英國如何避免退歐的災(zāi)難？
埃馬紐埃爾•馬克龍(Emmanuel Macron)本可以在與特里薩•梅(Theresa May)在巴黎會面時(shí)對梅羞辱一番。這位睿智程度超過本人年齡的法國總統(tǒng)告訴英國首相，重新思考英國與歐盟(EU)關(guān)系的大門仍然敞開著。英國應(yīng)該抓住馬克龍的話。有一條路徑可以走出英國退歐的亂局。它要求重新把國家利益置于保守黨利益之上。
In the pantheon of prime ministerial failures, Mrs May runs a close race with her predecessor David Cameron. As things stand, Mr Cameron claims the prize. The purpose of his premiership never reached beyond a sense of entitlement. His Brexit referendum reflected at once weakness and insouciant self-regard. He would first bow to the Tory Eurosceptics and then beat them.
在英國首相失誤的“紀(jì)念堂”里，梅與前任戴維•卡梅倫(David Cameron)可謂相差無幾。目前來看，勝出的是卡梅倫。他擔(dān)任首相的目的從未超越一種特權(quán)意識。他的英國退歐公投同時(shí)反映出軟弱和漫不經(jīng)心的自我欣賞。他以為，他可以先向保守黨的疑歐派屈服，然后擊敗他們。
Mrs May’s botched general election was more a matter of simple opportunism. She looked at the opinion polls, saw a chance to cast herself as the Iron Lady of Brexit, and fluffed it. Mr Cameron’s dismal record is fixed forever in the history books. Mrs May still has a chance to write a redeeming codicil.
梅搞砸了的英國大選，在更大程度上是一個(gè)簡單的機(jī)會主義的問題。她在看過民調(diào)后，看到了把自己標(biāo)榜為英國退歐的“鐵娘子”的機(jī)會，沒想到搞砸了?？穫惖脑愀庥涗浺驯惠d入史冊。梅仍有更改“遺囑”進(jìn)行補(bǔ)救的機(jī)會。
The presumption uniting the two leaders has been that Britain’s place in its own continent is the private property of their party. From Margaret Thatcher’s defenestration in 1990 to John Major’s battles with so-called cabinet “bastards”, Mr Cameron’s plebiscite and Mrs May’s promised hard Brexit, the national interest has been subsumed in a private war. Now, a deal with the EU will be possible only if the prime minister puts country before party.
把兩位領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人團(tuán)結(jié)在一起的是這樣一種假設(shè)：英國在其自身所屬大陸的地位，是他們所在的政黨的私有財(cái)產(chǎn)。從瑪格麗特•撒切爾(Margaret Thatcher)在1990年被拋棄到約翰•梅杰(John Major)與所謂的內(nèi)閣“混蛋”之間的斗爭，從卡梅倫的全民公投到梅承諾的硬退歐，國家利益被一場私人戰(zhàn)爭吞噬。如今，只有梅將國家置于政黨之上，與歐盟的協(xié)議才有可能達(dá)成。
The British people did not express a preference in the referendum as to what sort of Brexit they wanted. Insofar as they have given an opinion since, it has been to reject Mrs May’s prescription. She put national immigration controls and a purist’s view of sovereignty above prosperity and security. And she lost.
對于英國人想要什么樣的退歐，他們沒有在公投中表達(dá)過偏好。如果說他們此后表達(dá)過意見，那就是拒絕梅的方案。她把移民控制和純粹主義的主權(quán)觀置于繁榮和安全之上。結(jié)果失算了。
The first requirement now is for a measure of humility — though you could also call it realism. Mrs May could do worse than take a look at Europe through the lens of Paris, Berlin, or Brussels. British weakness is mirrored by growing continental confidence.
現(xiàn)在的第一個(gè)要求是拿出一點(diǎn)謙虛的態(tài)度，盡管你還可以稱其為現(xiàn)實(shí)主義。梅不妨透過巴黎、柏林或布魯塞爾的透鏡看一看歐洲。英國暴露出弱勢的同時(shí)，歐洲大陸的信心不斷增強(qiáng)。
The EU27 have problems, certainly — think about resurgent authoritarianism in Poland and Hungary — but optimism has replaced pessimism as the prevailing emotion. The eurozone economy is growing, the election of a reformist French president promises to revive the Franco-German partnership, and leaders have united in their disdain of Donald Trump’s US administration. No one is following Britain’s lead in heading for the exit, and no one feels compelled to offer concessions to Mrs May.
當(dāng)然，27個(gè)成員國的歐盟是有問題的，想想波蘭和匈牙利再次復(fù)活的威權(quán)主義吧，但樂觀已取代悲觀，成為當(dāng)前的主導(dǎo)情緒。歐元區(qū)經(jīng)濟(jì)在增長，法國選出一名改革派總統(tǒng)有望重振法德合作，而各國領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人共同鄙視唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的美國行政當(dāng)局。沒有一個(gè)國家仿效英國退出歐盟，也沒有人認(rèn)為有必要向梅做出讓步。
A British reset — and it probably falls on Philip Hammond, the chancellor, to persuade the prime minister — should start with the recognition that the previously imagined hard Brexit is impossible as well as undesirable. A distasteful electoral pact with Northern Ireland’s Democratic Unionist party makes no difference. The government does not have the numbers to legislate for a clean break. Nor does it have the time or administrative capacity to negotiate a bespoke arrangement.
