FT社評(píng)：中國(guó)投資對(duì)巴基斯坦來說是把雙刃劍

The Chinese can be forgiven for seeking out a reliable ally on their border. With Russia to the north, rival India to the south, an increasingly defiant North Korea to the east and Afghanistan in the throes of turmoil to the west, good neighbours are in short supply. That Pakistan comes closest to what the Chinese like to call an “all weather friend” shows how poor China’s options are.

中國(guó)人在邊境線上尋找可靠的盟友情有可原。北邊是俄羅斯、南邊是對(duì)手印度、東邊是日益肆無忌憚的朝鮮、西邊是動(dòng)蕩不斷的阿富汗，在這種情況下，好鄰居十分短缺。巴基斯坦最接近于被中國(guó)稱為“全天候朋友”，這表明中國(guó)的選擇是多么有限。

It is an odd relationship that has been decades in the making. China is consolidating it with billions of dollars in infrastructure and energy investment, military exports and bailout loans to prop up the Pakistani currency. The latter have been worth $1.2bn since last year, underlining the extent to which Islamabad is becoming reliant on Beijing as US patronage wavers. This alliance presents risks for both sides. Meanwhile, the west cannot afford to abandon nuclear-armed Pakistan altogether, as much as it might like to.

這是一種發(fā)展了數(shù)十年的奇怪關(guān)系。中國(guó)通過數(shù)十億美元的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施和能源投資、軍事裝備出口以及為支撐巴基斯坦匯率而發(fā)放的紓困貸款，不斷鞏固這種關(guān)系。自去年以來，中國(guó)向巴基斯坦發(fā)放的紓困貸款達(dá)到12億美元，突顯了在美國(guó)金主動(dòng)搖之際伊斯蘭堡對(duì)北京的依賴程度。中巴聯(lián)盟對(duì)雙方都構(gòu)成風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。與此同時(shí)，徹底放棄擁有核武器的巴基斯坦是西方承受不起的——盡管西方可能很想這么做。

On the surface the two states have little in common. The Chinese state is strong and its economy is growing. The Pakistani state, apart from the military, is weak and its economic performance disastrous. China is communist and religion is tightly controlled. Pakistan is Islamic and religious fervour is everywhere.

表面上，兩國(guó)幾乎沒有什么共同點(diǎn)。中國(guó)實(shí)力強(qiáng)大，經(jīng)濟(jì)不斷增長(zhǎng)。而巴基斯坦除軍事外各方面實(shí)力都很弱，其經(jīng)濟(jì)表現(xiàn)糟糕透頂。中國(guó)是共產(chǎn)主義國(guó)家，宗教受到嚴(yán)格控制。巴基斯坦是伊斯蘭國(guó)家，宗教熱情四處洋溢。

Despite this, developing common interests is natural for the two neighbours. The alliance furthers China’s ambition to recreate a Sino-centric Asian order while keeping common rival India on its toes.

盡管如此，發(fā)展共同利益對(duì)這兩個(gè)鄰國(guó)來說是自然而然的事。中巴聯(lián)盟有助于中國(guó)實(shí)現(xiàn)重建以中國(guó)為中心的亞洲秩序的雄心，同時(shí)又讓中巴共同的對(duì)手印度不敢輕舉妄動(dòng)。

There are drawbacks for Pakistan in becoming too dependent. Its trade deficit with China has doubled in recent years, exacerbating declines in its foreign currency reserves. This has forced the country to seek emergency loans from outside sources — including China — to maintain payments on older loans made in foreign currencies.

對(duì)于巴基斯坦而言，過度依賴中國(guó)存在一些弊端。近年來，巴基斯坦對(duì)華貿(mào)易逆差增加了一倍，致使其外匯儲(chǔ)備加速流失。這迫使巴基斯坦從外部(包括中國(guó))尋求緊急貸款，以維持償還以外幣計(jì)價(jià)的舊貸款的能力。

China’s investments, rather than prioritising Pakistan’s development interests, favours its own strategic ones. But it will be Pakistan that has to pay back the loans that fund the projects. China is planning up to $55bn worth of infrastructure and energy projects as part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. This will link its west with the Gwadar port in southern Pakistan through railways, roads and energy supply pipelines. Pakistan has also become the biggest importer of Chinese military hardware and has eight submarines on order. The terms of these contracts are not disclosed, making it impossible for Pakistanis to determine whether they are getting value for money.

中國(guó)安排投資側(cè)重點(diǎn)的依據(jù)是自身的戰(zhàn)略利益需求，而非巴基斯坦的發(fā)展需求。但巴基斯坦將是不得不償還項(xiàng)目貸款的一方。中國(guó)計(jì)劃建設(shè)價(jià)值550億美元的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施和能源項(xiàng)目，作為“中巴經(jīng)濟(jì)走廊”(China-Pakistan Economic Corridor)計(jì)劃的一部分。該計(jì)劃將通過鐵路、公路和能源供應(yīng)管道把中國(guó)西部與巴基斯坦南部的瓜達(dá)爾港連接起來。巴基斯坦也已成為中國(guó)軍事裝備最大的進(jìn)口國(guó)，并已訂購(gòu)8艘潛艇。這些合同的具體條款并未透露，使得巴基斯坦人無法判斷它們是否物有所值。

Nor is there any guarantee that the projects will be commercially viable. You do not have to look far to find Chinese-backed white elephants. The Hambantota port in Sri Lanka, which struggles to pay staff salaries, is one.

這些項(xiàng)目能否在商業(yè)上取得成功也無法打包票。由中國(guó)出資建設(shè)的華而不實(shí)的項(xiàng)目屢見不鮮。目前難以支付員工薪水的斯里蘭卡漢班托塔(Hambantota)港就是一例。

The most obvious risk for China is that Pakistan ultimately proves unable to honour its debts, and that it becomes as undependable a client as it has for the US. Islamabad has encouraged fundamentalist Islam with one hand of the state while checking it with another, poisoning relations with Washington. For the same reason, it may be a complicated partner for the Chinese, who have every reason to fear Islamist influence spreading across their western border.

對(duì)中國(guó)來說，最顯而易見的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)是巴基斯坦最終無法償還債務(wù)，以及它有朝一日不再是中國(guó)可靠的從屬國(guó)，就像它不再是美國(guó)可靠的從屬國(guó)那樣。伊斯蘭堡一只手助長(zhǎng)伊斯蘭原教旨主義、另一只手制約它，這破壞了與華盛頓之間的關(guān)系。出于同樣原因，巴基斯坦對(duì)中國(guó)人來說可能是個(gè)不省心的伙伴，中國(guó)完全有理由擔(dān)心伊斯蘭主義影響越過巴中邊境滲透至中國(guó)西部。

It might be tempting for the US to breathe a sigh of relief as China bails out its erstwhile client. This would be a mistake. It would also be a mistake for the US to see Pakistan as the object of rivalry between itself and China. Instead, the two superpowers have a common interest in a prosperous Pakistan, one that stops exporting terrorists around the world and begins to stabilise its tortuous relationship with its other neighbour, India.

美國(guó)看到中國(guó)搭救了自己曾經(jīng)的從屬國(guó)時(shí)，可能不禁如釋重負(fù)。這么想將是錯(cuò)誤的。此外，美國(guó)也不應(yīng)把巴基斯坦視為自己與中國(guó)爭(zhēng)奪的對(duì)象。相反，推動(dòng)巴基斯坦繁榮發(fā)展、停止向世界各地輸出恐怖分子、著手穩(wěn)定其與鄰國(guó)印度的復(fù)雜關(guān)系，符合美中兩個(gè)超級(jí)大國(guó)的共同利益。