中國(guó)下一任央行行長(zhǎng)可向周小川學(xué)什么？
中國(guó)時(shí)隔15年又要有一位新的央行行長(zhǎng)了。上周五，周小川主持了據(jù)信是他身為中國(guó)人民銀行(PBoC)行長(zhǎng)的最后一個(gè)記者會(huì)。預(yù)計(jì)將在3月19日公布的繼任者必然肩負(fù)多重使命，包括控制信貸增長(zhǎng)、吸引外國(guó)投資者進(jìn)入中國(guó)金融市場(chǎng)、遏制影子銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)蔓延以及創(chuàng)建更可持續(xù)的匯率制度。
The next governor would do well to take lessons from Mr Zhou, who played a weak hand in China’s bureaucracy very skilfully, affecting policy beyond the bounds of his official station. Unlike most central banks, the PBoC is not independent. The State Council signs off on routine adjustments to interest rates, banks’ reserve requirements and exchange rate management. Its members generally want to keep credit abundant and interest rates low, and have no interest in empowering the PBoC.
下一任央行行長(zhǎng)不妨從周小川身上學(xué)習(xí)一些經(jīng)驗(yàn)，后者手上沒有太好的牌，卻非常巧妙地把握中國(guó)官僚體系，對(duì)政策的影響超出他的官位。與多數(shù)央行不同，中國(guó)央行并不獨(dú)立。利率、銀行存款準(zhǔn)備金率和匯率管理制度的例常調(diào)整都需經(jīng)過國(guó)務(wù)院同意。國(guó)務(wù)院官員一般都希望經(jīng)濟(jì)中信貸充裕并且利率處在低水平，他們無(wú)意放權(quán)給央行。
Yet Mr Zhou managed to shape an aggressive financial reform agenda, including liberalisation of interest rates and the exchange rate. He used international expertise and engagement to frame choices for China’s leaders narrowly, portraying reforms as in line with those of other modern, developed financial systems. By introducing limited reforms that appeared innocuous, he ended up creating outsized effects that broke down state constraints on China’s financial system.
然而周小川設(shè)法促成了一份銳意進(jìn)取的金融改革議程，其中包括利率自由化和匯率形成機(jī)制改革。他運(yùn)用國(guó)際專長(zhǎng)，促進(jìn)國(guó)際交流，為中國(guó)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)層框定狹窄的選擇面，把改革措施呈現(xiàn)為與其他現(xiàn)代發(fā)達(dá)金融體系接軌。通過推行看似平常無(wú)奇的有限改革，他最終造成了極大的影響，減弱了政府對(duì)中國(guó)金融體系的制約。
Consider two examples: the internationalisation of the renminbi and the light regulatory approach to China’s fintech companies. Letting the currency accumulate offshore set up expectations that onshore financial markets would also be liberalised and prompted gradual moves towards capital account convertibility. Allowing internet-based banking spurred the rapid growth of new players, forcing state banks to compete for customers and leading to the end of hard caps on bank deposit rates.
舉兩個(gè)例子：人民幣國(guó)際化以及對(duì)中國(guó)金融科技公司的“輕監(jiān)管”。任由離岸人民幣越積越多，使人們產(chǎn)生了這樣的預(yù)期：中國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)金融市場(chǎng)也將實(shí)行自由化。這也促使當(dāng)局出臺(tái)了循序漸進(jìn)的朝著資本項(xiàng)目可兌換方向邁進(jìn)的舉措。允許開展互聯(lián)網(wǎng)銀行業(yè)務(wù)，推動(dòng)了新型金融機(jī)構(gòu)的迅速成長(zhǎng)，迫使國(guó)有銀行不得不去爭(zhēng)奪客戶，并導(dǎo)致銀行存款利率上限被廢除。
The leading candidates for the next governor include Guo Shuqing, head of the banking regulator, Jiang Chaoliang, party secretary of Hubei province, and Yi Gang, the current deputy governor. Mr Guo is the presumptive choice, but Mr Yi might run the bank’s day-to-day operations if a higher-level official such as Liu He takes the reins.
