱恩斯式的刺激。然而，新研究越來越讓人質疑標準的“貿易利得”說法，這種說法既合理化又推動了全球化。美聯儲(Fed)的賈斯汀•皮爾斯(Justin Pierce)和耶魯大學管理學院(Yale School of Management)的彼得•斯科特(Peter Schott)聯合開展的研究，將2001年至2007年美國制造業(yè)就業(yè)減少18%的多數原因歸為美國前總統(tǒng)比爾•克林頓(Bill Clinton)的一項決定：作為中國在2001年加入世界貿易組織(WTO)的一部分，美國賦予了中國永久性正常貿易關系待遇。其他一些研究總結稱，“中國貿易沖擊”更多的是一種零和游戲，美國勞動者和美國經濟處于不利地位。

The broader lesson here is that while exports do indeed create jobs, it is net exports that ultimately matter. When countries like the US and continents like Europe run massive and chronic trade deficits and countries like China do not allow freely floating currency movements to balance trade, bad things will eventually happen in the forms of accelerated offshoring, slower growth, falling productivity and stagnant wages.

更廣泛的教訓是盡管出口確實會創(chuàng)造就業(yè)，但最終重要的是凈出口。如果美國等國和歐洲等大陸長期處于大規(guī)模貿易赤字，而中國等國不允許匯率自由浮動以平衡貿易，那么糟糕的結果最終會以外包加快、增長放緩、生產率下滑以及薪資停滯的形式出現。

This is the economic and political landscape that the US now finds itself in, and it is no wonder that Mr Trump is so popular. Like Ronald Reagan in the 1980s, the Republican nominee understands America’s economic woes can only be addressed through comprehensive structural reforms, particularly in the areas of trade and tax policy.

這是美國現在所處的經濟和政治情況，特朗普如此受歡迎也就不足為奇了。與上世紀80年代的羅納德•里根(Ronald Reagan)一樣，這位共和黨總統(tǒng)提名人選明白，美國的經濟困境只能通過全面結構性改革化解，尤其是在貿易和稅收政策領域。

For example, America’s 35 per cent corporate tax rate means businesses carry down only 65 per cent of pre-tax earnings to their post-tax net. Mr Trump’s proposed 15 per cent rate promises a 30 per cent higher earnings return than at present, and would thereby greatly improve the attractiveness of domestic investment.

例如，美國35%的企業(yè)稅稅率意味著，企業(yè)只能將65%的稅前利潤計入稅后利潤。特朗普提議的15%的企業(yè)稅稅率意味著企業(yè)利潤將比目前提高30%，這將大大提高國內投資的吸引力。

Mr Trump’s broader mission is to reinvigorate the US economy and restore faith in the global free trade order by ridding it of cheating and structural misalignments. Europe may want to take a page out of his playbook. This is particularly true when it comes to China. Here, Europe has lagged behind the US in imposing countervailing tariffs against dumping, and is now paying a very heavy price.

特朗普的更廣泛任務是通過消除欺詐和結構性失調，恢復美國經濟的活力并重塑人們對全球自由貿易秩序的信任。歐洲可能會希望向他取經。在涉及到中國的問題上尤其如此。在征收反傾銷關稅方面，歐洲一直落后于美國，而且現在正付出非常沉重的代價。

The writer, a private international equity investor, is a senior policy adviser to the Trump campaign. Peter Navarro, business professor at the University of California, Irvine, contributed to this article

本文作者是一位私人國際股權投資者，是特朗普競選團隊的高級政策顧問。加州大學歐文分校(University of California, Irvine)商學教授彼得•納瓦羅(Peter Navarro)對此文亦有貢獻。