越南能在中美貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)中幸免于難嗎？

When elephants fight, the ants perish: The Khmer proverb captures the sense of peril in the escalating trade war between the United States and China. The world’s two superpowers have locked tusks over tariffs, and the rest of the world — especially Asia — seems in danger of being trampled. As the trade war heads into its third month, with the United States set to impose a new tranche of $200 billion in tariffs this fall, expanding the conflict fourfold, one truth is clearer than ever: In a globalized economy, nothing exists in isolation. There is no such thing as a trade war of surgical strikes, in which tariffs hit their targets and leave everything around them unscathed. In its attempt to punish China for unfair trade practices and to reduce a $375 billion trade deficit, the Trump administration is also inflicting harm on some of America’s allies in Asia — forcing them, like ants under the elephants’ feet, to scramble in search of escape.

大象打架，螞蟻遭殃：這句高棉諺語(yǔ)可以準(zhǔn)確地形容不斷升級(jí)的美中貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)的危機(jī)感。世界上兩個(gè)超級(jí)大國(guó)在關(guān)稅問(wèn)題上像兩只大象一樣纏斗，而世界其他地區(qū)，尤其是亞洲，似乎面臨被踩傷的危險(xiǎn)。隨著貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)進(jìn)入第三個(gè)月，美國(guó)將在今年秋季再對(duì)2000億美元商品加征關(guān)稅，將沖突擴(kuò)大三倍。一個(gè)比以往任何時(shí)候都清晰的事實(shí)是：在全球化的經(jīng)濟(jì)中，沒(méi)有什么是孤立存在的。在貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)中，不存在外科手術(shù)式的打擊;參戰(zhàn)雙方想讓關(guān)稅只擊中目標(biāo)，而他們周?chē)囊磺卸己涟l(fā)無(wú)損是不可能的。為了懲罰中國(guó)不公平的貿(mào)易操作、減少3750億美元的貿(mào)易逆差，特朗普政府也在對(duì)美國(guó)在亞洲的一些盟友造成傷害——迫使他們像大象腳下的螞蟻一樣，爭(zhēng)先恐后地尋求逃脫。

Consider the predicament of Vietnam. China and the United States, which each have their own violent histories in Vietnam, are now that country’s most important trading partners. Together, the giants gobbled up roughly 35 percent of Vietnam’s exports last year, furthering its transformation from sleepy purveyor of rice and coffee to manufacturing hub. When the trade war broke out, so did the ominous headlines in Hanoi. A rapid devaluation of the Chinese yuan sparked a brief run on Vietnam’s currency and a drop in its stock market. Rumors spread about an influx of cheap Chinese consumer goods and the threat of American protectionism spreading in ways that would affect Vietnam’s vital exports. And there was a tangible concern: Nearly $5 billion of Vietnamese exports are part of China’s value-added supply chain, meaning they may feel the impact of being exposed to punitive American tariffs.

想想越南的困境。中國(guó)和美國(guó)在越南都有自己的暴力歷史，現(xiàn)在都是越南最重要的貿(mào)易伙伴。去年，兩個(gè)大國(guó)總共吃下了越南約35%的出口，推動(dòng)了越南從一個(gè)不甚活躍的大米和咖啡供應(yīng)國(guó)向制造業(yè)中心的轉(zhuǎn)變。當(dāng)貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)爆發(fā)時(shí)，河內(nèi)也出現(xiàn)了不祥的新聞標(biāo)題。人民幣迅速貶值引發(fā)了越南貨幣短暫的拋售，并導(dǎo)致越南股市下跌。流言紛紛傳出：中國(guó)廉價(jià)消費(fèi)品可能大量涌入;美國(guó)保護(hù)主義蔓延可能會(huì)影響和威脅到越南的重要出口。另外，還有一個(gè)切實(shí)的擔(dān)憂(yōu)：將近50億美元的越南出口是中國(guó)增值供應(yīng)鏈的一部分，這意味著這些出口商可能會(huì)受到美國(guó)懲罰性關(guān)稅的影響。

Soon another sort of reaction began taking place. Driven by the dangers of the trade war, many foreign companies with stakes in China — those ants underfoot — have started shifting production away from China to Southeast Asia. One sign of this development was on display in mid-July, when a group of visitors showed up on Vietnam’s northern coast near Ha Long Bay. The men in white shirts and dark ties were not tourists. They represented 72 Japanese businesses, in industries ranging from textiles to electronics, and they were looking for economic refuge. “Many of these Japanese firms have been operating in China,” Nguyen Duc Tiep, an official from the local-investment promotion center, told a Vietnamese magazine. “They want to expand their investment markets out of China to shun risks caused by the nation’s rising production costs and by the U.S.-China trade war, which is making it hard for Japanese firms to export their products to the U.S. from China.”

