美國政要第6課
The Gulf War & RMA
--Interview with Dr. Eliot Cohen, Professor of Strategic Studies at Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University (February 18, 1998) 訪霍普金斯大學(xué)尼采國際研究生院教授愛略特•科恩博士
MR. CHEN BOJIANG: The U.S. began the discussion of military revolution and future warfare just after the Gulf War in 1991. Currently the U.S. is planning another military attack on Iraq because of the weapons inspection1 crisis. In the context of military revolution, what are some of the changes in strategy and operational methods or tactics the U.S. plans to use in the coming attack on Iraq?
DR. COHEN: I’m not sure there’s much that I can add that’s not in the article. If I would, it would probably be classified-and I couldn’t share it. I think the biggest changes are going to be in the kinds of weapons that we use-all precision-guided weapons and I also suspect that the intelligence base will be better than it was. I’m not sure that there’ll be huge differences in operational technique2 -it will be more focused on what we called, at the time of the Gulf War, strategic targets. But I’m not sure there will be huge operational level changes. I don’t know about those and I don’t want to know about those.
MR.CHEN: What is the topmost achievement or theoretical breakthrough3 as a result of the discussion on the RMA up to now?
DR. COHEN: I’m not sure that there’s been a breakthrough. I think we are still at a very early stage, theoretically. Americans, to some extent are not as theoretically inclined as perhaps we should be.
MR. CHEN: What are the possible implications4 of the RMA on military strategy and national defense policy of the U.S.?
DR. COHEN: Well, I think one possibility is obviously it could-I think it already has, and will continue to-give the U.S. tremendous5 military potential and much more military potential than that of various opponents. I think one of the biggest change that we will see, and have already seen, is that military organizations will begin to look very different from one another. They will be much more tailored to their geographic and political circumstances. And it will be much harder to assess them and to compare them.
MR. CHEN: What are the main trends in the development of the RMA?
DR. COHEN: I think there are a number of trends. One very basic one is toward the end of the mass army6, that is to say the importance of large numbers of soldiers. I think that’s really gone down very substantially. I think towards the creation of network organizations rather than hierarchical organizations which is a profound change to the use of long range precision strike. Obviously, there’s a weapons technology which is very much the direction which things are going and I think in general towards moving away from large-manned platforms of the traditional type. I think it’ll be a long sunset, but we will, I think see the sunset of the named fighter bomber. I suspect tanks will probably look very different 20 years from now than they do today. And some of the large platforms like the aircraft carriers may not survive in the forms that we’ve known them. I think those are some of the big changes.
MR. CHEN: In one of your articles, you, and many other experts, including those on the National Defense Panel, argue that the Pentagon’s “two-war strategy” is not necessary. Therefore, is the U.S. wasting valuable time by applying the effects of the RMA to this strategy?
DR. COHEN: I would put it differently. I would say that by pursuing the two-war strategy, we’re denying ourselves to devote adequate resources to the RMA, because the “two-war strategy” tends to give us rather large force-structure focused on today’s technology. And what is more important, I think, is a longer-term research and development efforts.
MR. CHEN: What benefits might the U.S. expect to reap from a more focused attempt to nurture7 the RMA?
DR. COHEN: I think there’re two. First in general, the U.S. benefits from being the militarily predominant power. That’s-the RMA will help ensure that. But I think the other reason is more defense-the thing about the information technologies is that they’re truly available to everybody and since that is the case I can easily imagine either states or non-states trying to compete with the U.S., not head-to-head, not aircraft carrier-to-aircraft carrier, but to acquire the ability to deny the U.S. the ability to operate freely in various parts of the world. And to that end, I think it’s important for us to always keep quite a substantial8 advantage.
MR. CHEN: How do you view the essence of the RMA?
DR. COHEN: I think the essence of RMA will be some very large changes in the way the military’s organized and operates.
MR. CHEN: Could you give me some comments on the next direction of the research of the RMA?
DR. COHEN: As I said, I think the biggest issues will be experimentation-what’s more important now, either in research and development or theory - will be trying different kinds of forces, different kinds of operational concepts9. I think that’s the next task and not sitting around and thinking about it. It’s going to be trying to go out in the field and seeing what one can do.
MR. CHEN: What are the main factors driving the RMA?
DR. COHEN: I think the information revolution is a very big part of it. I also think the end of the Cold War is very important. It creates a very different international environment with the U.S. thinking about very different kinds of threats and that makes it possible at some level, to start over again. There is an important geopolitical element to it as well. I think for the U.S. for example, we’re increasingly aware that all the military has to be expeditionary10. During the Cold War the army and air force thought of itself as operating from Europe. And I don’t think that’s as nearly as much the case.
WORDS AND EXPRESSIONS 詞匯提示
1.inspection [] n.核查
2.operational technique 作戰(zhàn)技術(shù)
3.breakthrough [] n.突破
4.implication [] n. 含義
5.tremendous [] n. 巨大的
6.mass army 大規(guī)模的軍隊(duì)
7.nurture [] v.培育
8.substantial [] a.實(shí)質(zhì)性的
9.operational concept 作戰(zhàn)概念
10.expeditionary [] a.遠(yuǎn)征的
QUESTIONS AFTER LISTENING 聽后答題：
1. When did the U.S. begin the discussion of the military revolution according to Dr. Cohen?
A.In 1997. B.In 1989.
