美國(guó)政要第23課
Transforming Defense
--Interview with the Chairman of the National Defense Panel，Philip A. Odeen 訪國(guó)防小組委員會(huì)主席菲利普•奧迪恩
MR.CHEN BOJIANG: Recently, I have read some documents1 on future warfare and the national defense development of the United States from Defenselink2 （on the web）.One of the most impressive documents I read was a national defense panelist3 report titled ”Transforming Defense-National Security in the 21st century.” I am very interested in interviewing its authors. And as the Chairman of the National Defense Panel，I feel honored to have the opportunity to interview you today.
“Transforming Defense-National Security in the 21st century” focused on the long term issues facing U.S. defense and national security. Obviously this ”transformation” could not take place over night. How long do you think it will take for this ”transformation” to be complete? Will there be several stages in this ”transformation” that you can currently identify?
MR.PHILIP A.ODEEN:I think the transformation will take 15 years, 20 years, a long time. Because the equipment has to change, and the cycle for designing and building new equipment is very long, and we also have lots of modern equipment, and it's too expensive to replace it all, so you have to replace it gradually over time. So it will take many years. And some of today's equipment will still be very useful, but some of it will have to be replaced in that timeframe4.
Secondly, it requires the military to come up with new concepts for operations, for using forces. And this is something you don't invent. You have to think about them. You have to experiment. You have to do exercises. And that takes many years as well.
And finally, the people have to think differently, so it will take time for new generations of leaders to emerge and move up in the structure, and for today's leaders to retire and leave. So it's hard for somebody that's a general officer today to think about doing things in a very different way. He wants to do things the way we've done them in the past, so you'll have to change some equipment, you have to change the concept, but also change the people.
So, I think it will take 15 years, perhaps 20 years for it to be complete. Now you will see change gradually over time, and the American forces have changed quite significantly over the last 10 years, really, since, say, before the Wall5 came down, before Desert Storm, before the Iraq situation, and today.
There have been many changes in terms of smart weapons6 and big improvements in communications and the use of computers. These army experiments at Fort Irwin7 last year, brought new ways to use telecommunications and information technology, so there are changes all the time, but I think in 15 or 20 years there will be more basic changes.
Army structure will change. Army divisions will go away and some kind of new smaller units will emerge. But it will be a long time. There will be brigades, or regiments8, or something, yes; smaller units. And probably more joint--There will be joint units. There will be combined Air Force and Army units, or Marine and Army units.
MR. CHEN: According to the analysis of this report, the transformation aimed at meeting all the U.S. security needs in 2020, covers all aspects of national defense. In your opinion, what is the most important aspect of the transformation? What are some of the difficulties one is likely to come across in this transformation process?
MR. ODEEN: Probably the most difficult one is the personnel--the human part of it, getting people to think differently, and getting people to think about different ways to use forces, different ways to operate, different tactics, and so on. As that changes, they will find ways to use today's weapons in different ways, but also they will be willing to accept the fact that new weapons and different kind of weapons will have to emerge. And probably the biggest change will be continued improvement in information, information technology access. So the intelligence information from the various sensors9 could make it rapidly available to the people flying airplanes，or tanks, or the people firing weapons. So you can take advantage of that information and immediately use it, as opposed to today, where the information is collected, and it goes to the headquarters, and the people analyze it and study it, and then eventually it gets to the troops, and it takes hours to go. This will be very quick. It will be real time10 .I think the biggest obstacle is for people to think differently and act differently, and other things will happen.
MR. CHEN: Implementing a transformation like that described in the report is expected to be complicated and will require a delicate11 balance between near term challenges and long-term challenges. What do you think about this balance? Or in other words, what do you think is the best way to deal with the near term and long term challenges?
MR. ODEEN: That's a very good question. The difficulty the U.S. military has in investing in new technologies and new thinking is that they're so involved in current operations. I mean, there's the force in Bosnia. They have small groups of people in Africa and elsewhere. We have a lot of forces right now in the Middle East because of the Iraq issue on the inspection12 team.
And there's so much--that takes money and energy, and it's delaying investments that would be important, useful investments, that could be made now that should be made now to begin to develop the new technologies for the future. So it's taking longer than we had expected.
And there's a concern also about--in thinking about the future there's still a lot of focus to the Middle East, to the Iraq situation still a lot of concern about Korea and the very unstable situation in North Korea, which I'm sure you people follow very closely as well, where there are various serious economic problems, and food shortages and a very large military, maybe some leadership issues there with the new leadership.
So it's difficult for the American military not to pay most of its attention to those two areas, plus the Bosnia situation is very unstable. And so they are distracted13 guess in a way, and their resources, their money, their budgets14, their time are focused on these near-term issues, rather than the long term. So that's the major issue I think. That's a very good question.
MR.CHEN:I noticed that the report used some classic quotes15 which included a quote by a famous ancient Chinese military thinker Sun Tzu. What do you see as the relationship between historical versus16 modern military thought，and foreign versus U.S. military thought?
