中美貿(mào)易的十個(gè)真相

特朗普政府正在與全世界打貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)。許多人認(rèn)為，特朗普及其貿(mào)易政策團(tuán)隊(duì)是一批極端貿(mào)易保護(hù)主義者，他們身處21世紀(jì)，但思維仍停留在19世紀(jì)。在過時(shí)貿(mào)易理念的驅(qū)使下，他們過份強(qiáng)調(diào)貿(mào)易的不平衡，與全世界各主要貿(mào)易伙伴大打貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)，搞亂了全球貿(mào)易秩序。

The Trump administration is engaged in a trade war with the whole world. Many people think that Trump and his trade policy team are a group of extreme trade protectionists whose bodies have entered the 21st century, but whose thoughts are still in the 19th century. Driven by outdated trade concepts, they over-emphasize trade imbalances and launch trade wars with major trading partners around the world, bringing chaos to the global trade order.

特朗普政府指責(zé)中國采取不公平貿(mào)易政策，指控中國占美國的便宜，迫使美國公司向本國企業(yè)轉(zhuǎn)讓技術(shù)，剽竊美國的知識產(chǎn)權(quán)，并懷疑在美留學(xué)的中國學(xué)生和學(xué)者收集技術(shù)情報(bào)。這些毫無根據(jù)的看法正在妖魔化中國，煽動(dòng)美國公眾對中國的負(fù)面情緒，從而加深了兩國人民之間的敵意。

The Trump administration accuses China of unfair trade policies. China is accused of taking advantage of the US, forcing US companies to transfer technology to local companies, stealing US intellectual property rights, and Chinese students and scholars studying in the US are supposedly collectors of technical intelligence. These unfounded views are demonizing China, fanning the negative sentiment of China amongst the American public, and as a result, deepening the hostility between the two peoples.

我認(rèn)為現(xiàn)在的當(dāng)務(wù)之急是讓兩國人民，尤其是美國人民了解中美貿(mào)易的真相。

I believe that what is urgent now is to let the people of both countries, especially the United States, understand the truth about China-US trade.

首先，中美貿(mào)易是自由和公平的。雖然作為一個(gè)發(fā)展中國家，中國的關(guān)稅高于美國，但它的關(guān)稅低于許多發(fā)展中國家，包括印度。中國并沒有強(qiáng)迫人們購買中國產(chǎn)品，美國進(jìn)口商也并不愚蠢。中國的進(jìn)口產(chǎn)品有助于多年來收入增長緩慢的美國中產(chǎn)階級，使他們以同樣收入買到更多商品。2017年中國出口的增長，恰恰是美國經(jīng)濟(jì)增長強(qiáng)勁和消費(fèi)者信心增加的結(jié)果。

First of all, China-US trade is free and fair. Although China as a developing country has higher tariffs than the US, it has lower tariffs than many developing countries, including India. China is not forcing people to buy from it, and US importers are not stupid. China's imports have helped the US middle class, which have experienced slow income growth for years, to buy more goods with the same income. The increase in Chinese exports in 2017 is precisely the result of strong US growth and increased consumer confidence.

第二，2001年加入WTO后，中國市場基本上是開放的。中國是美國出口增長最快的市場，如果中國市場不開放，就不可能有56%的美國大豆、26%的波音飛機(jī)和16%的美國汽車出口到中國。

Second, China's market is basically open after its accession to the WTO in 2001. China is the fastest growing market for US exports. If the Chinese market is not open, it is impossible to see 56% of US soybean exports, 26% of Boeing aircraft, and 16% of US automobiles exported to China.