英國重啟立場——說服首相的任務(wù)很可能落在財(cái)政大臣菲利普•哈蒙德(Philip Hammond)身上——應(yīng)該從承認(rèn)之前想象的硬退歐既不可能也不可取開始。與北愛爾蘭的民主聯(lián)盟黨(Democratic Unionist party)簽訂令人惡心的選舉協(xié)議并沒有什么幫助。英國政府沒有足夠的議會席位來立法實(shí)現(xiàn)“干凈退歐”。它也沒有時(shí)間和行政能力來談判達(dá)成一項(xiàng)定制安排。
The answer is a two-stage process. In the first, lasting perhaps five years beyond 2019, Britain would remain in the customs union and the single market through an arrangement within the European Economic Area — similar though not identical to that enjoyed by Norway. This pause, perhaps including a two-year notice clause if either side wished to withdraw, would allow for talks on a subsequent permanent association pact, embracing security and foreign policy as well as trade.
答案是兩階段過程。首先，可能在直到2019年后的5年內(nèi)，英國仍然通過歐洲經(jīng)濟(jì)區(qū)(European Economic Area)內(nèi)部的安排，留在關(guān)稅同盟和單一市場內(nèi)——與挪威的地位相似(盡管不完全相同)。這一暫緩階段(可能包括2年的通知期——如果其中一方想要退出)將允許就接下來的永久性聯(lián)系國協(xié)議展開談判，解決安全、外交政策以及貿(mào)易方面的安排。
It goes without saying that such a deal would disadvantage Britain relative to today. It would be swapping a significant voice and influence in the shaping of European affairs for a small measure of autonomy. But this is in the nature of the Brexit decision. The choice is not one between “good” and “bad”, but one between less and more damaging.
毫無疑問，相比如今的情況，這樣的協(xié)議不利于英國。它將意味著英國放棄在歐洲事務(wù)上重要的發(fā)言權(quán)和影響力，來換取較小程度的自治權(quán)。但這就是退歐決定的本質(zhì)。它并不是“好”與“壞”的選擇，而是兩害相權(quán)取其輕。
A two-stage plan would have attractions for the EU27. Most obviously it would avoid the shock of a chaotic Brexit and would guarantee for several years ahead Britain’s contribution to the Brussels budget. Put crudely, Germany and France would not have to pay in more and the likes of Poland and Slovakia would not be obliged to accept less. 兩階段計(jì)劃對歐盟27國也會有吸引力。最明顯的好處是，它可以避免英國無序退歐帶來的沖擊，也可以確保未來幾年英國繼續(xù)對歐盟預(yù)算做出貢獻(xiàn)。直白地講，如此一來德國和法國不需要增加支出，而波蘭和斯洛伐克等國獲得的撥款也不必減少。
The bigger reason, though, is that a relatively smooth Brexit would give Germany, France and others the space to press ahead with deeper integration of eurozone economies and closer collaboration in defence and foreign policies — to add economic and political to the present monetary union.
不過，更重要的原因在于相對平穩(wěn)的退歐會給德國、法國等國留下空間，使其得以深化歐元區(qū)經(jīng)濟(jì)一體化，并在國防和外交政策上實(shí)現(xiàn)更緊密的合作——在貨幣聯(lián)盟的基礎(chǔ)上增添經(jīng)濟(jì)和政治上的聯(lián)盟。
The EU emerging from such a process would be one of concentric circles of nations radiating outwards according to their willingness to agree more or less co-ordination of national policies. There might well be space in one of the outer circles for a Britain anxious to maintain autonomy over economic policies, but willing to contribute more, say, to a European foreign policy.
完成這一過程后，歐盟成員國將形成一系列由內(nèi)而外延伸的同心圓，各國所處位置取決于他們在多大程度上愿意協(xié)調(diào)國家政策。認(rèn)為自治權(quán)的地位高于經(jīng)濟(jì)政策、但愿意為歐盟的外交政策做出更多貢獻(xiàn)的英國，很可能在歐盟同心圓的外圈獲得一席之地。
Hardline Brexiters will accept none of this. They are deluded. Negotiating this “soft” Brexit would not be a trouble-free endeavour. Britain would secure only limited concessions on free movement of workers. The objections, though, melt away when measured against the inanity of the Brexiters’ have-our-cake-and-eat-it deal or the certain chaos of a cliff-edge departure. There also happens to be a majority in parliament for an intelligent Brexit. So what is it going to be Mrs May — party or country?
強(qiáng)硬退歐派不會接受這樣的計(jì)劃。他們昏了頭。談判達(dá)成這樣的“軟”退歐不會容易。英國在勞工自由流動(dòng)問題上只能爭取到有限的讓步。不過，相比退歐派打算兩頭不吃虧的無知大話、或者斷崖式退歐必然引發(fā)的混亂，他們的反對根本站不住腳。恰好英國多數(shù)議員也支持明智的退歐。那么梅會怎么做呢——選擇政黨利益還是國家利益?
