美國(guó)政要第9課
The U.S. Army in Joint Operation
--Interview with Lieutenant General (Re.) Jay M. Garner, the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (May 18, 1998) 訪美國(guó)陸軍前副參謀長(zhǎng)助理杰伊•加納中將(退役)
MR. CHEN BOJIANG: What is the contribution of the Army to future joint operations1? What new changes will arise in the relationship between the Army and other services in future joint operations?
MR GARNER: What changes? Well, I think, the biggest change is in how far you can shoot and how much information you have. What’s happened today is all the services on the battlefield, get the same information about the same time. No one gets any more information. The Air Force and the Navy don’t get any more information or any better information than the Army. The Army doesn’t get any more information or any better information than the Air Force and the Navy. So, we all have the same information. That means you can all develop the same targets. There was a time before when only the deep targets were seen by the Air Force and only the surface Naval targets were seen by the Navy. Everybody sees the same target list at the same time now, so, the Army, more and more, every year, can shoot deeper and deeper. I mean, this year, we’ll hundred kilometers. In future years, it will be over four hundred kilometers. So, what it means is the area of controlled by the Army commander is expanding greatly. what is means to the Air Force now is that the Air Force now doesn’t have to spend as many sorties working the close air support. They can go deeper and do more strategic work. We spent a lot of sorties in the past with the Air Force working the ground from say fifteen kilometers to a hundred kilometers deep. They don’t need to do that. They don’t have to do that. We can do that for ourselves. I mean, we see the battlefield. Our missiles are more accurate than airplanes. So, what we need to do now is expand the area of operations of the land components-The surface commanders, both the Nacy and the Army surface commanders. Then free up2 those aircraft that used to work close air support to go deeper and do much more work, strategic work, than they did before. I think that’s the biggest difference.
MR. CHEN: What is your opinion on information superiority in the future joint operation?
MR. GARNER: Well, I think that there’s big difference right now between U.S. forces and other forces in terms of information superiority. But, that window is going to close. Fifteen or twenty years from now, our enemies will have as much information as we have. So, the skill in the future will not be how you use information against your enemy. It’s how you can take his information away from him.
MR. CHEN: In future Joint Operations, how will former operational arts3 such as Centers of Gravity4 and Decisive Points, Simultaneity and Depth, Timing and Tempo, and so forth, change?
MR. GARNER: You always have a center of gravity if you’re an enemy. You have one yourself and your enemy has one. So, identifying the center of gravity will still be important. The difference is how quickly you get to that center of gravity now. How fast can you do that? Hopefully, as you go into Army After Next, as you go into the Revolution in Military Affairs, you will be able to reach the enemy center of gravity much, much faster than you were able to in the past. As long as he doesn’t have an asymmetric5 way to keep you from that.
MR. CHEN: Logistics is a growing concern for large army deployments. How does the U.S. Army address this challenge?
Mr. GARNER: Well, logistics has been a problem for five thousand years. It will always be a problem. The only way to begin to try to overcome the logistics problem is in your platforms. If you begin to be able to predict when things will wear out, so that you can have some sort of predictive analysis for support. In other words, I know that, in my tank, my engine is going to wear out probably next week sometime. The logisticians, they begin moving the new engine for me. You have digital electronics in there so when something happens to the vehicle, the logistician automatically knows. I don’t have to call him and tell him. He automatically knows that. And, he begins to immediately react to that. You have more fuel efficient vehicles, so that you have to move less fuel around the battlefield. But, you’ll always have the problems with things like water and food. Takes a lot of water for an Army and it takes a lot of food for an Army. What we’re talking about now is just in time logistics, which means we don’t move a lot of logistics. We predict what we’ll need and only move what we think we’re going to need. The ability to track where all the items you need are through stages, by putting a chip on whatever it is you’re moving. You’ll always know where it is in the pipeline. But, that’s a long ways off. We talk about it now, we’re getting better at it, but logistics will remain a problem in the future. It will always be a problem.
MR. CHEN: What changes do you predict will arise in the roles and mission of the Army in the post-Cold War? What efforts do the Army need to enact in order to meet these changes?
