為什么要告訴大猩猩羅賓·威廉姆斯的死訊

為什么要告訴大猩猩羅賓·威廉姆斯的死訊

According to press reports, Koko, the gorilla adept at sign language, seemed saddened to hear the news of the death of Robin Williams, whom the gorilla met once in 2001 (and bonded with immediately). I cannot fathom the ethical reasoning behind telling Koko about Williams’s death. What is the point of telling her about the death of someone she met once, 13 years ago? The press reports dwelt on the fact that she appeared sad. I don’t think any of us can know if she was sad or not — but even if this news opens the possibility of making her unhappy, it seems cruel to bring this into her life. What moral purpose does it serve? RITA LONG, OAKLAND, CALIF.

根據(jù)媒體報(bào)道，擅長(zhǎng)符號(hào)語(yǔ)言的大猩猩科科(Koko)聽(tīng)說(shuō)羅賓·威廉姆斯(Robin Williams)的死訊后表示出悲傷，她是在2001年遇到威廉姆斯的(而且馬上就喜歡上了他)。把威廉姆斯的死訊告訴科科，這背后的正當(dāng)理由是什么?我無(wú)法理解。告訴她某個(gè)13年前曾經(jīng)遇到過(guò)的人死了?媒體報(bào)道所基于的事實(shí)是：她看上去很悲傷。我不覺(jué)得我們能知道她是否真的悲傷——但是，就算這個(gè)新聞中說(shuō)的她不開(kāi)心是有可能的，讓她了解這回事似乎也很殘忍。這件事的道德目的是什么呢?麗塔·朗(Rita Long)，奧克蘭，加利福利亞。

Let’s start by looking at this from a slightly wider angle: What is the moral purpose of “talking” to a gorilla about anything? What’s the ethical justification for teaching Koko sign language and trying to communicate human ideas that have no bearing on her life?

讓我們從一個(gè)更為廣泛的角度開(kāi)始：和大猩猩“談話”有什么道德目的?教科科符號(hào)語(yǔ)言，試著把對(duì)她的生活沒(méi)有意義的人類(lèi)觀點(diǎn)傳輸給她，這有什么正當(dāng)理由?

The best possible answer to that question is that we might learn something that will amplify our understanding of both apes and of ourselves. We are not talking to this gorilla to make idle conversation. We are communicating with this gorilla to learn about consciousness. And if Koko were authentically saddened by the news of Robin Williams’s suicide, we would learn a great deal.

對(duì)于這個(gè)問(wèn)題，最好的答案或許是，我們可以從中學(xué)到某些東西，拓展對(duì)猿類(lèi)和對(duì)我們自身的認(rèn)識(shí)。我們不是和這只大猩猩閑聊。我們和她交流，是為了研究意識(shí)。如果科科真心為羅賓·威廉姆斯的自殺感到悲傷，我們能從中學(xué)到很多東西。

Koko met Robin Williams only once. And since an ape can’t comprehend the concept of “celebrity,” that meeting should be no more intrinsically meaningful than any one-time interaction Koko shared with anyone else. It’s not as if Koko sits around constantly rewatching “Moscow on the Hudson.” So if Koko was still impacted by that 2001 meeting in the year 2014, it would suggest something pretty profound about ape consciousness. I mean, can gorillas vividly recall and contextualize every interaction they experience? Do gorillas feel empathy for all mammals equally? Do gorillas have the ability to sense (and mentally catalog) specific interactions with “special” individuals (and did Robin Williams fall into that class)? Do gorillas simply want to please their human masters and reflexively display whatever emotion they assume is expected? Can gorillas comprehend what death is? Do they understand that they, too, will die (and that death, though natural, justifies sadness)? If any of these questions could be irrefutably affirmed, everything we think about gorillas would need to be re-examined, along with our entire relationship with all nonhuman mammals. So the moral question might not be “Is it wrong to tell Koko about a human’s suicide if that information will make her sad?” The moral question might be “If we tell Koko about a human’s suicide and her sadness is rational and authentic, what else are we obligated to tell her?”

