特朗普的貿(mào)易雙邊路線走不通
“馬歇爾計劃”(Marshall Plan)被視為歷史上最成功的經(jīng)濟外交戰(zhàn)略之一，這一稱譽理所應(yīng)當，但最重要的并不是它帶來的那些資金，而在于它讓遭受戰(zhàn)爭重創(chuàng)的西歐在貿(mào)易上拋棄了相互消耗的雙邊主義。
It did so by removing the dollar shortage that drove the emphasis on bilateral clearing. Institutionally, it did so by creating the European payments union within the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation. This led to convertibility on the current account and so to the world of liberal multilateral trade that we all now take for granted.
能做到這一點是因為它結(jié)束了導(dǎo)致強調(diào)雙邊清算的美元短缺，而這有賴于制度上的設(shè)計，該計劃在歐洲經(jīng)濟合作組織(Organisation for European Economic Co-operation)內(nèi)部創(chuàng)建了“歐洲支付同盟”。這帶來了經(jīng)常項目的可自由兌換，從而也造就了我們?nèi)缃褚暈槔硭斎坏淖杂傻亩噙呝Q(mào)易世界。
The economic nationalists who are influential in the administration of Donald Trump would presumably condemn this achievement by their predecessors. They prefer bilateral balancing to multilateral balancing in trade, bilateralism to multilateralism in policy and the exercise of unilateral US power to institutionally entrenched co-operation.
唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)政府中位高權(quán)重的經(jīng)濟民族主義者，很可能會指責(zé)前輩們?nèi)〉玫倪@一成就。在貿(mào)易方面，他們喜歡雙邊平衡勝過多邊平衡;在政策上，他們喜歡雙邊主義勝過多邊主義;比起基于制度的合作，他們更喜歡單方面行使美國權(quán)力。
We must be grateful that the catastrophes of the 1930s had then discredited the holders of similarly narrow nationalist and protectionist visions. It is horrifying to imagine what would have happened if these people had held sway. They would have been desperately wrong then. They are wrong now. They must lose. Our fate depends on it.
我們必須慶幸的是，上世紀30年代的種種災(zāi)禍已使當時持有同樣狹隘的民族主義和保護主義觀點的人士聲譽掃地。不敢想象如果這些人掌權(quán)的話會發(fā)生什么。他們當時就完全錯了?，F(xiàn)在也是錯的。他們必然失敗。我們的命運取決于這一點。
In 1945, Howard Ellis, a professor at Berkeley, published an important essay on the perils of the bilateralism then so rife in trade. In this, he concluded that “bilateralism is, in many respects, the most objectionable form of restraint placed on international trade”.
1945年，加州大學(xué)伯克利分校(Berkeley)教授霍華德•埃利斯(Howard Ellis)發(fā)表了一篇重要文章，論述當時在貿(mào)易領(lǐng)域非常盛行的雙邊主義的危害。他的結(jié)論是：“在很多方面，雙邊主義是施加于國際貿(mào)易之上的最令人反感的約束形式。”
Why might this be so? Consider what our national economies would look like if every company was required to balance its sales and purchases with every other one. This would be insanely costly — indeed insane. It is to allow a vastly more complex division of labour that we have money, and so the possibility of balancing the value of incomes against expenditure across the economy as a whole. Trade allows the same thing to happen across borders, thereby delivering improvements in prosperity, as Richard Baldwin argues in The Great Convergence. The move from bilateral to multilateral balancing nearly 70 years ago was a starting point for the explosion in trade that has driven global growth. (See charts.)
為什么會這樣?設(shè)想一下，如果每家企業(yè)都被要求平衡與其他任何一家企業(yè)之間的銷售和采購，我們的國民經(jīng)濟會變成什么樣。這將導(dǎo)致成本高得離譜——簡直是瘋狂。正是因為勞動分工的復(fù)雜程度得以大幅提高，才使我們擁有資金，也從而有可能使整個經(jīng)濟中的收入與支出達到平衡。理查德•鮑德溫(Richard Baldwin)在《大融合》(The Great Convergence)一書中辯稱，貿(mào)易使得同樣的事發(fā)生于跨境之間，進而帶來更大的繁榮。近70年前從雙邊向多邊平衡的轉(zhuǎn)變是貿(mào)易激增的起點，而貿(mào)易增長推動了全球經(jīng)濟增長(見以下圖表)。
In a multilateral economy, bilateral balances do not matter. Of course, overall budget constraints still do. But the fact that I run a consistent deficit with my nearest supermarket should be of no concern to me (or it), so long as I do not exhaust my overall resources.
在多邊經(jīng)濟中，雙邊貿(mào)易平衡并不重要。當然，總體預(yù)算約束仍然重要。但實際上，我對離得最近的超市一直保持逆差對我(或它)無關(guān)緊要，只要我不把自己所有的錢揮霍一空。
It was for much the same reason that the global framework of trade diplomacy has been both multilateral and non-discriminatory. It also sought to marry trade liberalisation to currency convertibility, initially on the current account. Yet in constructing this global regime, it was also understood that an important political difference exists between commerce within countries and across borders: the latter involves distrusted foreigners. So the best way in practice of regulating commitments to trade was through reciprocity. The combination of non-discrimination with reciprocity was duly made the foundation of the postwar global trade regime.