MR. GARNER: I don’t think you’ll see any changes in roles and missions. You know, the mission of the Army is to fight sustained6 land combat. That isn’t going to change. That will stay its mission. There’s a number of different roles that they’ll have to take on, in order to do that. But I think you’ll find, over the next ten or fifteen years, that most of the emphasis will be at the lower a spectrum of the spectrum of war. You know, peacekeeping operations7, more humanitarian8 operations, that type of thing. There will be some things in the middle of the scale. But, I don’t think many. I think the danger is not looking, not focusing on the upper end of the scale, because you’re doing of many things down at the bottom of the scale. Because you never know when, one day, you’ll have to fight another big war. And, you can never lose focus of that. But, it’s easy during this period to lose focus of that and only focus on the things like Bosnia, Rwanda, Haiti, Somalia that type thing.
MR. CHEN: Could you give me a brief introduction to the structure of research agencies and organizations in the Army? What is the relationship between them?
MR. GARNER: The research agencies? Oh, there’s a lot of them. In each one of our posts, that is a development post9, we have a research and development center there. For example, take Huntsville. Huntsville is a center of excellence for missiles, for the development of missiles. We have a huge research and development center there. So, if you go into each one of the posts where we build things, make things, or manage things, have the programs for them, we have a big research and development center. Now, outside of that, that’s sort of and acquisition function. As far as the think tank type piece goes, we have the missile analysis center out at White Sands. We have combat analysis agency here in Washington, D.C. We have a lot of deep attack analysis that goes on at West Point. We have a good analytical base at West Point. A lot of analysis, war fighting analysis, and future visionary thinking and all goes on at War College in Carlisle. So, there’s an awful10 lot of research going on. The skill is bringing all that together, which is more difficult. It’s easy to think of things, much harder to bring them together.
WORDS AND EXPRESSIONS 詞匯提示
1.joint operations 聯(lián)合作戰(zhàn)
2.free up 騰出
3.former operational arts 以往的戰(zhàn)役概念
4.Centers of Gravity 作戰(zhàn)重心
5.asymmetric [] a. 不對(duì)稱的
6.sustained [] a.持久的
7.peacekeeping operations 維持和平行動(dòng)
8.humanitarian [] n.人道主義
9.post [] n.基地
10.awful [] a.大量的
QUESTIONS AFTER LISTENING 聽后答題:
1. What has happened today on the battle field?
A.It is all the services on the battlefield get the same information about the same time.
B.It is all the services get the same order about the same time.
C.It is all the services attack the same target about the same time.
D.It is all the services communicate same massages about the same time.
2. When does Mr. Garner think the enemies would have as much information as the U.S. has?
A.10 or 15 years from now.
B.15 or 20 years from now.
C.5 or 10 years from now.
D.10 or 20 years from now.
3. What will be the skill about information in the future?
A.It is how to use the information.
B.It is how you can take his information away from him.
C.It is how to get the information.
D.It is how to analyze the information.
4. How long has logistics been a problem?
A.For two thousand years.
B.For four thousand years.
C.For five thousand years.
D.For six thousand years.
5. What is the only way to begin to try to overcome the logistics problem?
A.It is in the platforms.
B.It is in the personnel.
C.It is in the organization.
D.It is in the communication.
6. What’s the meaning of in time logistics?
A.It means that you need to move logistics more quickly.
B.It means that you don’t move a lot of logistics and only move what you’re going to need.
C.It means that you can move a lot of logistics more easily.
D.It means that you can move a lot of logistics more effectively.
7. What is the mission of the Army?
A.It is to safeguard the mainland.
B.It is to fight sustained land combat.
C.It is to guard against terrorists.
D.It is to suppress the rebellion.
8. What type of thing is at the lower spectrum of the spectrum of war?
A.Such as a hi- tech regional war.
B.Such as suppressing rebellions.
C.Such as border conflicts.
D.Such as peacekeeping operations, humanitarian operations.
9. What is Huntsville for?
A.A center for development of torpedo.
B.A center for development of ammunition.
C.A center for development of airplane.
D.A center for development of missiles.
10. What is there at West Point?
A.There is an analytical base.
B.There is a missile base.
C.There is a combat analysis agency.
D.There is a war fighting analysis.
