歐洲是中國(guó)眼里的“新非洲”
中國(guó)人以耐心著稱。在中國(guó)歷史書中，一個(gè)世紀(jì)只占一頁篇幅。我們歐洲人就急躁得多。首先，我們哀嘆歐洲制造業(yè)工作崗位被中國(guó)偷走了。接著，我們操心中國(guó)人在非洲大肆采購(gòu)原材料。如今我們正努力接受一個(gè)事實(shí)：中國(guó)正在收購(gòu)各種各樣的歐洲企業(yè)。
Europe should not complain. This is all part of globalisation and capitalism, the two pillars of our economic success in the past 100 years. Nevertheless, now that China might be seen as the champion of free trade and state-driven capitalism, we should pay close attention to what happens next, or what is already happening. And react accordingly.
歐洲不應(yīng)抱怨。這都是全球化和資本主義的組成部分，這兩者正是支撐我們?cè)谶^去100年取得經(jīng)濟(jì)成功的兩根支柱。然而，既然中國(guó)可被視為自由貿(mào)易和國(guó)家資本主義的捍衛(wèi)者，我們應(yīng)當(dāng)密切關(guān)注接下來會(huì)發(fā)生什么，或者說目前正在發(fā)生什么，并且相應(yīng)地做出反應(yīng)。
For decades, China has been folding Africa into its supply chain for raw materials – mainly oil and minerals. But it is currently mining Europe for its precious metals and gems: talent, intellectual property, market shares, technology, brands, established businesses and value chains.
幾十年來，中國(guó)一直在把非洲納入自己的供應(yīng)鏈，從非洲獲取原材料，主要是石油和礦物。如今，中國(guó)正在歐洲挖掘這里的“寶藏”：人才、知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)、市場(chǎng)份額、技術(shù)、品牌、成熟企業(yè)和價(jià)值鏈。
The gear shift is palpable. China is no longer just the world’s low-cost sweatshop. The shopping list in Europe includes high-tech, higher value added industries and services. A great number of investment bankers, lawyers, and due diligence professionals in London, Frankfurt and Paris are suddenly involved in projects with Chinese principals.
這種換擋是可以察覺的。中國(guó)不再只是世界的低成本血汗工廠。中國(guó)在歐洲的收購(gòu)清單覆蓋高科技、高附加值的產(chǎn)業(yè)和服務(wù)業(yè)。在倫敦、法蘭克福和巴黎，大量的投行家、律師和盡職調(diào)查專業(yè)人士突然投入到了中國(guó)委托人的項(xiàng)目中。
China is focused on Europe because the essentially protectionist Committee on Foreign Investment of the United States puts all Sino-US transactions under scrutiny and in effect places a “wall” in the path of Chinese investment. The change of control in the White House will not make investment in the US any easier.
中國(guó)注目歐洲，是因?yàn)楸举|(zhì)上持保護(hù)主義立場(chǎng)的美國(guó)外國(guó)投資委員會(huì)(Committee on Foreign Investment)對(duì)所有中美交易進(jìn)行審查，實(shí)際上等于在中國(guó)企業(yè)投資美國(guó)之路上豎起了一面“墻”。白宮換人不會(huì)使投資美國(guó)變得更容易。
This makes our continent lucrative for acquisitive Chinese funds. This week we can see it at Slush in Helsinki, one of the biggest start-up events in Europe, which has drawn many Chinese investors over the years. Two years ago I spent a day there with China’s vice-premier. Yet Europe appears to be taken by surprise by all this interest. It lacks US-style controls and tools for deliberation.
這讓歐洲大陸對(duì)中國(guó)收購(gòu)資金變得有吸引力。我們?cè)诮蘸諣栃粱鮿?chuàng)企業(yè)研討會(huì)(Slush)上就可看到這一點(diǎn)。作為歐洲規(guī)模最大的初創(chuàng)企業(yè)盛會(huì)之一，Slush這些年來吸引了很多中國(guó)投資者到會(huì)。兩年前，我曾陪同中國(guó)副總理出席了一天會(huì)議。不過，歐洲似乎對(duì)中國(guó)投資者的興趣感到意外。歐洲沒有美國(guó)那樣的控制措施和審議工具。
Europe is waking up to the new reality and its implications, as demonstrated by high-profile cases such as the attempted Chinese takeover of German chipmaker Aixtron. The economy ministry withdrew support after alleged reports that the US intelligence service had warned the government that the technology could be used for military purposes.
歐洲開始意識(shí)到這種新現(xiàn)實(shí)及其意義，一些備受矚目的交易就說明了這一點(diǎn)，比如中資有意收購(gòu)德國(guó)芯片企業(yè)愛思強(qiáng)(Aixtron)的交易。德國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)部收回了對(duì)該交易的支持，有報(bào)道稱，美國(guó)情報(bào)部門提醒了德國(guó)政府，相關(guān)技術(shù)可能被用于軍事目的。
Other takeovers pose fewer problems. For instance, Tencent, the Chinese investment holding company, this year bought a majority stake in Supercell. While the Finnish group’s flagship game, Clash of Clans, is a multiplayer test of strategic skill, the acquisition has little strategic importance in the real world.
