“一帶一路”不僅僅關(guān)乎經(jīng)貿(mào)

In discussing China’s ambitious One Belt, One Road infrastructure project last week, we argued that the rest of the world must see it for what it is: not simply an investment plan to be assessed on conventional economic grounds but an attempt at shaping the geostrategic structure of the global economy in future decades.

上周，在討論中國雄心勃勃的“一帶一路”基建計(jì)劃時(shí)，我們的觀點(diǎn)是，世界其他國家必須從本質(zhì)看待這一倡議：不單單是一項(xiàng)可從傳統(tǒng)經(jīng)濟(jì)角度評估的投資計(jì)劃，而且還是塑造未來幾十年全球經(jīng)濟(jì)地緣戰(zhàn)略結(jié)構(gòu)的一次嘗試。

To better understand why, it is important to have a sense of how the economic relationship created by a successful Belt and Road initiative would add up to much more than the sum of their its parts. (Whether it could be successful is an important question, too. Christopher Balding argues that even for China, the price tag of $1tn, give or take, may be too much of a stretch. The think-tank Bruegel agrees.)

為了更好地理解個(gè)中緣由，重要的是要意識到，成功的一帶一路倡議所創(chuàng)建的經(jīng)濟(jì)關(guān)系將如何產(chǎn)生“一加一大于二”的效果。(這一倡議能否取得成功也是一個(gè)重要問題。克里斯托弗•鮑爾丁(Christopher Balding)認(rèn)為，即便對中國而言，1萬億美元左右的投資或許也力有不逮。智庫勃魯蓋爾(Bruegel)同意鮑爾丁的說法。)

Paul Krugman dips into his earlier research programme on economic geography and provides a clear and succinct illustration of how infrastructure links such as those One Belt, One Road contemplates, matter. If economic activity is more profitable when done at greater scale, then (even small) transport upgrades that make one location better connected to many others can create a pole of attraction for investment and economic growth there, built on its cost-efficiency (even if small) in supplying those other markets. As a result, “you can definitely see Belts and Roads as a bit of a strategic trade policy as well as being a strategic, well, strategic policy”.

保羅•克魯格曼(Paul Krugman)翻出了自己早期對于經(jīng)濟(jì)地理學(xué)的研究，并清晰而簡明地說明了如一帶一路倡議嘗試打造的這類基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施網(wǎng)絡(luò)有多么重要。如果以更大規(guī)模進(jìn)行經(jīng)濟(jì)活動更有利可圖，那么讓一地與其他很多地方更便捷地連接起來的交通升級(即使小規(guī)模)便能為該地吸引投資和促進(jìn)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長，因?yàn)樵跒槠渌袌鎏峁┕┙o時(shí)，該地有了成本效益(即使小規(guī)模)。因此，“你當(dāng)然可以將一帶一路看作一種戰(zhàn)略性的貿(mào)易政策，同時(shí)也看作一種戰(zhàn)略性的戰(zhàn)略政策。”

Bruegel has examined the “strategic trade” bit of the policy in some detail, looking at the effects of trade both from reducing transport costs and of reducing trade barriers, should the infrastructure part of One Belt, One Road be matched by creating a free-trade area between its member countries. Interestingly, Europe would benefit from the infrastructure, but lose out from the creation of a FTA as some trade would be diverted. One can just about glimpse a future situation where the EU would feel a stronger imperative and therefore have a weaker bargaining position in negotiating free trade with China than is the case today.

智庫勃魯蓋爾詳細(xì)地考察了其作為“戰(zhàn)略貿(mào)易政策”的屬性，從降低運(yùn)輸成本和減少貿(mào)易壁壘方面觀察對貿(mào)易的影響——如果一帶一路倡議的基建部分配以在成員國之間建立自由貿(mào)易區(qū)的話。有意思的是，歐洲將從基建項(xiàng)目中受益，但會因自由貿(mào)易區(qū)的創(chuàng)建蒙受損失，因?yàn)椴糠仲Q(mào)易將轉(zhuǎn)向?？梢韵胂?，未來的歐盟將有更強(qiáng)的緊迫感，因此在與中國談判自由貿(mào)易時(shí)將處于比今天不利的談判地位。

Kadira Pethiyagoda from Brookings explores the “strategic strategic” bit. China’s “overarching foreign policy goal” with One Belt, One Road, he writes, is “to reach strategic parity with the United States in Asia and reshape its security environment to ensure its rise is unrestrained”. One Belt, One Road can contribute to this partly because “China’s infrastructure investments are often such that its influence over the host state is difficult to dislodge without breaching global economic norms”. Pethiyagoda offers Sri Lanka as an example where a change in the regime did not ultimately affect China’s standing.

布魯金斯學(xué)會(Brookings)的卡迪拉•佩西亞戈達(dá)(Kadira Pethiyagoda)分析了一帶一路作為“戰(zhàn)略性的戰(zhàn)略政策”的屬性。他寫道，中國一帶一路倡議的“首要外交政策目標(biāo)”是要“在亞洲與美國實(shí)現(xiàn)戰(zhàn)略上平起平坐，并重塑安全環(huán)境以確保崛起不受制約”。一帶一路之所以能有助于此，一定程度上是因?yàn)?ldquo;中國的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施投資往往是，不打破全球經(jīng)濟(jì)規(guī)范就很難消除中國在東道國的影響力”。佩西亞戈達(dá)舉了斯里蘭卡的例子，政權(quán)更迭最終并未影響中國在該國的影響力。

To see just how deeply political the whole project is, take some time to study the leaked plans for the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, published recently by the Dawn newspaper recently. As my FT colleagues point out in their analysis of CPEC, this hugely ambitious project raised concerns in Pakistan (and beyond) in part because of the deep involvement envisaged for the industrial arms of Chinese military institutions.

為弄清楚整個(gè)一帶一路倡議有多么深刻的政治性，可以花些時(shí)間研究一下最近由《黎明報(bào)》(Dawn)曝光的中巴經(jīng)濟(jì)走廊(China-Pakistan Economic Corridor)計(jì)劃。正如我的英國《金融時(shí)報(bào)》的同事在對中巴經(jīng)濟(jì)走廊的分析中指出的，這個(gè)極為雄心勃勃的計(jì)劃在巴基斯坦(以及其他國家)引發(fā)了擔(dān)憂，部分原因是中國軍事機(jī)構(gòu)的工業(yè)企業(yè)預(yù)計(jì)將深度參與其中。

None of this has to mean that One Belt, One Road is a bad idea — least of all for China — or that it has to be a zero-sum game that the rest of the world needs to oppose. But it does mean, as we argued last week, that the rest of the world needs to see it as the geostrategic plan it is, and countries should engage with it on the basis of their own geostrategic visions. That applies above all to the other end of the axis China is trying build: European nations and the EU.

這一切并不必然意味著一帶一路倡議是個(gè)壞主意(尤其對中國來說)，也不必然意味著這是世界其他國家都需要反對的一場零和博弈。但它確實(shí)意味著，正如我們上周指出的，世界其他地區(qū)需要把它看作一項(xiàng)地緣戰(zhàn)略計(jì)劃，各國應(yīng)該根據(jù)本國的地緣戰(zhàn)略愿景應(yīng)對。這首先適用于中國嘗試打造的軸線的另一端：歐洲國家和歐盟(EU)。