MR. ODEEN: I'm not a military historian, but among my friends, Sun Tzu is quoted very often. I mean, sort of the basic principles and ideas he enumerated17 are still very current today I think. There's a very basic sort of thing.
I think many American military thinkers have studied the older history. In fact, at West Point18, the military academy19, they study military history, and they study other pasts like the Civil War20.They go back and study these old battles of 100,150 years ago, as well as much earlier, and I think it's very useful, very important.
Practise Listening to Words 詞匯聽力練習(xí):
1.document [] n. 文件
2.defenselink （英特網(wǎng)上的）國(guó)防網(wǎng)址
3.panelist［］n. 小組委員會(huì)
4.timeframe 期間
5.Wall 在此指“柏林墻”
6.smart weapons 智能武器
7.Fort Irwin 歐文堡（美軍基地名）
8.regiment [] n. （軍隊(duì)的）團(tuán)
9.sensor [] n. 傳感器
10.real time 實(shí)際時(shí)間
11.delicate [] adj. 精細(xì)的
12.inspection [] n. 檢查
13.distract [] vt. 分散
14.budget [] n. 預(yù)算
15.quote [] n. 格言
16.versus [] prep. 與……相對(duì)
17.enumerate [ ] vt. 列舉
18.West Point 西點(diǎn)（軍校）
19.academy [] n. 學(xué)院，學(xué)術(shù)
military academy 軍校
20.Civil War （美國(guó)）內(nèi)戰(zhàn)
【參考譯文】
國(guó)防的轉(zhuǎn)變
陳伯江:最近，我從英特網(wǎng)的國(guó)防網(wǎng)址上讀到一些有關(guān)未來戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)和美國(guó)國(guó)防發(fā)展的文件。其中給我留下深刻印象的文件之一，是國(guó)防小組委員會(huì)題為《國(guó)防的轉(zhuǎn)變———21世紀(jì)的國(guó)家安全》的報(bào)告。我對(duì)訪談這一報(bào)告的作者很感興趣。你是國(guó)防小組委員會(huì)的主席，我對(duì)今天有機(jī)會(huì)對(duì)你訪談感到榮幸。
《國(guó)防的轉(zhuǎn)變———21世紀(jì)的國(guó)家安全》重點(diǎn)討論了美國(guó)國(guó)防和國(guó)家安全所面臨的長(zhǎng)期問題。很明顯，這一轉(zhuǎn)變不可能在一夜間發(fā)生，你認(rèn)為完成這一轉(zhuǎn)變要多長(zhǎng)時(shí)間？在你現(xiàn)在看來這一轉(zhuǎn)變將要經(jīng)歷哪幾個(gè)階段？
奧迪恩:我認(rèn)為這場(chǎng)轉(zhuǎn)變將需15～20年的長(zhǎng)時(shí)間。因?yàn)檠b備需要更新，設(shè)計(jì)和生產(chǎn)新裝備的周期很長(zhǎng)。我們已有許多現(xiàn)代裝備，因它們非常昂貴，所以不能一下子全部更新。因此你得逐步更換，這就需要許多年。有些今天的裝備仍將很有用，但部分裝備在轉(zhuǎn)變期間必須更新。
其次，這一轉(zhuǎn)變要求軍隊(duì)跟上有關(guān)軍事力量運(yùn)用和作戰(zhàn)的新概念的發(fā)展。這些新概念不是那種你能發(fā)明的東西。你必須思考它們，你必須進(jìn)行實(shí)驗(yàn)，你必須進(jìn)行演習(xí)，這也將需要許多年。
最后，人們必須以不同的方式進(jìn)行思維。因此，新一代領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人嶄露頭角并進(jìn)入領(lǐng)導(dǎo)崗位，今天的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人退休和離開領(lǐng)導(dǎo)崗位，都將需要時(shí)間。對(duì)于今天的某些高級(jí)軍官來說，要他們考慮以不同的方式做事是困難的。他們?cè)敢庖赃^去的方式做事。因而，你不僅必須更新裝備和觀念，你還必須更新人員。
