當今時代的意識形態(tài)之戰(zhàn)

If 2016 was the year that opponents of the liberal, rules-based world order built up over 70 years won stunning national victories — in Britain and the US — then 2017 was the year in which the supporters of liberal openness scrambled to mobilise.

如果2016年是那些反對過去70年逐步建立起來的以規(guī)則為基礎的自由世界秩序的人在國家層面上(英國和美國)取得了驚人勝利的一年，那么2017年就是自由開放秩序的支持者奮起反擊的一年。

2018 is set to be the year they confront one another. As governments harness state power for their respective sides, tension long simmering within each country morphs into a conflict between nations.

2018年，雙方將正面對抗。隨著各國政府利用國家權力各自為營，各國國內蓄勢已久的緊張局面演變成了國與國之間的沖突。

Profound structural economic change in almost all rich countries had increasingly separated those who reaped the benefits from those of their fellow citizens the transformation had left behind.

在幾乎所有富裕國家發(fā)生的深層結構性經濟變化，使得既得利益階層日益脫離了被這種轉變遺忘的同胞。

In Brexit and Donald Trump’s election victory, self-declared champions of the left behind took control of the national agenda with a promise to break with the internationalist liberal order. In reaction, centrist leaders elsewhere — most explicitly, Emmanuel Macron in France — have had to define themselves as that order’s defenders.

在英國退歐和唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)成功當選美國總統(tǒng)的過程中，是自稱維護被遺忘群體權益的那些人以打破國際自由秩序的承諾控制了國家議程。作為應對，其他國家的中間派領導人——最突出的是法國的埃馬紐埃爾•馬克龍(Emmanuel Macron)——不得不把自己定義為自由秩序的捍衛(wèi)者。

EU institutions and many European governments, together with Canada and Japan, now make up an avowedly liberal internationalist camp working to defend a multilateral system of collaborative rules-based governance for economic openness to mutual advantage.

歐盟各機構和歐洲很多政府、再加上加拿大和日本，如今組成了公開的自由國際主義陣營，努力捍衛(wèi)以協(xié)作規(guī)則為基礎的互利性經濟開放多邊治理體系。

The anti-liberal front’s undisputed leader, meanwhile, is the US under President Trump. The best guide to his goals is a plain reading of his statements from the inaugural speech to the recent update of the national security strategy. It is a zero-sum world in which there cannot be economic winners without losers, and it is each country for itself. Both camps want to make, or remake, the world in their image.

與此同時，反自由主義陣營無可爭議的領袖是特朗普治下的美國。讀一讀他從就職演講到最新國家安全戰(zhàn)略的各項聲明，就能明白他的目標。這是一個零和世界，他們篤信在經濟上沒有輸家就不可能有贏家，每個國家各自為戰(zhàn)。兩個陣營都希望以自己的設想塑造或重塑這個世界。

It is not the first time that whole nations have had to choose which ideology to rally behind. The same happened in the 1930s, and again during the cold war. Then, too, countries aligned along ideological divides, partly fuelled by economic and social conflict that had previously riven their domestic politics. As a result the battle shifted to the international stage where it was waged by all means including war, direct or by proxy.

這并不是第一次出現所有國家都不得不選擇支持哪種意識形態(tài)的情況。上世紀30年代曾出現同樣的局面，冷戰(zhàn)時期又再一次出現。當時，各個國家也是根據意識形態(tài)的分歧(部分是因為之前已經撕裂國內政治的經濟和社會沖突而產生)站隊。結果是斗爭轉移到國際舞臺上，以直接戰(zhàn)爭或代理人戰(zhàn)爭等各種形式開戰(zhàn)。

Within countries the conflict was to some extent repressed, as governments tried to ensure the side they had picked internationally was not undermined at home. For liberal states, this meant varying degrees of suppression of sympathy with fascism or communism. In dictatorships of the right and left, the elimination of dissenting views was total.

在國家內部，沖突在某種程度上被壓制，各國政府努力確保他們在國際上選擇的一方在國內不受動搖。對于自由主義國家而言，這意味著不同程度地壓制對法西斯主義或共產主義的同情。在右翼和左翼的獨裁制國家，這意味著消除異見。

There is no sign that the current global realignment will cause war between the camps; and we may still hope that political violence within nations can be avoided. But in three other arenas, the battle is on.

眼下沒有跡象表明目前的全球重新站隊將引發(fā)兩個陣營的戰(zhàn)爭;我們或許也仍然能夠對避免各國內部政治暴力抱有希望。但是在其他三個領域，戰(zhàn)斗已打響。

One is international institutions, in particular those in charge of global economic governance. The Trump administration seems determined to undermine the World Trade Organization, whose arbitration function it is sabotaging by frustrating the appointment of judges to the appellate panel. Conversely, the EU and Japan are trying to demonstrate the organisation’s value to US interests by offering a united front in a WTO context against a perceived abusive trade policy by China.