C.In 1995. D.In 1991.
2. What are the biggest changes in the kinds of weapons that the U.S. plans to use in the coming attack on Iraq in Dr. Cohen’s view?
A.All weapons that U.S. use will be precision-guided weapons.
B.All weapons that U.S. use will be strategic weapons.
C.Only small part of weapons that U.S. use will be precision-guided weapons.
D.Only small part of weapons that U.S. use will be strategic weapons.
3. What was the obvious implications of the RMA on military strategy and national defese policy of the U.S. according to Dr. Cohen?
A.It could give the U.S. tremendous economic interests.
B.It could give the U.S. tremendous military potential and much more military potential than that of various opponents.
C.It could give the U.S. tremendous political interests.
D.It could give the U.S. tremendous cultural interests.
4. What is the basic trend of the RMA?
A.It is toward the end of the mass destruction weapons.
B.It is toward the end of the mass army.
C.It is toward the end of the mass conflicts.
D.It is toward the end of the nuclear war.
5. What was Dr. Cohen’s view on large-manned platform?
A.It will keep with the traditional type.
B.It will move away from the traditional type in a long time.
C.It will move away from the traditional type very soon.
D.It will only use for 20 years.
6. What kind of strategy was criticized by Dr. Cohen?
A.Containment strategy.
B.Enlargement strategy.
C.Two-war strategy.
D.Engagement strategy.
7. Why did Dr. Cohen criticize the two-war strategy?
A.Because the strategy tends to give the U.S. rather large force-structure focused on today’s technology.
B.Because it tends to use the nuclear weapons.
C.Because it tends to develop unmanned aerial vehicle.
D.Because I tends to deploy a constellation of sensors.
8. What will be the essence of the RMA according to Dr Cohen?
A.It will be some very large changes in the way the military’s organized and operates.
B.It will be some very large changes in the way the weapons develop.
C.It will be some very large changes in the way the forces are employed.
D.It will be some very large changes in the way of operations.
9. What was Dr. Cohen’s comment on the next direction of the research of the RMA?
A.The biggest issues will be the expenditure.
B.It will be the concepts.
C.It will be the experimentation.
D.It will be the organization.
10. What are the main factors of driving the RMA in Dr. Cohen’s view?
A.They are the political democracy and economic integrity.
B.They are the information revolution, international environment and geopolitical element.
C.They are the information revolution and cultural revolution.
D.They are the economic globalization and information revolution.
【參考譯文】
海灣戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)與軍事革命
陳伯江：美國是在1991年海灣戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)之后開始軍事革命和未來戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的討論。由于當(dāng)前的武器核查危機(jī)，美國正在計(jì)劃對(duì)伊拉克實(shí)施另一場(chǎng)軍事打擊。從軍事革命的角度來說，如果美國再次對(duì)伊進(jìn)行軍事打擊，其戰(zhàn)略、作戰(zhàn)方法或戰(zhàn)術(shù)的運(yùn)用會(huì)有些什么變化？
