過度炒作會毀了初創(chuàng)企業(yè)

Start-ups often live or die by publicity. A successful marketing pitch early in a venture’s life can grab media attention — and place it firmly in the minds of potential consumers.

宣傳往往會讓初創(chuàng)企業(yè)生存或毀滅。在創(chuàng)業(yè)伊始，成功的市場營銷能夠抓住媒體的眼球，并讓潛在消費者對公司印象深刻。

One tactic is to seize on a topic that has already gained traction in the media. SoFi, the US online lender, this year saw its chance to exploit comments by Tim Gurner, an Australian real estate developer, who claimed millennials could not afford to buy a house because they spent too much on luxury food — specifically smashed avocado toast and coffee.

策略之一是捕捉媒體關注的熱點話題。SoFi，美國的一家網貸公司，今年就瞅準機會好好利用了一下澳洲一位房產商蒂姆•格納(Tim Gurner)的評論。格納說，千禧一代買不起房，因為他們花在高檔食品上的錢太多——比如牛油果吐司和咖啡。

SoFi, founded in 2011 as a student loan refinancer, was expanding into mortgage lending. What better way to lure new customers with not only a competitive rate but also a free side order of the trendy snack?

SoFi成立于2011年，從學生再融資貸款起步，隨后將業(yè)務拓展到抵押貸款領域。還有什么比這更好的法子吸引新客戶嗎?不僅貸款利率有競爭力，還免費附贈時尚小吃。

US news outlets picked up the headline-friendly story. And SoFi, valued at $4bn following its most recent round of funding in February, has the capacity to meet an increase in demand.

美國媒體報道了這則標題友好的新聞，而SoFi也已經具備滿足需求增長的實力。在今年2月的最近一輪融資中，SoFi的估值已達40億美元。

But what happens if media attention arrives too soon? The tech press is littered with stories of much-hyped start-ups that garner headlines — and in some cases raise lots of money — but are unable to deliver on the promise of their publicity. Can media buzz harm more than it helps?

然而如果媒體關注來得過快會怎么樣呢?科技類媒體有很多關于初創(chuàng)企業(yè)的天花亂墜的報道，它們占據著頭條位置——有時還籌集了大量資金——但卻無法兌現宣傳時的承諾。媒體炒作會不會弊大于利?

Todd Berger has reason to think so. In 2014, the graphic designer and a few friends founded a social network called Ello, aimed at fellow artists, designers and creative professionals.

托德•伯杰(Todd Berger)就有理由這樣認為。2014年，這位平面設計師和幾位朋友一起創(chuàng)建了一個名為Ello的社交網站，主要面向藝術家、設計師及其他從事創(chuàng)意行業(yè)的專業(yè)人士。

Ello vowed to be free from advertising and its “manifesto” promised not to collect or sell users’ data. New members could only join on invitation from existing users, a limitation aimed at cultivating what Mr Berger describes as “a place on the internet focused on putting creators first and providing real visibility, influence and opportunity”.

Ello號稱無廣告，其“宣言”承諾絕不收集或出賣用戶的數據。新成員只有接受現有用戶的邀請方可加入，目的是要在互聯網上打造出伯杰先生所描述的“以創(chuàng)作者為先，提供真實的關注度、影響力和機會的一方天地”。

In September of that year, Ello went mainstream. The catalyst was Facebook, which in 2014 enforced more strictly a policy requiring users to use their legal names on their profiles.

在當年9月，Ello成了社交網絡的主流。契機是2014年Facebook更加嚴苛地要求用戶使用實名注冊。

This sparked outrage from transgender rights advocates and domestic violence survivors, who often used aliases; and Native Americans, whose names were often flagged as fake, among others. Some went looking for an alternative, and found Ello. The company was deluged with requests to join.

這引發(fā)了跨性別維權人士和家暴幸存者們(這些人經常使用化名)、印第安人(他們的名字常常被標記為假名)等群體的不滿。有些人轉而去尋找一個可以取代Facebook的網站，于是發(fā)現了Ello。一時間Ello的注冊申請紛至沓來。

“The onslaught of people coming to Ello from the LBGTQ community really tipped the scale and contributed to lots more buzz,” Mr Berger says. In the media, Ello was quickly cast as a potential “Facebook killer”.

伯杰說：“來自LGBTQ群體的成員蜂擁涌入切實扭轉了格局并為Ello帶來了更多的關注。”很快媒體就將Ello稱為一個潛在的“Facebook殺手”。

News outlets picked up on its manifesto, which seemed to take aim at the world’s largest social network, proclaiming: “Your social network is owned by advertisers . . . You are the product that’s bought and sold.” Ello’s founders, who were in the midst of raising their first round of funding, tried to ride the wave.

新聞媒體重又提起Ello的宣言，這份宣言似乎針對的是全球最大的社交網絡，它宣稱：“廣告商才是你們社交網絡的主子……你們本身就是被買賣的商品。”Ello的創(chuàng)始人，正忙于他們的第一輪融資，試圖利用媒體造勢。

“We were growing rapidly, to say the least, but without the resources, leadership or experience to see what was about to happen,” recalls Mr Berger, who at the time was Ello’s head of graphic design. “Ultimately we embraced it.”