很快，另一種反應(yīng)開(kāi)始發(fā)生。在貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)的危險(xiǎn)驅(qū)使下，許多在中國(guó)持有股份的外國(guó)公司——那些大象腳下的螞蟻——開(kāi)始將生產(chǎn)從中國(guó)轉(zhuǎn)移到東南亞。這一發(fā)展趨勢(shì)的跡象之一是7月中旬，一群訪(fǎng)客出現(xiàn)在越南北部海岸下龍灣(Halong Bay)附近。穿白襯衫打黑領(lǐng)帶的男子們不是游客。他們代表了從紡織到電子等行業(yè)的72家日本企業(yè)，正在尋求經(jīng)濟(jì)庇護(hù)。“這些日本公司中有很多在中國(guó)運(yùn)營(yíng)，”當(dāng)?shù)赝顿Y促進(jìn)中心的官員阮德捷(Nguyen Duc Tiep，音)告訴一家越南雜志，“他們希望將投資市場(chǎng)擴(kuò)大到中國(guó)以外，以規(guī)避中國(guó)生產(chǎn)成本上升和美中貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)造成的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)使得日本公司很難從中國(guó)向美國(guó)出口產(chǎn)品。”

The Japanese businessmen may be among the trade war’s first economic victims. But the shift of manufacturing away from China is not a new phenomenon. Over the past few years, as wages in Chinese factories have risen sharply, many companies, foreign and Chinese alike, have begun moving at least some of their operations to Southeast Asia to take advantage of lower production costs. In Vietnam, where wages are barely a third of those in China, Adidas now makes twice as many shoes as it does in China, and Intel and Samsung Electronics have made billion-dollar investments there. The country’s export-led growth depends on attracting foreign investment, and now American and Chinese policies may be hastening its arrival. “For many companies, the trade conflict is a catalyst to explore changes they hadn’t contemplated before,” says Jon Cowley, a tax-and-trade partner at the law firm Baker McKenzie in Hong Kong. “For others, it’s an accelerant to a process they’d already started. The trade conflict is just pushing them over the finish line.”

日本商人可能是這場(chǎng)貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)的第一批經(jīng)濟(jì)受害者。但是，把制造業(yè)從中國(guó)轉(zhuǎn)移出來(lái)并不是一個(gè)新現(xiàn)象。在過(guò)去幾年中，隨著中國(guó)工廠(chǎng)的工資大幅增長(zhǎng)，包括外企和中國(guó)公司在內(nèi)的許多企業(yè)都已開(kāi)始把它們的至少一部分業(yè)務(wù)轉(zhuǎn)移到東南亞，以利用那里低廉的生產(chǎn)成本。在工資幾乎不及中國(guó)三分之一的越南，阿迪達(dá)斯目前在那里生產(chǎn)的運(yùn)動(dòng)鞋是其在中國(guó)生產(chǎn)的兩倍，英特爾和三星電子也已在南亞投資了數(shù)十億美元。越南的出口導(dǎo)向型增長(zhǎng)依賴(lài)于吸引外國(guó)投資，現(xiàn)在美國(guó)和中國(guó)的政策也許正在加速投資的到來(lái)。“對(duì)很多公司來(lái)說(shuō)，中美貿(mào)易沖突是一個(gè)催化劑，推動(dòng)它們探索以前未曾考慮過(guò)的變化，”香港律所貝克·麥堅(jiān)時(shí)(Baker McKenzie)的稅收與貿(mào)易合伙人喬恩·考利(Jon Cowley)說(shuō)。“對(duì)其他人來(lái)說(shuō)，這是一個(gè)加速他們已經(jīng)開(kāi)始的進(jìn)程的東西。中美貿(mào)易沖突只是正在推動(dòng)他們?cè)竭^(guò)終點(diǎn)線(xiàn)。”

It is still early in the trade war, only two months in, so many of these corporate moves are just taking shape. Still, the race is on to secure excess manufacturing capacity all around the region — in Thailand, Indonesia and elsewhere. In late July, Delta Electronics, a Taiwanese producer of Apple power components, approved a $2.14 billion buyout of its Thai affiliate to cope with the growing trade risks. Also this summer, Hong Kong’s Techtronic Industries (T.T.I.), the maker of Hoover vacuum cleaners and Milwaukee power tools, opened a new plant in Vietnam and another, its sixth, in the United States. Some 76 percent of T.T.I.’s revenue comes from North America. “We have always said we won’t want all our eggs in one basket,” the company’s chief executive, Joseph Galli, said in August, stressing the importance of “a flexible supply chain.”

貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)仍處于初期，開(kāi)戰(zhàn)才兩個(gè)月，所以，這些企業(yè)做法中的許多才剛有模樣。盡管如此，為確保在包括泰國(guó)、印度尼西亞和其他地方的整個(gè)區(qū)域有更多制造能力的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)已經(jīng)開(kāi)始。7月下旬，蘋(píng)果電源元件的臺(tái)資生產(chǎn)商臺(tái)達(dá)電子(Delta Electronics)批準(zhǔn)了以21.4億美元收購(gòu)其泰國(guó)子公司的交易，以應(yīng)對(duì)日益增長(zhǎng)的貿(mào)易風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。同樣在今年夏天，生產(chǎn)胡佛(Hoover)吸塵器和密爾沃基(Milwaukee)電動(dòng)工具的香港制造商創(chuàng)科實(shí)業(yè)(T.T.I.)在越南建了一個(gè)新工廠(chǎng)，并在美國(guó)建了其第六個(gè)工廠(chǎng)。創(chuàng)科實(shí)業(yè)大約76%的營(yíng)收來(lái)自北美。“我們一直都在說(shuō)，我們不希望把所有的雞蛋放在一個(gè)籃子里，”公司首席執(zhí)行官約瑟夫·蓋里(Joseph Galli)今年8月在強(qiáng)調(diào)“靈活供應(yīng)鏈”的重要性時(shí)說(shuō)。

Supply chains, innocuous as they sound, are a locus of collateral pain in this trade war. The American exports that China is hitting with retaliatory tariffs are mostly simple goods sourced close to home: pork, soybeans, whiskey. But China’s exports to the United States, especially in high-tech, are complex products assembled in China from a staggering array of foreign components and raw materials. A “Made in China” laptop shipped to America, for example, may have a South Korean screen, a Japanese hard drive and a memory chip from Taiwan. A tariff hurts every part of this international supply chain. Asia’s most advanced economies, including Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, are so globalized that they can easily get caught in this protectionist crossfire.

供應(yīng)鏈聽(tīng)起來(lái)不冒犯任何人，但這場(chǎng)貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)的附帶痛苦正確切地發(fā)生在供應(yīng)鏈上。中國(guó)以報(bào)復(fù)性關(guān)稅打擊的美國(guó)出口產(chǎn)品大多是在美國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)的簡(jiǎn)單商品：豬肉、大豆、威士忌。但是中國(guó)對(duì)美國(guó)的出口，特別是高技術(shù)產(chǎn)品，是在中國(guó)組裝的復(fù)雜產(chǎn)品，用于組裝這些產(chǎn)品的外國(guó)零部件和原材料多得驚人。例如，一臺(tái)運(yùn)往美國(guó)的“中國(guó)制造”筆記本電腦里可能有一個(gè)韓國(guó)屏幕、一個(gè)日本硬盤(pán)和一個(gè)來(lái)自臺(tái)灣的內(nèi)存芯片。關(guān)稅傷害這個(gè)國(guó)際供應(yīng)鏈中的每一部分。包括日本、韓國(guó)和臺(tái)灣在內(nèi)的亞洲最先進(jìn)的經(jīng)濟(jì)體都高度全球化，以至于它們很容易在這場(chǎng)保護(hù)主義戰(zhàn)火中中槍。

Taiwan may stand to lose the most. It supplies 18 percent of China’s total imports of intermediate goods, or nearly 14 percent of Taiwan’s gross domestic product, according to the Stimson Center in Washington. As Tsai Ming-fang, an economist at Taipei’s Tamkang University, told Bloomberg: “Trump’s tariffs are giving Taiwanese companies further incentives to move to Southeast Asia.”