第三，美國的出口管制是增加對華出口的障礙。與其他一些發(fā)展中國家一樣，中國的比較優(yōu)勢是勞動(dòng)力成本較低，而美國的比較優(yōu)勢在于資本、技術(shù)和土地。在這種差異的推動(dòng)下，中國向美國出口勞動(dòng)密集型產(chǎn)品，美國則向中國出口技術(shù)產(chǎn)品和農(nóng)產(chǎn)品。正如美國中國商會(huì)所抱怨的，美國的出口管制政策比歐洲(特別是德國)和日本更嚴(yán)格，它限制了美國的對華出口。美國的出口管制對貿(mào)易逆差也應(yīng)該負(fù)有一定責(zé)任。

Third, US export controls are a barrier to more exports to China. Like some other developing countries, China's comparative advantage lies in cheaper labor. America's comparative advantage lies in capital, technology, and land. Driven by this difference, China exports labor-intensive products to America, and the US exports technology products and agricultural products to China. As the US Chamber of Commerce in China complains, the US export control policies are stricter than those of Europe (especially Germany) and Japan, limiting US exports to China. US export controls should take part of the responsibility for the trade deficit.

第四，美中貿(mào)易是全球供應(yīng)鏈的組成部分。雖然全球化給各國帶來了財(cái)富和增長，但它并沒有改變富國和窮國之間的分工。實(shí)際上，美國處于供應(yīng)鏈的高端，而中國處于供應(yīng)鏈的低端。蘋果手機(jī)就是最典型的例子。幾乎所有蘋果手機(jī)都在中國組裝，但中國工人和工廠只獲得5%的附加值(主要是勞動(dòng)力成本)，而蘋果的設(shè)計(jì)、品牌和銷售拿走附加值的近60%，蘋果的美國投資者分享了這些利潤。然而，作為蘋果手機(jī)組裝的最后一環(huán)，中國必須承擔(dān)蘋果公司出口到美國的全部價(jià)值。不同的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家認(rèn)為，全球供應(yīng)鏈把中國對美國的出口夸大了40%到60%。

Fourth, US-China trade takes place within the global supply chain. While globalization has brought wealth and growth to countries, it has not changed the division of labor between the rich and the poor nations. In reality, the US is at the high end of the supply chain, while China is at the low end of the supply chain. Apple's iPhone is the most typical example. Almost all iPhones are assembled in China, but Chinese workers and factories only receive 5% value added (mainly labor costs), and Apple's design, branding, and sales account for nearly 60% of the value added, and American investors from Apple share these profits. However, as the final assembly point of the iPhone, China has to bear the entire value of all Apple exports to the US. The global supply chain exaggerates China's exports to the United States by as much as 40-60%, according to different economists.

第五，特朗普和其他保護(hù)主義者只強(qiáng)調(diào)中美商品貿(mào)易逆差，而故意忽視美國在服務(wù)貿(mào)易中對中國的順差。例如，據(jù)中國的統(tǒng)計(jì)，2017年美國對華服務(wù)貿(mào)易順差高達(dá)541億美元，如果采用美國標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，2017年美國對華服務(wù)貿(mào)易順差總額超過900億美元。美國從中國游客和學(xué)生，以及從對中國的出口版權(quán)和專利那里獲得了大量好處。

Fifth, Trump and other protectionists only emphasize the Sino-US trade deficit in goods, but they deliberately ignore the US surplus with China in service trade. For example, according to Chinese statistics, the US service trade surplus with China in 2017 was as high as $54.1 billion; if the US standard applies, the total US service trade surplus with China in 2017 would exceed $90 billion. The US has gained a lot of benefits from Chinese tourists and students, and from exporting copyrights and patents to China.

第六，貿(mào)易保護(hù)主義者故意忽視的另一點(diǎn)是，在華投資的美國公司銷售額已超過5000億美元。它們不僅從快速增長的中國市場獲取巨額利潤，還導(dǎo)致美國零部件以及知識產(chǎn)權(quán)出口到中國，這反過來也促進(jìn)了美國經(jīng)濟(jì)的增長。

Sixth, another thing trade protectionists deliberately ignore is that the sales of US companies investing in China have surpassed $500 billion. They not only make huge profits from the fast-growing Chinese market, they also lead to the export of US parts and components as well as intellectual property rights to China, which in turn promotes growth in the US economy.

