中國(guó)會(huì)在貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)中動(dòng)用“核選項(xiàng)”嗎？

它通常被稱為“核選項(xiàng)”。

In the trade war between the United States and China, economists and investors have long tried to game out how both sides might use their clout. In virtually all the predictions, at least until recently, they revolved around a tit-for-tat tariff war.

在美中之間的貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)中，經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家和投資者長(zhǎng)期以來(lái)一直試圖弄清雙方可能會(huì)如何利用自己的影響力。至少直到最近，幾乎所有預(yù)測(cè)都是圍繞著針鋒相對(duì)的關(guān)稅戰(zhàn)。

Even in the gloomiest of doomsday scenarios, there is one weapon that has long been considered unthinkable: the Chinese, the biggest holder of United States foreign debt with more than $1 trillion, publicly taking a step back from buying United States Treasuries — or worse, dumping what they own in the open market.

即使在最悲觀的末世局面設(shè)想之中，也有一種武器一直被認(rèn)為是不可想象的：中國(guó)是美國(guó)外債的最大持有者，持有量超過(guò)1萬(wàn)億美元，它可以公開(kāi)退出購(gòu)買美國(guó)國(guó)債——或者更糟糕的是，在公開(kāi)市場(chǎng)傾銷他們手上持有的國(guó)債。

The very idea is typically dismissed as a waste of time to even consider, and the reason is a sort of mutually assured destruction. It would be wildly irrational in economic terms, the thinking goes. China selling Treasuries would send interest rates up and hurt the United States, but it would simultaneously severely damage the value of China’s own Treasury holdings. As the industrialist J. Paul Getty famously said, “If you owe the bank $100, that’s your problem; if you owe the bank $100 million, that’s the bank’s problem.” In the United States-China relationship, China is very clearly the bank.

人們通常覺(jué)得這個(gè)念頭想一想都是浪費(fèi)時(shí)間，理由是某種相互毀滅保證。人們覺(jué)得，這在經(jīng)濟(jì)方面是非常不合理的。中國(guó)拋售美國(guó)國(guó)債會(huì)導(dǎo)致利率上升，并損害美國(guó)，但它同時(shí)會(huì)嚴(yán)重?fù)p害中國(guó)自己的國(guó)債持有。正如工業(yè)家J·保羅·蓋蒂(J. Paul Getty)所說(shuō)，“如果你欠銀行100美元，那是你的問(wèn)題;如果你欠銀行1億美元，那就是銀行的麻煩了。”在美中關(guān)系中，中國(guó)顯然相當(dāng)于銀行。

But the conventional wisdom about what China might — or might not — be prepared to do could be wrong. China has lately reduced its holdings of United States government debt, and a growing number of financiers, economists and geopolitical analysts are quietly raising the prospect that China may look to its ability to influence interest rates as its ultimate Trump card.

但是關(guān)于中國(guó)可能會(huì)——或可能不會(huì)——做什么的常規(guī)思維也許有誤。中國(guó)最近減持了美國(guó)政府債券，越來(lái)越多的金融學(xué)家、經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家和地緣政治分析家正悄悄提出這樣一種前景：中國(guó)可能將其影響利率的能力作為向特朗普打出的最后一張牌。

After all, China doesn’t have any American imports left to tariff and it is already taking aim at deals, so what’s left?

畢竟，中國(guó)沒(méi)有更多美國(guó)進(jìn)口商品可以征收關(guān)稅了，它已經(jīng)在把目標(biāo)瞄準(zhǔn)美國(guó)企業(yè)的交易，所以還剩下什么呢?

If China were to undertake such a maneuver, it would do so at a delicate time for the United States economy: The rising deficit has increased the Treasury’s borrowing needs. There is more debt to be purchased, and the Federal Reserve is raising interest rates, making that debt more expensive. It’s not clear how much China could drive up rates by shedding Treasuries, but it would certainly add to the momentum already present.

如果中國(guó)采取這樣的策略，它將在美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)的微妙時(shí)刻這樣做：赤字上升增加了財(cái)政部的借貸需求。需要購(gòu)買的債務(wù)更多，而美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)正在提高利率，導(dǎo)致債務(wù)更加昂貴。目前尚不清楚中國(guó)可以通過(guò)減少國(guó)債來(lái)提高多少利率，但它肯定會(huì)促進(jìn)已經(jīng)存在的勢(shì)頭。

And it is worth remembering that Beijing’s endgame is not necessarily to ensure the financial health of its country this year or the next. If China were to suffer short-term pain to gain a real and lasting advantage over the United States — or at least not lose any advantages it does have — it might be willing to struggle a bit today.