“我們當時至少可以說是正在迅速成長，但我們缺乏資源、領導能力或經驗，無法預知將會發(fā)生什么，”伯杰先生回憶，那時他是Ello的平面設計主管。“但最終，我們接受了一切。”

The instinct to capitalise on unexpected attention is understandable. Academics have tried to quantify the value of publicity and this much is clear: media coverage is associated with business success.

本能地利用始料未及的關注度是可以理解的。學者們曾試圖量化宣傳的功效，至少有一點很明確：媒體報道與商業(yè)成功是相關聯的。

Research from Babson College in the US suggests the media wants stories about flourishing start-ups — but, equally, those fledgling companies should not necessarily chase the media buzz.

美國巴布森學院(Babson College)的研究顯示，媒體喜歡報道朝氣蓬勃的初創(chuàng)企業(yè)的故事——但與此同時，那些剛起步的公司不必追求媒體的大肆宣傳。

Professor Andrew Zacharakis, who teaches entrepreneurship at Babson and who co-wrote the research, cautions: “Don’t get ahead of yourself. In the age of the unicorns, everyone wants to be next superstar, but we don’t want those valuations to be based on vapourware.” He points to Ello as a cautionary tale “where the story overcame what the business really was”.

安德魯•查克羅基斯(Andrew Zacharakis)教授在巴布森商學院教創(chuàng)業(yè)學，同時也是這份研究報告的聯合撰稿人，他提醒人們：“不要急于求成。在獨角獸頻現的時代，人人都想成為下一個超級巨星，但我們不希望這些估值是鏡花水月。”他指出Ello的故事就是“名不副實的宣傳”，并希望人們能夠引以為戒。

Mr Berger agrees: “As a function of all the media hype, we had lost our way, lost control of our narrative, and we had naively embraced a new narrative that wasn’t our own.”

伯杰先生認為：“所有的媒體炒作引發(fā)的效應之一就是，我們迷失了方向、無法控制媒體對我們的宣傳表述、并天真地接受了一個并不屬實的全新演繹。”

When Ello took off, its staff was just seven people who worked part-time while running other businesses. They were soon overwhelmed. The platform was not robust enough to support demand: the site crashed and Ello had to freeze invitations. Once new users were able to join, many were disappointed with what they found.

Ello大熱時，只有7名工作人員，他們只是在Ello兼職。很快這幾個人就被壓垮了。這個平臺還無法支撐海量的申請需求：網站崩潰了，Ello也不得不凍結對新用戶的邀請。一旦新用戶能夠加入了，許多人卻對他們的體驗感到失望。

“Our product was very nascent. You could post and follow other members, and that’s about it . . . You couldn’t even comment yet,” Mr Berger says.

伯杰稱：“我們的產品還很稚嫩。你可以發(fā)帖并關注別人，而這就是全部功能……那時甚至還無法發(fā)表評論。”

“What we had product-wise wasn’t enough to start comparing ourselves to Facebook and acting like we were about to unseat the leader in the social space. In so doing, we created an environment of un-met expectations via hyperbole and misplaced zealousness.”

“就產品本身而言，我們還不能跟Facebook媲美，無法去撼動社交空間領導者的地位。就這樣，通過夸大其詞和不應有的熱忱，我們創(chuàng)造了一個與人們的期望值不符的環(huán)境。”

The company had to deal with the influx of press requests, which Mr Berger says distracted from other tasks, such as coming up with a sustainable growth strategy.

公司不得不去應付眾多媒體，伯杰先生稱，這讓公司無法專心處理其他事務，比如制定可持續(xù)發(fā)展戰(zhàn)略。

“In hindsight, we would have hit pause and more deeply considered the ramifications of leaning into a narrative that felt virtually impossible to support and execute against successfully,” he says.

他說：“事后看來，我們本該按下暫停鍵，更深地思考接受這樣一種讓人感覺幾乎不可能去支撐和成功落實的宣傳的后果。”

As quickly as Ello’s popularity lit up, it fizzled. Within a few weeks, the press had moved on to other subjects, and the surge of new users subsided. Today, Ello still exists as a network for artists and creatives, but is most often cited as an example of a start-up failing to live up to the hype.

就像當初人氣迅速爆棚一樣，人們對Ello的熱情也很快消失。短短幾周，媒體關注的焦點就轉向其他話題，新用戶也不再激增。如今，Ello仍是一個面向藝術家和創(chuàng)作者的社交網絡，但卻作為一個與宣傳不符的初創(chuàng)企業(yè)案例被頻頻引用。

For Mr Berger, who now serves as Ello’s chief executive, the lesson is simple. “A good product speaks for itself. There’s no amount of marketing or storytelling that will make an incomplete, undeveloped product a great one,” he says.

對于現任Ello首席執(zhí)行官的伯杰先生而言，這次事件的教訓很簡單。伯杰先生稱：“優(yōu)質的產品本身就能說明一切。任何營銷或宣傳都無法讓一個尚未完善的、還不成熟的產品變得偉大。”

“Press is only as good as the extent to which you can back up the narrative you are investing in creating and sharing. That narrative has to be real and you have to be able to support it.”

“媒體宣傳只在某種程度上適用，那就是你能夠支持你精心構建并分享給他人的故事。故事的講述必須真實，而且你也必須有能力支撐它。”