【參考譯文】
聯(lián)合作踐中的美國(guó)陸軍
陳伯江：陸軍對(duì)未來聯(lián)合作戰(zhàn)的貢獻(xiàn)是什么？在未來聯(lián)合作戰(zhàn)中，陸軍與其他軍種之間的關(guān)系會(huì)有哪些新的變化？
加納：我認(rèn)為最大的變化是你在多遠(yuǎn)可以發(fā)射和你能獲得多少信息。目前的情況是戰(zhàn)場(chǎng)上所有的軍種幾乎在同時(shí)獲得同樣的信息。沒有一個(gè)軍種可以多得到一點(diǎn)信息?？哲姾秃＼姴荒艿玫饺魏伪汝戃姼嗷蚋玫男畔?。因此，我們都擁有同樣的信息。這意味著各軍種都可能發(fā)現(xiàn)相同的目標(biāo)。陸軍也不能得到任何比空軍和海軍更多或更好的信息。因此我們都擁有同樣的信息。這意味著各軍種都可能發(fā)現(xiàn)相同的目標(biāo)。以往只有空軍才能看到位于縱深目標(biāo)，只有海軍才能看到水上目標(biāo)?，F(xiàn)在各軍種都能同時(shí)看到相同的目標(biāo)清單。因此陸軍攻擊縱深目標(biāo)的距離一年比一年遠(yuǎn)。我的意思是，今年我們的陸軍戰(zhàn)術(shù)導(dǎo)彈系統(tǒng)的發(fā)射距離已超過300公里，今后幾年將可超過400公里。這表明陸軍指揮官控制的范圍已大大地?cái)U(kuò)展了。對(duì)空軍來說，這意味現(xiàn)在不必耗費(fèi)許多架次用于近距離空中支援，空軍可到更深的縱深去執(zhí)行更具戰(zhàn)略性的任務(wù)。過去我們花費(fèi)大量的空軍架次用于15公里至100公里縱深的地面作戰(zhàn)?，F(xiàn)在不需要他們?nèi)プ鲞@些事，我們自己可以做了。我的意思是，我們能看到戰(zhàn)場(chǎng)，我們的導(dǎo)彈比飛機(jī)更準(zhǔn)確。因此，目前我們要做的是擴(kuò)大地面軍種和地面指揮官（包括海軍和陸軍地面指揮官）的作戰(zhàn)區(qū)域，然后騰出以往用于近距離空中支援的飛機(jī)到更遠(yuǎn)的縱深去執(zhí)行比過去更多的戰(zhàn)略任務(wù)。我認(rèn)為這是最大的不同。
陳：您對(duì)未來聯(lián)合作戰(zhàn)中的信息優(yōu)勢(shì)有何看法？
加納：我認(rèn)為就信息優(yōu)勢(shì)來說，目前其它國(guó)家軍隊(duì)與美國(guó)軍隊(duì)之間存在著較大的差距。但這種差距正趨于縮小。在從現(xiàn)在起15或者20年內(nèi)，我們的敵人將會(huì)擁有與我們同樣多的信息。因此，未來的關(guān)鍵問題將不是你怎樣對(duì)你的敵人使用信息，而是你怎樣才能從你的敵人那里剝奪信息。
陳：在未來的聯(lián)合作戰(zhàn)中，以往的戰(zhàn)役概念如“作戰(zhàn)重心”、“決定點(diǎn)”、“同時(shí)”、“縱深”、“時(shí)機(jī)和節(jié)奏”等等，將會(huì)有哪些變化？
加納：如果你是一個(gè)敵人，你總會(huì)有一個(gè)重心。你有一個(gè)你的重心，而你的敵人有一個(gè)他的重心。因此，確定“作戰(zhàn)重心”將仍然是重要的。不同的是你現(xiàn)在多快才能到達(dá)那個(gè)“重心”，多快才能摧毀那個(gè)重心？當(dāng)發(fā)展到“后天的陸軍”、發(fā)展到軍事革命階段時(shí)，可能有希望用比以往快得多的速度到達(dá)敵人的重心，只要他不采用非對(duì)稱的方法使你無法接近他。
陳：后勤保障對(duì)于大規(guī)模陸軍行動(dòng)日顯重量要，美國(guó)陸軍如何對(duì)付這一挑戰(zhàn)？