所以，我認(rèn)為完成這場(chǎng)轉(zhuǎn)變需要15年，也許20年。隨著時(shí)間的推移，你將會(huì)逐步看到這種變化。在過去的10年里，從柏林墻倒下前和沙漠風(fēng)暴前至今，美國(guó)軍隊(duì)確實(shí)已經(jīng)發(fā)生了相當(dāng)巨大的變化。在智能武器方面有許多變化，通訊和計(jì)算機(jī)的運(yùn)用方面有許多重大改進(jìn)。去年在歐文堡進(jìn)行的一系列陸軍實(shí)驗(yàn)中，采取了新的方式運(yùn)用電信和信息技術(shù)。所以說一直都存在著變化，但我認(rèn)為在15或20年內(nèi)將會(huì)發(fā)生更多的帶根本性的變化。
陸軍的結(jié)構(gòu)將發(fā)生變化。陸軍師行將消失，某種新的更小的建制單位將應(yīng)運(yùn)而生。但這需要一段時(shí)間。將會(huì)有旅或團(tuán)、或某種更小的建制單位，并且大概更加聯(lián)合——將會(huì)出現(xiàn)聯(lián)合的編制。將會(huì)有空軍和陸軍、或海軍陸戰(zhàn)隊(duì)和陸軍合為一體的建制單位。
陳:根據(jù)國(guó)防小組委員會(huì)報(bào)告的分析，這次國(guó)防轉(zhuǎn)變的目的是為了滿足2020年美國(guó)的安全需要，涉及到國(guó)防的方方面面。在你看來，最重要的轉(zhuǎn)變是什么？轉(zhuǎn)變的過程將會(huì)遇到哪些困難？
奧迪恩:大概最困難的問題是人的問題——人的因素部分，使人們以不同的方式思考問題，使人們考慮以不同的方式使用武力，以不同的方式作戰(zhàn)、以及采用不同的戰(zhàn)術(shù)等等。隨著這些變化，人們不僅要探索以不同的方式使用今天的武器，而且還會(huì)愿意接受這一事實(shí):即新的種類各異的武器必然出現(xiàn)。大概最大的變化將是信息和信息技術(shù)領(lǐng)域的改進(jìn)。來自各種傳感器的情報(bào)信息可以迅速提供給正在天上飛行的飛行員、或坦克駕駛員、或正在進(jìn)行武器發(fā)射的人員。因此，你可以利用信息優(yōu)勢(shì)，并立即使用信息。這與今天那種從收集信息、傳遞到指揮所、對(duì)信息進(jìn)行分析和研究、最后傳遞到部隊(duì)、需耗時(shí)數(shù)小時(shí)的方式截然不同。它將是非?？旖莺蛯?shí)時(shí)的。
所以我認(rèn)為最大的困難是要求人們以不同的方式思維和行動(dòng)，以及考慮到將會(huì)出現(xiàn)的新問題。
陳:進(jìn)行一場(chǎng)如你們的報(bào)告所述的國(guó)防轉(zhuǎn)變將是非常復(fù)雜的，并需要統(tǒng)籌考慮近期挑戰(zhàn)和長(zhǎng)期挑戰(zhàn)的平衡。你怎樣看待這種平衡?或者換句話說，你認(rèn)為怎樣才能處理好近期挑戰(zhàn)與長(zhǎng)期挑戰(zhàn)的關(guān)系?
奧迪恩:這是一個(gè)很好的問題。美國(guó)軍隊(duì)在新技術(shù)和新思維的投資方面所面臨的困難，是他們對(duì)當(dāng)前的作戰(zhàn)卷入過多。我的意思是，我們有部隊(duì)在波斯尼亞，我們有少量部隊(duì)在非洲和其它地區(qū)。由于伊拉克武器核查問題，目前我們還有大量部隊(duì)在中東，太多的部隊(duì)卷入當(dāng)前的作戰(zhàn)，花費(fèi)了資金和精力，推延了一些重要的、有用的投資。一些面向未來發(fā)展的新技術(shù)的投資本該現(xiàn)在就開始，但卻比我們所希望的需要更長(zhǎng)的時(shí)間。
今后，我們?nèi)詫⒁獙?duì)中東、對(duì)伊拉克的形勢(shì)給予較多地關(guān)注;還要對(duì)朝鮮和形勢(shì)極不穩(wěn)定的北朝鮮給予較多的關(guān)注。我相信你們也會(huì)非常關(guān)注。北朝鮮存在著各種嚴(yán)重的經(jīng)濟(jì)問題、食品短缺和龐大的軍隊(duì)，可能還存在著領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的問題。因此，美國(guó)軍方很難做到不去關(guān)注這兩個(gè)地區(qū)。加上波斯尼亞形勢(shì)也極不穩(wěn)定。我認(rèn)為，美國(guó)軍方分散了他們的資源、資金、預(yù)算和時(shí)間。他們的重點(diǎn)放在近期而非長(zhǎng)期問題上。我認(rèn)為這是主要問題。
陳:我注意到你的報(bào)告中引用了一些傳統(tǒng)的格言，其中包括中國(guó)古代著名軍事思想家孫子的名言。你怎樣看待傳統(tǒng)軍事理論與現(xiàn)代軍事理論、外國(guó)軍事理論與本國(guó)軍事理論的關(guān)系?
奧迪恩:我不是軍事歷史學(xué)家，但我有不少朋友是，他們經(jīng)常引用孫子的格言。我認(rèn)為，孫子所說的一些基本原理和思想在今天仍具有非?，F(xiàn)實(shí)的意義。美國(guó)許多軍事思想家都研究過去的歷史。事實(shí)上，在西點(diǎn)軍校，他們研究軍事歷史，他們研究過去諸如美國(guó)內(nèi)戰(zhàn)的歷史。他們回顧過去，研究100年、150年前以及更早的戰(zhàn)例。我認(rèn)為這非常有用，非常重要。