臺(tái)灣可能會(huì)承受最大的損失。根據(jù)華盛頓的史汀生中心(Stimson Center)的數(shù)據(jù)，臺(tái)灣提供了中國(guó)全部進(jìn)口中間商品的18%，這種出口占臺(tái)灣國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值的14%。正如臺(tái)北淡江大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家蔡明芳對(duì)彭博社(Bloomberg)所說(shuō)：“特朗普的關(guān)稅正在給臺(tái)灣公司更多搬往東南亞的動(dòng)力。”

The dust kicked up by the trade war obscures the fact that Asia is the world’s most dynamic trading region. According to the World Trade Organization, Asia in 2017 had the world’s fastest growth in trade volume for both imports and exports, 9.6 percent and 6.7 percent, respectively. Eighteen months ago, the leaders of Vietnam and 10 other Pacific Rim nations believed the economic outlook would be enhanced even further by the creation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership. The agreement, which included the United States and Japan but not China, also offered the chance to push back, as a group, against Beijing’s unfair trade practices like intellectual-property theft and forcing companies that do business in China to share their technology.

貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)掀起的塵埃掩蓋了這樣一個(gè)事實(shí)：亞洲是全球最具活力的貿(mào)易區(qū)。根據(jù)世界貿(mào)易組織的數(shù)據(jù)，2017年，亞洲的進(jìn)出口貿(mào)易總額的增長(zhǎng)速度在全球最高，分別為9.6%和6.7%。18個(gè)月前，越南和其他10個(gè)環(huán)太平洋國(guó)家的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人都以為，跨太平洋伙伴關(guān)系協(xié)定(Trans-Pacific Partnership，簡(jiǎn)稱(chēng)TPP)的簽署將進(jìn)一步提升區(qū)域經(jīng)濟(jì)前景。針對(duì)北京不公平的貿(mào)易做法(比如盜取知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)，以及迫使在中國(guó)做生意的外國(guó)公司分享技術(shù)等)，包括美國(guó)和日本但不包括中國(guó)的TPP，也會(huì)給作為一個(gè)集體的協(xié)定國(guó)提供反擊的機(jī)會(huì)。

President Trump rejected T.P.P. out of hand. Now, with diminished influence in the region, the United States wages its trade war alone, leaving many of its erstwhile Asian partners, and many American companies, too, stuck in the middle, seeking the safest way out.

特朗普總統(tǒng)不假思索地拒絕了TPP。如今，隨著美國(guó)在亞太地區(qū)的影響力減弱，美國(guó)又獨(dú)自發(fā)動(dòng)了貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)，許多昔日的亞洲伙伴、以及許多美國(guó)企業(yè)都被夾在了中間，它們都在尋找最安全的出路。

To offset the conflict’s negative impact, Beijing has slashed tariffs to Asian countries, a reminder, it seems, that China will remain the lone superpower in Asia long after the trade war is over. This appeal, however, may not stop the flow of manufacturers out of China to Southeast Asia. The American shoe-and-accessory maker Steve Madden, for example, is shifting its handbag production from China to Cambodia — 15 percent this year, 30 percent in 2019. (A U.S. Fashion Industry Association study released in July showed that two-thirds of all textile companies are expected to lower production in China over the next two years, citing United States trade protectionism as the top challenge.) Moving production to a new location is expensive and complicated. Given the mercurial man behind the trade war, and the chaotic churn of American politics, some executives are holding fast in hopes that it will all go away. But as new tariffs loom for another $200 billion worth of Chinese imports, with 6,031 products on its target list, the trade war no longer looks like a short-term crisis.

為了抵消貿(mào)易沖突的負(fù)面影響，中國(guó)政府大幅度降低了對(duì)亞洲國(guó)家的關(guān)稅。這似乎在提醒人們，待到貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)結(jié)束之后，中國(guó)在未來(lái)的很多年里，仍將是亞洲唯一的超級(jí)大國(guó)。然而，這種吸引力可能不足以阻止制造商從中國(guó)轉(zhuǎn)向東南亞。比如，美國(guó)鞋履及配飾制造商史蒂夫·馬登(Steve Madden)正將手袋的生產(chǎn)從中國(guó)轉(zhuǎn)移到柬埔寨，今年轉(zhuǎn)移15%，2019年再轉(zhuǎn)移30%。(美國(guó)時(shí)裝行業(yè)協(xié)會(huì)[U.S. Fashion Industry Association]7月份發(fā)布的一份研究報(bào)告顯示，三分之二的紡織企業(yè)預(yù)計(jì)將在未來(lái)兩年減少在中國(guó)的生產(chǎn)，這些企業(yè)認(rèn)為美國(guó)的貿(mào)易保護(hù)主義是其面臨的最大挑戰(zhàn)。)將生產(chǎn)轉(zhuǎn)移到一個(gè)新的地方既昂貴又復(fù)雜?？紤]到貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)推動(dòng)者的喜怒無(wú)常，以及美國(guó)政治混亂的反反復(fù)復(fù)，一些高管正勉力支撐，希望這一切都會(huì)過(guò)去。但是，隨著即將對(duì)又一批價(jià)值2000億美元的中國(guó)進(jìn)口商品(目標(biāo)清單上總共有6031種產(chǎn)品)加征新關(guān)稅，貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)看起來(lái)不再像是一次短期危機(jī)。