科恩：關(guān)于這個(gè)問題我寫過一篇文章，看來你也已讀過這篇文章。我不知道我能對(duì)文章內(nèi)容作多少補(bǔ)充。如果要我補(bǔ)充的話，其內(nèi)容將是保密的。而我不能泄密。我認(rèn)為最大的變化是我們將使用的武器全都是精確制導(dǎo)武器，情報(bào)基礎(chǔ)也將會(huì)比海灣戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)時(shí)好得多。我不能肯定作戰(zhàn)技術(shù)是否會(huì)有很大的不同，是否會(huì)更加側(cè)重于攻擊我們?cè)诤硲?zhàn)爭(zhēng)時(shí)所說的“戰(zhàn)略目標(biāo)”。但我不認(rèn)為作戰(zhàn)上會(huì)有重大變化。
陳：美國開展軍事革命討論以來，所取得的最重要的成果或理論上的突破是什么？
科恩：我不知道是否有突破。我認(rèn)為我們從理論一說仍處在剛剛起步的階段。從某種程度上說，美國人并非像我們應(yīng)當(dāng)做的那樣擅長(zhǎng)于理論。
陳：軍事革命將會(huì)對(duì)美國的軍事戰(zhàn)略和國防政策帶來哪些可能的影響？
科恩：一個(gè)很明顯的可能性是它將能夠--我認(rèn)為它已經(jīng)并將繼續(xù)--給美國帶來巨大的軍事潛力，大大超過各種各樣對(duì)手的軍事潛力。我們將會(huì)看到、并且已經(jīng)看到的最大變化，是軍隊(duì)組織將顯得彼此很不相同，它們將更加適合于其地理和政治條件。因而對(duì)軍隊(duì)組織進(jìn)行評(píng)估和比較將會(huì)難得多。
陳：軍事革命發(fā)展的主要趨勢(shì)是什么？
科恩：我認(rèn)為有多個(gè)趨勢(shì)。最基本的一個(gè)趨勢(shì)是，人數(shù)眾多的大部隊(duì)將走向終結(jié)，也就是說擁有大量的士兵不再重要。我認(rèn)為軍隊(duì)人數(shù)會(huì)大幅度減少。另一個(gè)趨勢(shì)是建立網(wǎng)絡(luò)式的編制結(jié)構(gòu)而不是上下等級(jí)制的編制結(jié)構(gòu)，這是一個(gè)深刻的變化。它有利于遠(yuǎn)距離精確攻擊的運(yùn)用。另一個(gè)明顯趨勢(shì)是武器技術(shù)的發(fā)展，它將按照目前正在發(fā)展的方向發(fā)生更大的變化，并且我認(rèn)為一般的發(fā)展趨勢(shì)，將是放棄傳統(tǒng)的有人操作的大型平臺(tái)。大型平臺(tái)退出戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)舞臺(tái)。我認(rèn)為２０年后的坦克年起來大概會(huì)與今天的很不相同。并且某些大型武器平臺(tái)，如航空母艦，將不會(huì)以我們現(xiàn)在知道的樣式存在。這些都是重大的變化。
陳；您在一篇文章中發(fā)表了與其他專家（包括國防小組委員會(huì)的成員）相同的意見，即認(rèn)為五角大樓提出的“兩場(chǎng)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)”戰(zhàn)略是不必要的。有人甚至認(rèn)為美國將軍事革命的成果用于這種戰(zhàn)略是在浪費(fèi)寶貴的時(shí)間，您怎樣看這個(gè)問題？
科恩：我可以換一個(gè)角度說明這個(gè)意見。我認(rèn)為實(shí)行“兩場(chǎng)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)”戰(zhàn)略，就無法將足夠的資源用于軍事革命，因?yàn)?ldquo;兩場(chǎng)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)”戰(zhàn)略迫使我們繼續(xù)依賴于今天的技術(shù)武裝起來的相當(dāng)龐大的兵力結(jié)構(gòu)，我認(rèn)為更為重要的是著眼于長(zhǎng)期研究與發(fā)展。
陳：美國期望從這場(chǎng)大力培育的軍事革命中得到什么好處？
科恩：我認(rèn)為有兩個(gè)方面．首先，一般地說，好處是美國能成為在軍事上占優(yōu)勢(shì)地位的強(qiáng)國．這就是說，軍事革命將有助于確保美國軍事上的優(yōu)勢(shì)地位．但我認(rèn)為另一個(gè)好處主要是在防御方面．信息技術(shù)確實(shí)是每個(gè)人都能到得的技術(shù)．由此不難想象，無論是國家還是非家的個(gè)人或組織，都有將能與美國進(jìn)行較量．這種較量無需人與人進(jìn)行決斗、航空母艦與航空母艦進(jìn)行對(duì)戰(zhàn)，而只要能夠剝奪美國在世界各地自由作戰(zhàn)的能力。正因?yàn)槿绱?，我認(rèn)為美國始終保持較大的優(yōu)勢(shì)非常重要的。
陳：您怎樣看待軍事革命的實(shí)質(zhì)？
科恩：我認(rèn)為軍事革命的實(shí)質(zhì)是組織與動(dòng)作軍隊(duì)的方式將發(fā)生非常重大的變化。
陳：您對(duì)軍事革命研究下一步的發(fā)展有何評(píng)說？
科恩：正如我已說過的，我認(rèn)為最大的問題將是試驗(yàn)。無論研究與發(fā)展還是理論，目前最重要的是對(duì)不同類型的部隊(duì)、不同類型的作戰(zhàn)概念進(jìn)行試驗(yàn)。我認(rèn)為下一步的任務(wù)不只是坐在那里苦冥想，而是走到實(shí)驗(yàn)場(chǎng)上去，看看我們到底能做些什么。
陳：推動(dòng)軍事革命發(fā)展的主要因素是什么？
科恩：我認(rèn)為信息革命在軍事革命中發(fā)揮了很大的作用．我還認(rèn)為冷戰(zhàn)的結(jié)束也是重要的因素．冷戰(zhàn)后出現(xiàn)了一個(gè)非常不同的國際環(huán)境，使美國思考迥然不同的威脅，使美國有可能在某些方面重新開始．還有一個(gè)重要的地緣政治因素在推動(dòng)著軍事革命的發(fā)展．例如，我認(rèn)為對(duì)美國來說，我們?cè)絹碓角宄卣J(rèn)識(shí)到我們所有的軍隊(duì)都必須具有遠(yuǎn)征作戰(zhàn)能力．在冷戰(zhàn)期間，美國陸軍和空軍認(rèn)為他們只要在歐洲作戰(zhàn)，我認(rèn)為現(xiàn)在根本不是這種情況了．
KEYS TO THE QUESTIONS 參考答案：
1.d 2.a 3.b 4.b 5.b 6.c 7.a 8.a 9.c 10.b
