特朗普時(shí)代美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)角色將發(fā)生何種轉(zhuǎn)變？

Three and a half decades ago, a Yale student called Adam Glick tried to persuade his fellow students to embrace the freshly elected president Ronald Reagan.

35年前，耶魯大學(xué)(Yale)學(xué)生亞當(dāng)•格利克(Adam Glick)試圖說(shuō)服同學(xué)接受剛剛當(dāng)選為總統(tǒng)的羅納德•里根(Ronald Reagan)。

It was hard. Back in 1980 most of the establishment — and gilded students — sneered at the idea of a former B-list Hollywood actor in the Oval Office. Almost nobody guessed that Reagan might end up a Republican icon.

那很難。在上世紀(jì)80年代，大多數(shù)建制派——以及家境較好的學(xué)生——嘲笑前好萊塢二流演員入主橢圓形辦公室的想法。幾乎沒(méi)人能猜到里根最終會(huì)成為共和黨的偶像人物。

Mr Glick is now a successful asset manager running a multibillion-dollar private fund. He feels a sense of déjà vu. The election of Donald Trump has left elites shocked and outraged — and Mr Glick is once again trying to tell friends (and fellow financiers) this is a mistake.

格利克如今是一位成功的資產(chǎn)管理者，經(jīng)營(yíng)著一只數(shù)十億美元的私募基金。他現(xiàn)在有似曾相識(shí)的感覺(jué)。唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)當(dāng)選總統(tǒng)讓精英們感到震驚而憤怒——而格利克再一次嘗試著告訴朋友(以及金融界同行)這是不對(duì)的。

Instead, he insists that what investors need to recognise is that the “wisdom of crowds” has given the next president a powerful mandate for change. As a result, in 30 years’ time, historians might see 2016, like 1980, as a big economic policy inflection point.

相反，他堅(jiān)稱(chēng)，投資者需要認(rèn)識(shí)到，“群眾的智慧”賦予了下一任總統(tǒng)推行改變的強(qiáng)大授權(quán)。其結(jié)果是，再過(guò)30年，歷史學(xué)家或許會(huì)把2016年視為重大的經(jīng)濟(jì)政策拐點(diǎn)，就像1980年一樣。

Can this optimistic interpretation of events be correct? In some ways, it seems hard to believe. On the campaign trail Mr Trump seemed very different from Reagan. He has no experience of public office. He projects anger rather than optimism about an American “morning”. He does not seem inclined to collaborate with enemies. The Republican elite (mostly) shunned him. His personality is at best undisciplined and at worst abusive.

對(duì)當(dāng)前事件的這種樂(lè)觀解讀有可能正確嗎?在某些方面，這似乎很難相信。在競(jìng)選之路上，特朗普似乎與里根截然不同。他沒(méi)有擔(dān)任公職的經(jīng)歷。他渲染憤怒，而不是關(guān)于美國(guó)“清晨”的樂(lè)觀態(tài)度。他不像是有意與敵人合作。共和黨精英們(多數(shù))看不起他。他的個(gè)性往好了說(shuō)是散漫、無(wú)紀(jì)律，往壞了說(shuō)是辱罵他人。

But one striking detail about this week’s events is that his victory speech was calm and conciliatory. That might — just possibly — suggest Mr Trump the president will not be quite the same as Mr Trump the angry candidate. A second important detail is that the president-elect, like Reagan before him, appears to recognise that he needs to rely on advisers to compensate for his lack of policy knowledge. And if you look at the advisory team around him, it is possible to see a policy platform emerging that might indeed turn out to be bold.

但是本周的事件中有一個(gè)令人矚目的細(xì)節(jié)：他的勝選演講平靜而且和緩。這或許(只是有可能)表明，身為總統(tǒng)的特朗普不會(huì)和身為憤怒候選人的特朗普完全一樣。第二個(gè)重要的細(xì)節(jié)是，就像之前的里根一樣，這位當(dāng)選總統(tǒng)似乎意識(shí)到，他需要依靠顧問(wèn)來(lái)彌補(bǔ)他在政策知識(shí)上的不足。而如果你看看他身邊的顧問(wèn)團(tuán)隊(duì)，就有可能看到，一個(gè)真正大膽的政策平臺(tái)或許會(huì)浮出水面。

Nobody should describe this platform as Reaganism 2.0 or a free-market revolution. Mr Trump is deeply protectionist, reluctant to reform benefits such as Social Security and favours an extensive infrastructure programme. If implemented in full, which seems unlikely, these bold pledges would add $10tn to the public debt in the next decade. This (rightly) appals conservatives.

沒(méi)人會(huì)把這個(gè)平臺(tái)形容為里根主義2.0或自由市場(chǎng)革命。特朗普是堅(jiān)定的保護(hù)主義者，不愿改革社會(huì)保障之類(lèi)的福利，并且支持大手筆的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施項(xiàng)目。如果完全實(shí)施(似乎不太可能)，這些大膽承諾將在未來(lái)十年增加10萬(wàn)億美元的公共債務(wù)。這嚇壞了保守派，而且理應(yīng)如此。

But Mr Trump’s advisers are also batting around ideas that Reagan’s heirs can applaud. They want to cut personal taxes and slash corporate tax rates from 35 per cent to 15 per cent, a move that Anthony Scaramucci, one adviser to Mr Trump, thinks could boost corporate earnings by 30 per cent. Advisers such as Tom Barrack, of Colony Capital, want to fund infrastructure with public-private partnerships. They want to use tax incentives to repatriate companies’ overseas cash piles. They also plan widespread deregulation, ranging from a “bonfire of energy rules” to a reversal of new fiduciary rules for asset managers and a repeal of Obamacare, the US’s healthcare act.