其他收購(gòu)案帶來的問題要少一些。比如，中國(guó)的投資控股公司騰訊(Tencent)今年收購(gòu)了Supercell的多數(shù)股權(quán)。盡管這家芬蘭集團(tuán)的旗艦游戲《部落戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)》(Clash of Clans)是一款考驗(yàn)戰(zhàn)略能力的多人對(duì)戰(zhàn)游戲，這起收購(gòu)案在現(xiàn)實(shí)世界幾乎不具有重要戰(zhàn)略意義。
The big question is how Europe should react.
主要問題是歐洲如何應(yīng)對(duì)。
The first thing to do is to be aware that the aqcuisitions are taking place and that they are systematic. This is not necessarily a bad thing; Europe needs an injection of foreign capital. At the same time it is important to understand that many, but by no means all, of the transactions are state led and targeted at intellectual property and IT. These could have a strategic impact and should thus be dealt with carefully.
第一點(diǎn)是要明白，這些收購(gòu)正在確實(shí)發(fā)生，而且是成批的。這未必是壞事;歐洲需要外來資金的注入。同時(shí)，有必要搞清楚，很多交易——但絕不是全部——是政府主導(dǎo)的，意在獲取知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)和IT技術(shù)。這些交易可能產(chǎn)生戰(zhàn)略性的影響，因此應(yīng)當(dāng)謹(jǐn)慎地處理。
Second, Europe should not burn bridges by taking knee-jerk protectionist measures. Few predicted that the Chinese would emerge as advocates of free trade while the US turned inward. The best option would be a new deal between Europe and the US based on security, foreign policy and trade – but if the administration of Donald Trump decides to scrap the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership with Europe, we will have to look elsewhere. In terms of size and scale, China is the obvious direction in which to look.
第二點(diǎn)，歐洲不應(yīng)條件反射地采取保護(hù)主義措施、燒斷橋梁。很少人預(yù)料到，中國(guó)人會(huì)成為自由貿(mào)易的倡導(dǎo)者，而美國(guó)卻把目光轉(zhuǎn)向國(guó)內(nèi)。最佳選項(xiàng)是歐洲和美國(guó)在安全、外交政策和貿(mào)易方面達(dá)成一項(xiàng)新協(xié)議，但如果唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)政府決定拋棄《跨大西洋貿(mào)易與投資伙伴關(guān)系協(xié)定》(TTIP)，我們將不得不把目光投向別處。從體量和規(guī)模上看，歐洲的目光顯然應(yīng)該投向中國(guó)。
Third, Europe should seek common solutions. The natural reaction is to go native, to come up with national as opposed to common rules. This would be the wrong approach. Europe would become a patchwork flea market instead of a co-ordinated internal market. The left hand would not know what the right hand was doing. And in any case history has shown that protectionism leads nowhere.
第三點(diǎn)，歐洲應(yīng)當(dāng)尋求達(dá)成共同解決方案。自然的反應(yīng)是各自為政，各自擬定本國(guó)應(yīng)對(duì)策略，而不是制定共同對(duì)策。這將是錯(cuò)誤的。歐洲將成為一個(gè)大雜燴般的跳蚤市場(chǎng)，而不是協(xié)調(diào)一致的內(nèi)部市場(chǎng)。左手將不知右手在做什么。況且歷史已證明，保護(hù)主義沒有出路。
Perhaps it is finally time for Europeans to be patient; to understand that the balance of economic power is shifting. It is not about blue-collar work moving continents. It is about white-collar companies changing owners. That is imbedded in the basic nature of global capitalism.
也許，歐洲人終于到了必須拿出耐心的時(shí)候了;要理解經(jīng)濟(jì)力量格局正在發(fā)生變化。重點(diǎn)不是藍(lán)領(lǐng)工作從一個(gè)大陸流向另一個(gè)大陸，而是白領(lǐng)公司換了主。這種變化根植于全球化資本主義的基本特性之中。
The best way to react is to remain cool, calm and collected – to assess the situation, understand what is going on and try to come up with a joint approach. My hope is that this happens sooner rather than later. My fear is that we are already too late. This is yet further proof that markets are often a step ahead of the regulators.
最佳對(duì)策是保持沉著、冷靜、泰然處之，要評(píng)估形勢(shì)、理解當(dāng)前正在發(fā)生的事情，努力制定共同方針。我希望歐洲盡快這么做。但我擔(dān)心我們已為時(shí)太遲。這進(jìn)一步證明，市場(chǎng)經(jīng)常比監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)快一步。
Alexander Stubb is a former prime minister of Finland
本人作者為芬蘭前總理