加納：5000年來，后勤一直是一個(gè)問題，今后仍將是一個(gè)問題。解決后勤問題的唯一辦法是從作戰(zhàn)平臺(tái)做起。如果你能夠預(yù)計(jì)什么時(shí)候物資將消耗殆盡，你就可提出對(duì)后勤保障的某種預(yù)測(cè)分析。換句話說，我知道我的坦克發(fā)動(dòng)機(jī)大約會(huì)在下個(gè)星期的某個(gè)時(shí)候報(bào)廢，后勤人員就可以為我運(yùn)來一臺(tái)新發(fā)動(dòng)機(jī)。在你的坦克上有一個(gè)數(shù)字式的電子裝置，當(dāng)有什么情況發(fā)生時(shí)，后勤人員可自動(dòng)地知道，我不必打電話告訴他，他能自動(dòng)了解情況，并立即開始對(duì)情況做出反應(yīng)。你擁有能更加高效使用燃料的坦克，因此你向戰(zhàn)場(chǎng)調(diào)運(yùn)的油料更少。但是，你會(huì)經(jīng)常遇到水和食品這類問題，軍隊(duì)要消耗大量的水和食品。我們現(xiàn)在所說的是實(shí)時(shí)后勤保障問題，其含意是我們不要運(yùn)輸大量的后勤物資，我們預(yù)計(jì)所需要的物資，并只運(yùn)送我們將會(huì)需要的物資。跟蹤你所需要的各項(xiàng)物資的能力是通過在你機(jī)動(dòng)的各個(gè)站點(diǎn)放上一個(gè)電腦芯片獲得的。你總能知道你所需要的物資在運(yùn)輸系統(tǒng)的什么位置。然而，這是一個(gè)長(zhǎng)期的發(fā)展過程，我們現(xiàn)在談?wù)撍?，我們將不斷完善它，但后勤保障在今后仍將是一個(gè)有待解決的問題．
陳：在冷戰(zhàn)后，陸軍的職能和任務(wù)不會(huì)有什么變化，你知道，陸軍的任務(wù)是進(jìn)行持續(xù)的地面作戰(zhàn)，這將不會(huì)變，仍然是陸軍的任務(wù)。為完成這個(gè)任務(wù)，陸軍必須增加一些新的職能。但是，我想你會(huì)發(fā)現(xiàn)，在今后10至15年間，陸軍的大多數(shù)任務(wù)將集中在戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)頻譜的較低譜段，即維和、人道主義行動(dòng)這類任務(wù)。在戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)頻譜的中段也會(huì)有一些事情，但不會(huì)太多．我認(rèn)為危險(xiǎn)在于由于較低譜段將有許多事情要做，因而看不到、忽視戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)頻譜的高段。但是不知道什么時(shí)候、哪一天將要打另一場(chǎng)大仗。陸軍絕不能忘記還有可能打大仗這個(gè)重點(diǎn)。然而，在這期間很容易忘記這個(gè)重點(diǎn)，而只把重點(diǎn)放在像波斯尼亞、盧旺達(dá)、海地、索馬里這類事情上。
陳：請(qǐng)您簡(jiǎn)要介紹一下陸軍的研究機(jī)構(gòu)和組織的構(gòu)成。這些機(jī)構(gòu)和組織之間的關(guān)系如何？
加納：你問研究機(jī)構(gòu)？對(duì)，有許多這樣的機(jī)構(gòu)。在我們的每一個(gè)開發(fā)基地，都有一個(gè)研究開發(fā)中心。例如，拿亨茨維爾來說，它就是一個(gè)用于導(dǎo)彈開發(fā)的先進(jìn)研究中心，在那里有一個(gè)大型的研究與發(fā)展中心。因此，如果你到每一個(gè)開發(fā)基地（在這些基地我們建立、制造、管理某些東西，進(jìn)行一些研究項(xiàng)目）。則都有一個(gè)大的研究和開發(fā)中心，這些中心還有某種采購(gòu)功能。就思想庫(kù)類的研究機(jī)構(gòu)來說，在白沙試驗(yàn)場(chǎng)，我們有導(dǎo)彈分析中心；在華盛頓我們有作戰(zhàn)分析機(jī)構(gòu)；在西點(diǎn)軍校我們進(jìn)行了大量的縱深攻擊分析，我們?cè)谀怯幸粋€(gè)非常好的分析基地。大量有關(guān)作戰(zhàn)分析、未來構(gòu)想的研究都是在克萊爾兵營(yíng)的陸軍軍事學(xué)院進(jìn)行的。因此，大量的研究項(xiàng)目正在進(jìn)行。問題是如何把所有這些研究結(jié)合起來，這是最困難的。思考一些問題并不難，而使它們結(jié)合起來卻要難得多。
KEYS TO THE QUESTIONS 參考答案：
1.a 2.b 3.b 4.c 5.a 6.b 7.b 8.d 9.d 10.a