正是出于差不多同樣的原因，貿(mào)易外交的全球框架一直保持多邊性和非歧視性。它還尋求將貿(mào)易自由化與貨幣自由兌換相結(jié)合——從經(jīng)常賬戶開始。但在構(gòu)建這一全球機制的過程中，不言自明的是，一國境內(nèi)的商業(yè)往來與跨國貿(mào)易之間在政治上有天壤之別：后者涉及不被信任的外國人。因此，規(guī)范貿(mào)易承諾在實踐中的最佳方式是采取互惠安排。非歧視待遇與互惠的結(jié)合恰恰成了戰(zhàn)后全球貿(mào)易體制的基礎(chǔ)。
This is all very well, say today’s nationalists, but trade does not balance. Some countries run vast surpluses and other vast deficits. The former are predatory and the latter ruinous. This, they argue, must stop. Bilateralism, they insist, is also the way to do this because bilateral imbalances are now so huge.
當今的民族主義者會說，這完全沒錯，但無法實現(xiàn)貿(mào)易平衡。有些國家存在巨額貿(mào)易順差，而有的國家逆差巨大。前者在掠奪，后者是毀滅性的。他們認為，這種狀況必須停止。他們堅持認為，雙邊主義也是達到這個目的的一種方式，因為現(xiàn)在的雙邊貿(mào)易失衡如此巨大。
This is grossly misguided. First, there is no way to ensure bilaterally balanced trade other than by constant — and constantly varying — interference in the decisions of private businesses and individuals. Indeed, it must lead to a planned economy. It is ridiculous for this idea to be propounded by an administration notionally dedicated to economic liberalisation. Second, this would be a game of “whack a mole”: every time the US sought to cut its deficit with country A, it would rise with countries B or C, as imports were diverted. Third, the outcome would be unmanageably complex and uncertain trading rules: if all members of the World Trade Organization regulated trade with others bilaterally, more than 13,000 such agreements would exist. That would be mad. This approach would tear up all existing agreements, creating trade policy chaos.
這是嚴重誤導(dǎo)。首先，雙邊貿(mào)易平衡是沒辦法確保的，除非持續(xù)地干預(yù)私營企業(yè)和個人的決策并且不斷改變干預(yù)方式。事實上，這必將導(dǎo)致計劃經(jīng)濟。荒謬的是，這個想法竟然是由一個理論上應(yīng)該致力于經(jīng)濟自由化的政府提出的。其次，這將變成一場“打鼴鼠”游戲：每當美國想減少對A國的逆差，隨著進口來源轉(zhuǎn)移，對B國或C國的逆差就會擴大。第三，結(jié)果將形成一套無比復(fù)雜和不確定的貿(mào)易規(guī)則：如果世貿(mào)組織所有成員都以雙邊規(guī)則來管理與他國的貿(mào)易，就需要有超過1.3萬個這類協(xié)定，這簡直是瘋了。這種做法將撕毀所有現(xiàn)有協(xié)議，造成貿(mào)易政策混亂。
As Stephen Roach notes, current account deficits and surpluses are macroeconomic phenomena — a point that escapes Mr Trump’s protectionist advisers. The balances are the difference between a country’s aggregate income and spending, or its saving and investment. The Chinese and Germans spend less than their incomes and Americans more. The latter, he argues, must be more prudent, not blame foreigners.
正如斯蒂芬•羅奇(Stephen Roach)所指出的，經(jīng)常賬戶赤字和盈余都是宏觀經(jīng)濟現(xiàn)象——特朗普那些奉行保護主義的顧問們忽略了這一點。赤字或盈余乃一國總收入和總支出的差額，或該國儲蓄和投資的差額。中國人和德國人花的比賺的少，而美國人花的比賺的多。羅奇認為，后者必須更加節(jié)儉，而不是怪罪外國人。
Mr Roach is largely right but not wholly so. If a very large economy, such as the US, were to raise its desired domestic savings substantially, when global real interest rates are so low and demand so weak, it could deliver a global recession. I have argued that unsustainable US spending drove global demand, before the financial crisis of 2007-08. In this context, the excess savings of China, Germany and some others are a global concern, because we lack ways of absorbing them into productive and sustainable investments elsewhere.
羅奇的觀點大體上是正確的，但不是全部正確。如果一個非常龐大的經(jīng)濟體，比如美國，打算大幅提高其國內(nèi)儲蓄，而當全球?qū)嶋H利率如此低、需求如此疲軟時，就可能導(dǎo)致全球衰退。我在2007-08年金融危機之前曾說過，不可持續(xù)的美國支出在推動全球需求。在這種情況下，中國、德國等國儲蓄過剩就是個全球問題，因為我們?nèi)狈⑦@些儲蓄吸收到其他地方具有生產(chǎn)性的、可持續(xù)的投資中的辦法。
Thus, overall imbalances are a legitimate issue for public policy, as John Maynard Keynes argued. But these cannot be dealt with through bilateral deals. That way lies policy failure and poisonous ill will. They need to be dealt with multilaterally, because they are a multilateral phenomenon. It would also be far more productive to address them via macroeconomic policy and the capital account than via trade. The bilateralism now touted by the Trump administration is a delusion. It will not work. But it will do huge damage. It must be buried.
因此，正如約翰•梅納德•凱恩斯(John Maynard Keynes)所說，總體失衡是公共政策的一個合理問題。但這些失衡不能通過雙邊協(xié)議來處理。這是一條飽含惡意、注定走向政策失敗的道路。這些失衡需要用多邊方式來處理，因為它們是一種多邊現(xiàn)象。如果能通過宏觀經(jīng)濟政策和資本賬戶、而不是通過貿(mào)易手段來解決這些問題，將更加富有成效。特朗普政府現(xiàn)在兜售的雙邊主義是一種妄想，不會起作用，但會造成巨大損害，必須將其埋葬。