第七，最新數(shù)據(jù)反駁了對中國所謂“盜竊知識產(chǎn)權(quán)”的指責(zé)。雖然知識產(chǎn)權(quán)制度起步較晚(始于上世紀(jì)90年代初)，但中國已經(jīng)建立了相對完整的知識產(chǎn)權(quán)法律保護(hù)制度，包括設(shè)立知識產(chǎn)權(quán)法院和專門的司法機(jī)構(gòu)，對知識產(chǎn)權(quán)的保護(hù)明顯已經(jīng)生效。例如，2017年中國對外支付知識產(chǎn)權(quán)費(fèi)用達(dá)到286億美元，比2001年加入WTO的時(shí)候增加了15倍。而美國知識產(chǎn)權(quán)所有者是最大的受益人。

Seventh, the latest data refutes the accusations about China's so-called “theft of intellectual property rights”. Although the system of intellectual property rights started late (since the early 1990s), China has established a relatively complete intellectual property legal protection system, including the establishment of intellectual property courts and specialized judicial institutions, and the protection of IP rights has clearly taken effect. For example, in 2017, China's external payment of intellectual property fees reached $28.6 billion, a 15-fold increase over the time when it joined the WTO in 2001. US intellectual property owners are the biggest beneficiaries.

第八，至于所謂中國“強(qiáng)制技術(shù)轉(zhuǎn)讓”問題，并沒有證據(jù)表明中國政府有法律或法規(guī)對外國投資企業(yè)實(shí)施這一要求，中國也沒有對美國企業(yè)強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行技術(shù)轉(zhuǎn)讓。美國汽車業(yè)在中國市場的巨大成功表明，中美合資企業(yè)的主要基礎(chǔ)是自愿的契約行為。通用汽車和福特通過合資企業(yè)向中國出口了大量汽車和零部件，已經(jīng)成為中國最大的汽車制造商之一。

Eighth, as for the so-called "forced technology transfer" problem in China, there is no evidence that the Chinese government has a law or regulation that imposes this requirement on foreign-invested enterprises, and there is no enforcement of the transfer of technology on US companies. The great success of the US auto industry in the Chinese market indicates that China-US joint ventures are mainly based on voluntary contractual behavior. General Motor and Ford have exported a large number of automobiles and parts to China through joint ventures, becoming one of the largest automobile manufacturers in China.

第九，“中國制造2025”產(chǎn)業(yè)政策是特朗普政府攻擊中國的主要目標(biāo)之一。顯然，他擔(dān)心中國會(huì)采取所謂“國家資本主義”政策，通過國家補(bǔ)貼提高中國企業(yè)在高科技產(chǎn)業(yè)的競爭力。這種指責(zé)是毫無根據(jù)的，原因是：首先，利用產(chǎn)業(yè)政策升級中國企業(yè)技術(shù)是中國的發(fā)展權(quán)，符合WTO規(guī)則。其次，中國的政策只是指導(dǎo)性的，不是強(qiáng)制性的。第三，中國的產(chǎn)業(yè)升級是必要的，因?yàn)殡S著勞動(dòng)力成本的上升，中國的勞動(dòng)力競爭優(yōu)勢大多已經(jīng)喪失，中國經(jīng)濟(jì)增長面臨著巨大困難。此外，美國自己在農(nóng)業(yè)和制造業(yè)領(lǐng)域存在大量補(bǔ)貼，最近濫用301條款和232條款(以國家安全為名)就是美國版國家保護(hù)主義的一個(gè)例子。

Ninth, the industrial policy “Made in China 2025” is one of the main goals of the Trump administration's attack on China. Obviously, he is worried that China will adopt the so-called “state capitalism” policy and enhance the competitiveness of Chinese enterprises in the high-tech industry through state subsidies. This accusation is unfounded, because of the following factors: the use of industrial policies to upgrade the technology of Chinese enterprises is China's development right and is in line with WTO regulations. Second, China's policies are only guidelines, they're not mandatory. Third, China's industrial upgrade is necessary because, with the rise of labor costs, China's labor competitive advantage is mostly lost, and China's eco