值得記住的是，北京在最后階段并不一定要確保中國(guó)在今年或明年的財(cái)政健康。如果中國(guó)遭受短期痛苦就可以獲得對(duì)美國(guó)持久的真正優(yōu)勢(shì)——或者至少不會(huì)失去它已擁有的任何優(yōu)勢(shì)——它可能愿意在今天承受點(diǎn)煎熬。

“The negotiation between the two great powers isn’t about how many soybeans or Boeing airplanes they buy by the end of the year,” said Kevin Warsh, a former governor of the Federal Reserve. “We are at a pivotal moment in history. The actions of the U.S. and Chinese governments in the next 12 months will set the course for the relationship of the two great powers of the 21st century.”

“這兩個(gè)大國(guó)之間的談判不是關(guān)于他們?cè)诮衲昴甑浊百?gòu)買多少大豆或波音飛機(jī)，”美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)的一位前主管凱文·沃什(Kevin Warsh)說(shuō)。“我們正處于歷史的關(guān)鍵時(shí)刻。美國(guó)和中國(guó)政府在未來(lái)12個(gè)月的行動(dòng)，將為21世紀(jì)兩個(gè)大國(guó)的關(guān)系奠定基礎(chǔ)。”

And the war of words is only getting sharper. Last week, Vice President Mike Pence accused China of using “political, economic and military tools, as well as propaganda, to advance its influence and benefit its interests in the United States.” And on Monday, China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, admonished the Trump administration for “ceaselessly elevating” trade tensions and “casting a shadow” over relations between the two countries as he sat directly across from Secretary of State Mike Pompeo.

而言語(yǔ)之戰(zhàn)只會(huì)越來(lái)越尖銳。上周，副總統(tǒng)邁克·彭斯(Mike Pence)指責(zé)中國(guó)利用“政治、經(jīng)濟(jì)和軍事手段以及宣傳手段提升其影響力，促進(jìn)其在美國(guó)的利益。”周一在與國(guó)務(wù)卿邁克·龐皮歐(Mike Pompeo)直接會(huì)談時(shí)，中國(guó)外交部長(zhǎng)王毅指責(zé)特朗普政府“不斷升級(jí)”貿(mào)易緊張局勢(shì)，給兩國(guó)關(guān)系“蒙上了陰影”。

Still, critics who dismiss the possibility of China trying to upend the United States Treasury market say that China’s own economy is too fragile to risk doing anything that would cause instability.

然而，對(duì)中國(guó)試圖顛覆美國(guó)國(guó)債市場(chǎng)的可能性不以為然的批評(píng)人士表示，中國(guó)自己的經(jīng)濟(jì)太過(guò)脆弱，不能冒風(fēng)險(xiǎn)做出任何會(huì)引發(fā)不穩(wěn)定的事情。

Stability has long been a watchword in China. Over the weekend, China’s central bank, clearly nervous about a slowdown, pumped $175 billion into the economy by lowering the amount of money that some lenders are required to hold in reserve, allowing that money to circulate freely instead.

穩(wěn)定一直是中國(guó)的一個(gè)口號(hào)。周末，明顯對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)放緩感到不安的中國(guó)央行通過(guò)下調(diào)貸方需要儲(chǔ)備的資金，允許這些資金自由流通，向經(jīng)濟(jì)注入1750億美元。

Supporters of the Trump administration’s tough stance on tariffs with China take actions like that as a sign that the United States holds the negotiating leverage. And it remains an open question whether China could inflict real damage by selling Treasuries. 特朗普政府對(duì)華強(qiáng)硬關(guān)稅的支持者將這樣的做法視為美國(guó)手握談判籌碼的跡象。中國(guó)是否能通過(guò)出售國(guó)債造成真正的傷害，仍是一個(gè)有待解答的問(wèn)題。

“Treasuries sales in a sense are easy to counter, as the Fed is very comfortable buying and selling Treasuries for its own account,” wrote Brad W. Setser, a senior fellow for international economics at the Council on Foreign Relations. “I have often said that the U.S. ultimately holds the high cards here: The Fed is the one actor in the world that can buy more than China can ever sell.”