但是特朗普的顧問(wèn)們也在介紹一些里根的信徒可能稱(chēng)贊的構(gòu)想。他們想要削減個(gè)人稅收，并把企業(yè)所得稅稅率從35%下調(diào)至15%，特朗普的顧問(wèn)之一安東尼•斯卡拉穆齊(Anthony Scaramucci)認(rèn)為，此舉有望提高企業(yè)盈利30%。柯羅尼資本(Colony Capital)的湯姆•巴拉克(Tom Barrack)等顧問(wèn)希望以公私合作伙伴關(guān)系的方式為基建提供資金。他們想利用稅收激勵(lì)來(lái)鼓勵(lì)企業(yè)把囤積在海外的現(xiàn)金匯回美國(guó)。他們還計(jì)劃大范圍放寬管制，從“能源規(guī)則篝火”、到逆轉(zhuǎn)針對(duì)資產(chǎn)管理公司的新的受托規(guī)則、以及廢止“奧巴馬醫(yī)改”(Obamacare)，美國(guó)的醫(yī)保法律。

This may look like a bewildering mix, knitted together only with populism. But what links them is a deep conviction that governments cannot reignite growth by relying on monetary policy alone. Rather, fiscal and supply-side reforms are needed. Indeed, Mr Trump’s advisers are so scornful of ultra-loose monetary policy that some are keen to push for the early exit of Janet Yellen as US Federal Reserve chair.

這可能看起來(lái)像是令人困惑的組合——僅靠民粹主義編織到一起。但是貫穿這些主張的是一種深層次的信念，即政府無(wú)法僅僅依靠貨幣政策來(lái)重新激發(fā)增長(zhǎng)。相反，政府需要進(jìn)行財(cái)政和供應(yīng)面改革。的確，特朗普的顧問(wèn)如此仇視超寬松的貨幣政策，以至于一些人熱衷于讓珍妮特•耶倫(Janet Yellen)提早卸任美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)(Fed)主席。

As a result, when historians look back at this week, they may well conclude that the most important inflection point is not about deregulation or tax cuts. Instead, the pendulum swing that matters is about the role of central banks. After all, the howl of voter anger shows with cruel clarity that it was a mistake to expect central bank policy experiments alone to deliver sustainable economic growth. That might now pave the way for a long-awaited recognition that central banks cannot — and should not — be the “only game in town”, to quote Mohamed El-Erian, chief economic adviser at Allianz. Fiscal and supply-side policy is now centre stage.

因此，當(dāng)未來(lái)歷史學(xué)家回顧本周時(shí)，他們很可能得出結(jié)論認(rèn)為，最重要的轉(zhuǎn)折點(diǎn)并不關(guān)乎放寬管制或減稅。相反，重要的改變關(guān)乎央行的角色。畢竟，選民的憤怒發(fā)泄無(wú)情地表明，指望單純依靠央行政策實(shí)驗(yàn)來(lái)實(shí)現(xiàn)可持續(xù)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的想法是錯(cuò)誤的。現(xiàn)在，這可能為央行不能、也不應(yīng)該成為“城里的唯一游戲”——借用安聯(lián)(Allianz)首席經(jīng)濟(jì)顧問(wèn)穆罕默德•埃爾-埃利安(Mohamed El-Erian)的話——這一期待已久的共識(shí)鋪平道路。財(cái)政政策和供應(yīng)面政策如今站上了舞臺(tái)中央。

If so, this is an inflection point that is long overdue. There is no guarantee that Mr Trump can corral his team to deliver; his personality may in the end prove too erratic, and his advisers’ economic policy dreams may ultimately collapse into foreign or domestic strife.

若果真如此，這將是一個(gè)早就該來(lái)的轉(zhuǎn)折點(diǎn)。沒(méi)人能保證特朗普有能力指揮其團(tuán)隊(duì)實(shí)現(xiàn)這些：他的個(gè)性最終可能被證明過(guò)于任性，其顧問(wèn)的經(jīng)濟(jì)政策夢(mèng)想或許最終淪為國(guó)際或國(guó)內(nèi)沖突。

But the fact that the stock market has rallied shows that Mr Glick is not the only asset manager who thinks he can smell a domestic economic policy turning point. Yes, he may turn out to be misguided. But investors discount this possibility at their peril, particularly after a year in which the elites have been wrongfooted so many times.

但是股市上漲的事實(shí)表明，格利克并不是唯一認(rèn)為自己嗅到國(guó)內(nèi)經(jīng)濟(jì)政策拐點(diǎn)的資產(chǎn)經(jīng)理。沒(méi)錯(cuò)，他可能最終被證明受到了誤導(dǎo)。但是投資者忽視這種可能性或許也會(huì)嘗到苦果，特別是在精英們多次被打亂陣腳的今年。