As the battle escalates, there’s a worry that Chinese companies may shift more operations southward, too, using ‘’tariff-jumping” tactics to get their goods to the United States. The Vietnamese, at least, are vigilant against Chinese intrusions. Their antagonistic history with their northern neighbor — the millennium under Chinese imperialism, the bloody 1979 border war, the ongoing disputes over the South China Sea — has colored recent protests against Chinese businesses. It almost seems like karmic payback that Vietnam might benefit from China’s conflict with the United States, a country that, despite its own protracted war here, has become one of Vietnam’s strongest allies.

隨著戰(zhàn)斗的升級(jí)，人們擔(dān)心中國(guó)公司也會(huì)把更多的業(yè)務(wù)向南轉(zhuǎn)移，使用“關(guān)稅避讓”策略將貨物運(yùn)往美國(guó)。至少越南人對(duì)中國(guó)人的進(jìn)入保持警惕。越南與自己這個(gè)北方鄰國(guó)的敵對(duì)歷史——上千年的中華帝國(guó)統(tǒng)治，慘烈的1979年邊境戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)，在南海持續(xù)不斷的爭(zhēng)端——影響了最近針對(duì)中國(guó)企業(yè)的抗議活動(dòng)。越南可能從中美兩國(guó)的貿(mào)易沖突中獲益這一點(diǎn)，幾乎像是一種因果報(bào)應(yīng)。美國(guó)雖然也與越南進(jìn)行過(guò)曠日持久的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)，但如今已經(jīng)成為越南最強(qiáng)大的盟友之一。

Nobody can predict all of the pain and permutations of the trade war. The Vietnamese government is cautious, even projecting negligible declines in growth over the next five years. Others are far more sanguine. In July, Standard Chartered raised its growth forecasts for Vietnam to 7 percent this year, based on the influx of foreign direct investment. In addition to attracting companies hedging their Chinese bets, Vietnam may also pull in American buyers eager to diversify their imports from outside China. “The consensus before was that T.P.P. would be the catalyst,” says Michael Kokalari, chief economist at the Vietnam-focused asset-management firm VinaCapital. “But the trade war could be the thing that really opens the floodgates.” In Vietnam, fighting elephants just might give the nimblest (or luckiest) ants a chance to thrive.

沒(méi)有人能預(yù)測(cè)貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)帶來(lái)的所有痛苦和轉(zhuǎn)變。越南政府持謹(jǐn)慎態(tài)度，甚至預(yù)測(cè)貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)對(duì)未來(lái)五年的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)可能造成微不足道的下滑。其他人則樂(lè)觀(guān)得多。今年7月，渣打銀行(Standard Chartered)將越南今年的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)預(yù)期上調(diào)至7%，理由是外國(guó)直接投資的流入。除了吸引企業(yè)來(lái)這里來(lái)對(duì)沖它們?cè)谥袊?guó)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，越南還可能吸引來(lái)美國(guó)買(mǎi)家，這些買(mǎi)家正急于從中國(guó)以外的地方進(jìn)口，以達(dá)到貨源的多樣化。“以前的共識(shí)是，TPP將是催化劑，”邁克爾·科卡拉里(Michael Kokalari)說(shuō)，他是以越南為重點(diǎn)的資產(chǎn)管理公司VinaCapital的首席經(jīng)濟(jì)師。“但貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)可能會(huì)真的打開(kāi)閘門(mén)。在越南，打架的大象可能會(huì)給最靈活(或最幸運(yùn))的螞蟻一個(gè)茁壯成長(zhǎng)的機(jī)會(huì)。