“從某種意義上來(lái)說(shuō)，拋售國(guó)債很容易應(yīng)對(duì)，因?yàn)槊缆?lián)儲(chǔ)完全可以自行購(gòu)買和出售國(guó)債，”美國(guó)外交關(guān)系委員會(huì)(Council on Foreign Relations)國(guó)際經(jīng)濟(jì)高級(jí)研究員布拉德·W·塞策(Brad W. Setser)寫道。“我常常說(shuō)，大牌終歸是在美國(guó)手上：美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)是世界上唯一一個(gè)有能力買入比中國(guó)賣出量更多國(guó)債的一方。”

Even so, the market dynamics are unpredictable. Chances are, over the past two decades, there have been Treasury auctions at which the Chinese haven’t been bidders. But whether they were active bidders or not, the other bidders have always had to assume they were.

即便如此，市場(chǎng)變幻仍難以預(yù)測(cè)。過(guò)去20年很可能存在中國(guó)人沒(méi)有在國(guó)債拍賣上競(jìng)拍的情況。但無(wú)論中國(guó)人是否競(jìng)拍，其他競(jìng)拍者得一直假定他們參與其中。

It is one thing to show up at Sotheby’s and not raise your paddle. It would be quite another to send out a news release saying you’re never going to Sotheby’s again. 出現(xiàn)在蘇富比卻不舉起競(jìng)拍牌是一回事。發(fā)一篇新聞稿，說(shuō)你再也不會(huì)去蘇富比，那就是完全另外一回事了。

The problem is that China would have to find something to do with that money — and, in this case, the auction house is always offering the best deals in town.

問(wèn)題在于，中國(guó)得給這筆錢找到去處——在這種情況下，拍賣行往往給出了市面上最好的條件。

“Even if it could sell its more than a trillion dollars of Treasurys without pushing the market against it, where would it park the funds?” Marc Chandler, global head of currency strategy for Brown Brothers Harriman, wrote in a note to investors. “It will not be able to secure the liquidity, safety and returns that are available in the U.S.”

“即便是中國(guó)能拋售出手中超過(guò)一萬(wàn)億美元的美國(guó)國(guó)債，而又做到不讓市場(chǎng)對(duì)自己不利，它要把這些錢投在哪里?”布朗兄弟哈里曼(Brown Brothers Harriman)全球貨幣戰(zhàn)略負(fù)責(zé)人馬克·錢德勒(Marc Chandler)在寫給投資者的一封信中表示。“中國(guó)將會(huì)無(wú)法保證這筆資金在美國(guó)能獲得的流動(dòng)性、安全性和回報(bào)。”

But brinkmanship does not breed rational thought. The escalation of hostilities, even economic ones, raises both stakes and tempers alike, which is a dangerous combination.

但邊緣政策不會(huì)帶來(lái)理性思考。雙方敵意不斷升級(jí)——即使只是經(jīng)濟(jì)方面的敵意，這既會(huì)引發(fā)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，也會(huì)帶來(lái)怒氣等情緒，而這兩者是一個(gè)危險(xiǎn)的組合。

And in this case, there is no proving ground. There is no predictable math, no scale model.

并且，在這種情況里是不存在試驗(yàn)場(chǎng)的。沒(méi)有可以預(yù)測(cè)的計(jì)算結(jié)果，也沒(méi)有比例模型。

If China were to use its nuclear option and the markets didn’t react, it would lose influence in stark fashion. If it worked — but was more effective than expected — China could inflict unintended damage on its own economy.

如果中國(guó)要使用“核選項(xiàng)”，市場(chǎng)不作出反應(yīng)，中國(guó)將在眾目睽睽之下失去影響力。如果成功了——但效果超過(guò)預(yù)期——中國(guó)將給本國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)帶來(lái)并非有意的傷害。

And even a perfectly executed strike that left China unharmed would be perilous: A targeted attack on the United States economy would have unknowable repercussions. If the fallout cloud settled over Europe or emerging markets, would China be ready for that fight, too?

而且，即使是一次對(duì)中國(guó)無(wú)害的、完美執(zhí)行的打擊，也將十分危險(xiǎn)：以美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)為目標(biāo)的攻擊將帶來(lái)不可知的后果。如果這件事帶來(lái)的陰云籠罩歐洲或新興市場(chǎng)，中國(guó)也能為這種對(duì)抗做好準(zhǔn)備嗎?

Since the end of the Cold War and the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the world has embraced a policy of strategic stability: reducing the incentive for rival nations to unleash unimaginable destruction.

自冷戰(zhàn)結(jié)束、核武擴(kuò)散以來(lái)，全世界已經(jīng)接納了一個(gè)維護(hù)戰(zhàn)略性穩(wěn)定的政策：減少會(huì)刺激敵對(duì)國(guó)家釋放不可想像的破壞力的因素。

That is probably good economic policy, too.

這可能也是一個(gè)不錯(cuò)的經(jīng)濟(jì)政策。