國際機構是其中一個戰(zhàn)場，特別是那些負責全球經濟治理的機構。特朗普政府似乎下定決心要削弱世界貿易組織(WTO)的影響力，通過阻撓為WTO上訴機構任命法官來破壞WTO的仲裁功能。相反，歐盟和日本則試圖通過在WTO框架下提供統(tǒng)一戰(zhàn)線，對抗其認為的中國濫用貿易政策的行為，以此展示該組織對美國利益的價值。

Another arena is alliance building. The shock of isolationist victories accelerated work on deepening the existing global economic order. The EU has completed free trade agreements with Japan and Canada, and intensified talks with Mexico, Australia and New Zealand. Japan and Canada, besides tying up with the EU, are pushing forward the Trans-Pacific Partnership with the remaining 11 members after the US abandoned it.

另一個戰(zhàn)場是結盟。孤立主義獲勝的沖擊加速了深化現有全球經濟秩序的工作。歐盟已經與日本和加拿大簽訂了自由貿易協(xié)定，并加強了與墨西哥、澳大利亞和新西蘭的磋商。除了與歐盟聯手外，日本和加拿大還在美國放棄《跨太平洋伙伴關系協(xié)定》(TPP)后，與其余11個成員國一起推進該協(xié)定。

As for Mr Trump, he seems more eager to build bridges with Vladimir Putin’s Russia and befriend autocrats from the Philippines to Saudi Arabia than to shore up relationships with allies or maintain the political unity of Nato. In Europe, Hungary and Poland — the jury is out on Austria — are tilting towards his camp.

至于特朗普，他似乎更急于與弗拉基米爾•普京(Vladimir Putin)領導的俄羅斯建立橋梁，并與從菲律賓到沙特阿拉伯的獨裁者交朋友，而非鞏固與盟友的關系或保持北約(Nato)的政治團結。在歐洲，匈牙利和波蘭——奧地利目前還說不準——正在向特朗普陣營傾斜。

Paradoxically, the most important arena for governments engaged in a global ideological battle remains their own public at home. This third dimension is decisive if the cold war is anything to go by. Communism was boosted by the great depression, but later could not indefinitely survive the evidence that it simply did not perform as well for its people as liberal-democratic capitalism. Conversely today, populist nationalism derives much of its strength from a mishandled financial crisis and mismanaged (often non-existent) policy responses to rapid structural change.

矛盾的是，對于參與全球意識形態(tài)斗爭的政府來說，最重要的戰(zhàn)場仍然是國內公眾。如果冷戰(zhàn)有任何參考價值的話，那就是這個第三戰(zhàn)場將起到決定性作用。共產主義的發(fā)展受到了大蕭條的推動，但后來仍無法無限期地挺過一個事實——對于其人民來說，其表現不如自由民主資本主義。相反，如今民粹民族主義大部分的力量都來自于政府對金融危機的處置不當及其在應對快速結構變化時的糟糕政策(往往是沒有應對政策)。

In the long term, liberals have cause for hope: withdrawing from the liberal order will surely bring lasting harm to countries where isolationists are now in charge. But that hope is vulnerable to two threats. First, if the liberal order unravels, early withdrawers may hold the advantage. Second, the anti-liberals may show short-term economic results for longer than liberals can stay in power — in part because they are free from the pieties of conventional policy.

從長遠來看，自由主義者有理由抱有希望：退出自由主義秩序必然會給那些如今由孤立主義者掌權的國家?guī)沓志脗Α５沁@一希望面臨著兩個威脅。首先，如果自由主義秩序崩潰，早期的退出者可能占據優(yōu)勢。其次，反自由主義者展示的短期經濟結果，可能比自由主義者當權的時間更長久——部分是因為前者不受傳統(tǒng)政策的影響。

While conflicts remained domestic, caution was harmful but sustainable. That luxury is gone. In a global battle of ideas, liberals must show urgently that the existing order can be made to work for everyone. The 1930s and the cold war both saw economic liberalism survive by becoming radically more progressive than before. It is time for such a bold, centrist radicalism again.

當沖突仍然停留在國內時，謹慎雖然有害但可持續(xù)。如今，這種奢侈的時光已經結束了。在全球意識形態(tài)大戰(zhàn)中，自由主義者必須抓緊時間，證明現有秩序可以為所有人服務。上世紀30年代和冷戰(zhàn)時期都見證了這一點：經濟自由主義通過比之前大為激進地進步而挺了過來?，F在又是大膽的中間派激進主義大展拳腳的時候了。