可能出任下一任央行行長(zhǎng)的主要人選包括銀監(jiān)會(huì)主席郭樹清、湖北省委書記蔣超良和現(xiàn)任中國(guó)央行副行長(zhǎng)的易綱。人們認(rèn)為郭樹清最有可能出任，但如果由一位級(jí)別更高的官員——比如劉鶴——出任行長(zhǎng)，那么易綱可能負(fù)責(zé)管理央行日常業(yè)務(wù)。
Last year’s imposition of capital controls puts the onus on the next governor to restore the credibility of China’s commitment to rules-based governance of the financial system. Capital outflows from China are inevitable as a $27.3tn money supply expands by about 10 per cent a year, creating powerful incentives for Chinese households and corporates to diversify into foreign assets. Capital controls will be of questionable long-term efficacy, and policy uncertainty continues to loom over exchange-rate management. Foreign investment into China’s financial markets would help offset the outbound capital, but attracting these inflows will require more reform.
去年實(shí)施的資本管制措施，意味著下一任行長(zhǎng)有必要恢復(fù)中國(guó)要按照規(guī)則治理金融體系這一承諾的可信度。資本流出中國(guó)是不可避免的，因?yàn)樨泿殴?yīng)規(guī)模高達(dá)27.3萬(wàn)億美元，且在以每年約10%的速度擴(kuò)張，這為中國(guó)家庭和企業(yè)創(chuàng)造了投資海外資產(chǎn)的強(qiáng)大動(dòng)機(jī)。資本管制的長(zhǎng)期效力成疑，政策不確定性繼續(xù)困擾著匯率管理。流入中國(guó)金融市場(chǎng)的外國(guó)投資將幫助抵消資本外流，但吸引這些投資將需要更多改革。
Markets typically test new central bank governors, so early policy signals towards the interbank and foreign exchange markets will be important. Investors will be watching for changes to the PBoC’s historical aversion to credit defaults. The new governor must continue Beijing’s deleveraging campaign while preventing contagion from developing credit risks in China’s $39.7tn banking system. In June 2013, the PBoC backed down after an attempt to tame shadow banking resulted in an acute funding crunch. That arguably created conditions for the further explosion of shadow banking activity.
央行新行長(zhǎng)上任時(shí)一般都會(huì)受到市場(chǎng)的考驗(yàn)，因此，向銀行間及外匯市場(chǎng)釋放的早期政策信號(hào)將很重要。投資者將密切關(guān)注中國(guó)央行歷來(lái)厭惡信貸違約的態(tài)度是否會(huì)出現(xiàn)變化。新行長(zhǎng)必須繼續(xù)推行中央的去杠桿化努力，同時(shí)防止在中國(guó)39.7萬(wàn)億美元規(guī)模的銀行業(yè)體系中信貸風(fēng)險(xiǎn)蔓延擴(kuò)散。2013年6月，在遏制影子銀行的舉措導(dǎo)致嚴(yán)重資金荒之后，中國(guó)央行放棄了相關(guān)努力?？梢哉f，那給影子銀行業(yè)活動(dòng)后來(lái)進(jìn)一步激增創(chuàng)造了條件。
Under Mr Zhou, the PBoC has consistently been home to reform-minded officials, highlighting the continuing importance of individuals even in China’s centralised system. The next governor’s ability to preserve that legacy will help shape the future of China’s economy and its impact on the world.
周小川領(lǐng)導(dǎo)下的中國(guó)央行一直有很多具有改革意識(shí)的官員，說明即便是在中國(guó)的集中化體制內(nèi)，個(gè)體也始終在發(fā)揮著重要作用。下一任行長(zhǎng)保持這一傳統(tǒng)的能力，將幫助塑造中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)的未來(lái)及其對(duì)世界的影響。
The writer is director of China markets research at Rhodium Group
本文作者系榮鼎集團(tuán)(Rhodium Group)中國(guó)市場(chǎng)研究總監(jiān)