科科只遇到過(guò)羅賓·威廉姆斯一次。因?yàn)樵愁?lèi)無(wú)法理解“名人”這個(gè)概念，那次會(huì)面可能和科科其他的臨時(shí)一次性會(huì)面沒(méi)有本質(zhì)區(qū)別?？瓶坪孟褚膊皇浅３Ｗ谀莾阂淮斡忠淮蔚乜础豆眠d河丘上的莫斯科》(Moscow on the Hudson)。所以如果到了2014年，科科仍然對(duì)2001年的會(huì)面有印象，這可以揭示出猿類(lèi)意識(shí)中非常有意義的東西。我的意思是，大猩猩能否生動(dòng)地回憶起他們的互動(dòng)，以及當(dāng)時(shí)的情景?大猩猩是否能對(duì)其他哺乳類(lèi)動(dòng)物產(chǎn)生同等的移情?大猩猩是否有能力感受到與某些“特殊”人物的特定互動(dòng)(并在心理上分類(lèi))，如果可以，羅賓·威廉姆斯屬于這一類(lèi)人嗎?大猩猩是否只是希望取悅?cè)祟?lèi)主人，并且相應(yīng)地展現(xiàn)出主人所期待的感情?大猩猩能理解死亡嗎?他們能理解他們自己也會(huì)死嗎(死亡盡管是自然的，但它能解釋悲傷的合理性嗎)?如果這些問(wèn)題可以被確鑿無(wú)誤地證實(shí)，我們就需要重新審視我們目前對(duì)大猩猩的全部觀點(diǎn)，以及我們同人類(lèi)之外的哺乳動(dòng)物的全部關(guān)系。所以這件事中的道德問(wèn)題或許不是“如果告訴科科一個(gè)人自殺了會(huì)讓她悲傷，那么這是不是錯(cuò)的?”而是“如果我們告訴科科一個(gè)人自殺了，而她的悲傷是理性而真誠(chéng)的，那么我們還有義務(wù)告訴她什么事情?”

Now, the counter to this reasoning is simple: Gorillas are believed to have the cognitive ability of a 3- or 4-year-old human. This means telling Koko about the death of Williams is akin to telling a 3-year-old child that a random uncle she met last Christmas is now dead and buried, and that this event is tragic. Framed in those terms, the whole idea seems cruel (and suggests that anything we’d supposedly “learn” from such an exchange could just as easily be deduced through common sense). Yet shielding her might be even less humane.

現(xiàn)在，對(duì)于做這件事的理由的反駁非常簡(jiǎn)單：人們認(rèn)為大猩猩的認(rèn)知能力相當(dāng)于三四歲的孩子。這意味著告訴科科威廉姆斯的死訊類(lèi)似于告訴一個(gè)三歲的孩子，某個(gè)她去年圣誕節(jié)見(jiàn)過(guò)的什么叔叔死了，被埋葬了，這件事是個(gè)悲劇。在這個(gè)思維框架下，整件事顯得很殘忍(而且讓人覺(jué)得我們理應(yīng)從這種事中“學(xué)到”的東西可以輕易從常識(shí)中推斷出來(lái))。但是如果向她隱瞞或許更不人道。

“I would question the ethics of not telling Koko about this death,” says the veterinarian Vint Virga, the author of “The Soul of All Living Creatures” and the subject of a recent New York Times Magazine article about the interior lives of animals. “I would set aside the issue of the animal’s cognitive intelligence and focus on the concept of an animal’s emotional intelligence, which studies continue to show is much greater than we previously imagined. Animals and humans both experience joy and sadness throughout their life. Why would you want to shelter a gorilla from that experience? I believe a gorilla absolutely has the ability to understand the loss of someone who was important to her, and animals are often able to deal with grieving and loss more effectively than humans.”

“我會(huì)質(zhì)疑不告訴科科這個(gè)死訊背后的倫理意義，”獸醫(yī)文特·沃加(Vint Virga)說(shuō)，他著有《所有生物的靈魂》(The Soul of All Living Creatures)一書(shū)，最近《紐約時(shí)報(bào)雜志》一篇關(guān)于動(dòng)物內(nèi)心世界的文章也報(bào)道了他。“我想把動(dòng)物的認(rèn)知能力放在一邊，專(zhuān)注討論動(dòng)物的情感能力——研究持續(xù)表明，動(dòng)物的情感能力要比我們之前想象的強(qiáng)得多。動(dòng)物和人類(lèi)的生命中都會(huì)經(jīng)歷喜悅與悲傷。我們?yōu)槭裁匆虼笮尚善帘芜@種體驗(yàn)?我相信，一只大猩猩完全有能力理解失去某個(gè)重要的人的感受，動(dòng)物處理悲傷和喪失的能力通常比人類(lèi)要好。”

Virga argues that the only reasons for not telling Koko this information would be if we thought the death itself was insignificant or wanted to spare the ape from emotional distress. He thinks the latter motive is shortsighted. “There is nothing inherently wrong with stress,” he told me. “All living things need a degree of stress for their health and well-being. Just because an animal shows the recognition of loss doesn’t mean it’s being inordinately distressed. It just means animals feel things.”

沃加說(shuō)，如果不告訴科科這件事，理由只可能是，我們覺(jué)得這個(gè)死訊本身不重要，或者不想讓這只大猩猩感到悲傷。他覺(jué)得后一個(gè)理由是短視的。“壓力本身并沒(méi)有錯(cuò)，”他告訴我。“為了自身的健康與幸福，所有生物都需要某種程度的壓力。動(dòng)物表現(xiàn)出對(duì)喪失的認(rèn)識(shí)，這并不意味著它極度悲痛，這只意味著動(dòng)物能感受到東西。”