FT社評：理性應(yīng)對特朗普的非理性鋼鋁關(guān)稅

The world’s big steel and aluminium-exporting countries are grappling with one of the more intractable puzzles in trade policy: how do you deal with a fundamentally illogical hegemon?

全球鋼鐵和鋁出口大國正在努力應(yīng)對貿(mào)易政策中更棘手的難題之一：如何與一個(gè)根本不按常理出牌的霸權(quán)國打交道?

Donald Trump’s announcement of emergency tariffs on steel and aluminium has put the likes of the EU, Japan, Canada, Mexico and Brazil into a quandary. The duties will come in next week, and in the meantime the EU and others are formulating their reaction.

唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)對鋼鐵和鋁宣布征收緊急關(guān)稅，令歐盟、日本、加拿大、墨西哥和巴西等經(jīng)濟(jì)體陷入了左右為難的窘境。這些關(guān)稅將于下周生效，同時(shí)，歐盟和其他經(jīng)濟(jì)體正在制定應(yīng)對措施。

Their responses so far have largely been drawn from the traditional playbook: attempt to negotiate exclusions from the tariffs (successfully, so far, for Canada, Mexico and Australia) or hit back with tariffs of their own in politically sensitive areas (the EU’s current plans). But the risks of these moves going legally astray or setting off a major trade war are much higher than in earlier decades. Affected countries should be planning (as well or instead) to keep the trading system open and functioning between themselves.

到目前為止，他們的反應(yīng)還是以傳統(tǒng)方式為主：嘗試協(xié)商關(guān)稅豁免(目前加拿大、墨西哥和澳大利亞成功了)，或者通過在政治敏感領(lǐng)域也征收關(guān)稅進(jìn)行回?fù)?歐盟目前的計(jì)劃)。但這些措施在法律上陷入誤區(qū)或者引發(fā)大規(guī)模貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)要比在此前的幾十年高得多。受影響的國家應(yīng)該轉(zhuǎn)而或同時(shí)做出計(jì)劃，以保持當(dāng)前貿(mào)易體系在它們自己之間的開放和正常運(yùn)行。

The standard answer to a provocation like Mr Trump’s would be to take a case to the World Trade Organization and in the meantime contemplate countermeasures. But Mr Trump’s decision to invoke the rarely used national security exemption in WTO rules has complicated this.

針對特朗普這類挑釁的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)解決方式是向世界貿(mào)易組織(WTO)提起訴訟，同時(shí)考慮反制措施。但特朗普決定援引WTO規(guī)則中極少被使用的國家安全豁免條款，讓情況變得更加復(fù)雜。

The irrationality and inconsistency is plain to see. The US’s main national security adversary, China, is barely affected by the tariffs. Mr Trump himself frequently departs from the script by arguing that the tariffs are actually intended to correct unfair trade.

其中的不合理和相互矛盾之處顯而易見。美國的主要國家安全對手是中國，而后者幾乎沒有受到鋼鋁關(guān)稅的影響。特朗普本人經(jīng)常不按劇本演戲，辯稱這些關(guān)稅實(shí)際上是為了糾正不公平貿(mào)易。

But the obvious nonsense of the justification does not necessarily ensure trading partners will win a WTO case — or indeed permit the EU, as Brussels has threatened, to classify the tariffs as “safeguards” designed to cope with surges in imports and impose countermeasures unilaterally. WTO rules give wide discretion to governments to invoke national security exemptions.

但其明顯胡說八道的理由并不一定能保證貿(mào)易伙伴贏得WTO訴訟——或者允許歐盟像布魯塞爾威脅的那樣將這些關(guān)稅列為旨在應(yīng)對進(jìn)口激增并單方面實(shí)施反制措施的“保護(hù)措施”。WTO規(guī)則賦予各國政府廣泛的自由裁量權(quán)來援引國家安全豁免條款。

It is quite possible that, assuming the cases can wend their way through a clogged-up WTO dispute settlement system, the US would win and the EU lose. This would hand Mr Trump a propaganda victory.

即使這些案件真的得以通過運(yùn)行不暢的WTO爭端解決機(jī)制解決，結(jié)果也很可能是美國會(huì)贏，歐盟會(huì)輸。這將送給特朗普一次宣傳上的勝利。

In addition to retaliation or as an alternative option, the global economy’s big powers need to consider how they can keep the system going without the US. Cutting tariffs or otherwise easing trade between themselves as much as possible within WTO rules would be a way of showing the US that its exports could be disadvantaged by its actions.

除了報(bào)復(fù)之外，作為替代方案，全球幾大經(jīng)濟(jì)體還需要考慮如何在沒有美國的情況下維持貿(mào)易體系運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)。在WTO規(guī)則內(nèi)盡量削減關(guān)稅，或放寬彼此的貿(mào)易限制，將是向美國展示其出口可能因其行為而處于不利地位的方法之一。

The commendable efforts of the other 11 economies in the Trans-Pacific Partnership to resurrect the talks after Mr Trump had pulled out of the deal shows the way. More broadly, with regard to the health of the multilateral trading system, other countries have been pondering the possibility of setting up their own dispute settlement system under the aegis of WTO rules.

《跨太平洋伙伴關(guān)系協(xié)定》(Trans-Pacific Partnership，簡稱TPP)余下11個(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)體在特朗普退出后重啟談判的可貴努力就是榜樣。在更廣泛的層面上，關(guān)于多邊貿(mào)易體系的健康問題，其他國家一直在思考在WTO規(guī)則的庇護(hù)下建立自己的爭端解決機(jī)制的可能性。

None of this is easy, not least because any effective effort to isolate the US in the system will need to include China, which has been shifting away from an open, rules-based approach to trade. But trying to bargain for exemptions from a notoriously fickle negotiator, or tackling the US head-on with potentially illegal sanctions, are fraught with more than the usual danger.

這些都不容易，尤其是任何在該體系內(nèi)孤立美國的有效努力都需要中國的加入，而中國正逐漸遠(yuǎn)離開放的、基于規(guī)則的貿(mào)易方式。但試圖與一個(gè)以多變著稱的談判對手協(xié)商豁免，或以可能不合法的制裁與美國正面對抗，則充滿不同尋常的危險(xiǎn)。

The EU and other big economies need to err on the side of caution. The US steel tariffs, after all, will affect only about 2 per cent of EU steel production: not negligible, but not dramatic. The slow, painstaking business of pursuing legal avenues and building a system that bypasses the US is much less satisfying than slapping tariffs on bourbon. But it may well pay longer-term dividends in the face of such a mercurial US administration.

歐盟和其他大型經(jīng)濟(jì)體需要謹(jǐn)慎行事。畢竟，美國的鋼鐵關(guān)稅只會(huì)影響歐盟鋼鐵產(chǎn)量的約2%，不容忽視，但并不嚴(yán)重。追求以法律途徑解決和建立一個(gè)繞過美國的體系是一項(xiàng)緩慢而艱苦的工作，遠(yuǎn)不如對冥頑不靈者加征關(guān)稅來得痛快。但面對如此反復(fù)無常的美國政府，這項(xiàng)工作可能會(huì)帶來更長期的回報(bào)。