美國政要第13課

所屬教程:美國政要

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Revolution in Military Affairs in the United States
--Interview with Former Secretary of National Defense, Dr. William Perry 訪美國前國防部長威廉•佩里博士
MR. CHEN BOJIANG: I feel honored to have the opportunity to interview you today. In my research on military revolution, future warfare and national defense development, you are the interviewee1 whom I most desire to speak with. As far as I know, you have not only personally directed defense research and engineering which contributed significantly to the advanced military technologies being used currently, but also promoted the discussion of revolution in military affairs during your appointment2 as the Secretary of Defense3. I really appreciate this chance to gain your insight4 and views on these issues.
What is the reason for the encouragement of the discussion of RMA5 in the USA? You have directed defense research and engineering for a long time. How do you view the emphasis and essence6 of this revolution in military affairs?
DR. PERRY: The RMA in the United States is simply applying the same technologies and the same management procedure to the military—that we’re applying to the commercial area. There’s a technological revolution going on in the world and it provides not only a basis for making newer and better products, but it also provides a basis for managing more effectively and more efficiently. The RMA is to conceive7 of what products could be most effective for the military and also what processes and procedures improve military efficiency—so that it’s not fundamentally different from the application of technology in the field. Once the new product—military weapons—has been developed and as new management processes become available, it can have a profound impact on tactics8 and doctrine9, and organization10. Now this is true in the industry as well—but it is perhaps more obvious in the military because the military tends to formulate their doctrine in certain forms and so the army, for example—in FM-10011 something—describes the thinking about military doctrine. But some of these new products and processes change dramatically and therefore it is important to exploit12 tactics and doctrine at the same time. An excellent example of this is Desert Storm13, where for the first time, we used stealth14 technology and for the first time, we took modern intelligence15 techniques to the battlefield. Those techniques were so powerful that we had to devise16 new tactics on how to use them. It is great credit17, I think, to the American military leadership, that even though they did not have the new manuals18 at that time, that they were able to adapt the technology as the war was proceeding. The most striking19 was the way that used stealth. They chose to use the stealth airplane over the area with the greatest defense. The idea was that stealth would have a leveraging20 effect. If we could use it to essentially defeat the defense system, then you end up giving other aircraft a much easier time. So, the military leaders who were putting the military campaign21 together had to devise a way of using the aircraft they had, including non-stealth most effectively, and so that the other aircraft benefited from how we were using the stealth aircraft. That’s an example of how doctrine and tactics need to be adapted to reflect the availability of new weapons systems and new technology.
MR. CHEN: Compared to the RMAs that have occurred in history, what are the topmost characteristics of the RMAs which should be especially noticed?
DR. PERRY: In terms of other RMAs in history, the characteristic of this one, which is dramatically different from any other, is the speed with which it is proceeding, compared with the introduction of gunpowder22, introduction of the flint23 lock and other major changes that brought about change in tactics and doctrine. They changed the way we fought war—caused us to back away from trench24 warfare. All of those changes occurred over several decades, whereas the current technology is changing every few years now. And so, the military leaders, if they want to use the most effective technology have to be prepared to turn over weapons systems in a few years time and change their tactics and doctrine in a correspondingly short time. And that’s a very difficult task. One area of difficulty is that in the computer field, a new generation of computers is introduced every two years, whereas it takes us ten to twelve years to develop a new airplane. And when that airplane comes into the force, it’s there for twenty or thirty years. That means that you’d have to find a way of deciding which of the new technologies are most important and incorporating them into existing weapon systems without waiting for the next generation of weapon systems. And that challenges our system development because it was set up to operate in a different way—in a twelve year cycle. The topmost characteristic which affects the whole system the most, is the speed with which it advances.
MR. CHEN: To the best of your knowledge, what is the topmost achievement or theoretical breakthrough25 as a result of the discussion on RMA?
DR. PERRY: The topmost break-through is certainly stealth—it was a dramatic breakthrough. But in a different field altogether, and I would say equally important, has been the introduction of information technology, which basically answers the question that soldiers have asked for centuries, which is what is over the next hill. The way of answering that question has moved very slowly through the centuries. During the last decade, The technology has moved very fast and has completely revolutionized how that question is answered.
MR. CHEN: How is the American future development of national defense related with RMA? How do you think RMA influences that development of national defense? Is the United States at the beginning, middle, or end of an RMA? What are the main trends in the development of RMA?
DR. PERRY: Yes. If I focus on information technology, we’re certainly not at the beginning of it—we have been introducing it now ever since before Desert Storm. I would say we’re not at the end of it, by any means. We’re in intermediate26 phase. But information technology continues to develop at a very fast rate. It’s been under way for fifty years and it has a long way to go. We’re not near the end yet. Because we’re not near the end of the technological changes, particularly in the field of information technology.

Practice Listening to words詞匯聽力練習(xí)：
1.interviewee [] n. 被采訪者
2.appointment [] n. 任命，指定
3.Secretary of Defense國防部長
4.insight [] n. 見識
5.RMA:Revolution in Military Affairs軍事革命
6.essence []ｎ.實(shí)質(zhì)
7.conceive [] vi. 考慮
8.tactics []ｎ．戰(zhàn)術(shù)
9.doctrine []ｎ．條令，思想
10.organization []ｎ．編制
11.FM-100美國軍作戰(zhàn)條令的一種
12.exploit [] vt．開拓，發(fā)展
13.Desert Storm沙漠風(fēng)暴（意指海灣戰(zhàn)爭）
14.stealth []ｎ．隱形
15.intelligence []ｎ．情報(bào)
16.devise [] vt．設(shè)計(jì)，想出（辦法）
17.credit []ｎ．聲望，榮譽(yù)
18.manual []ｎ．手冊
19.striking [] adj．顯著的，驚人的
20.leverage []ｎ．杠桿
21.campaign []ｎ．戰(zhàn)役
22.gunpowder []ｎ．火藥
23.flint []ｎ．燧石，打火石；～lock燧發(fā)槍
24.trench []ｎ．塹壕；trench warfare 塹壕戰(zhàn)
25.breakthrough []ｎ．突破
26.intermediate [] adj．中間的

【參考譯文】
美國的軍事革命
陳伯江：今天我有機(jī)會對您訪談，感到非常榮幸。在我著手進(jìn)行有關(guān)美國軍事革命、未來戰(zhàn)爭和國防發(fā)展問題研究的時(shí)候，您是我最想訪談的對象。因?yàn)閾?jù)我所知，你本人不僅親自領(lǐng)導(dǎo)了對于當(dāng)今美國軍正在使用的先進(jìn)軍事技術(shù)有著重大貢獻(xiàn)的防務(wù)研究和工程項(xiàng)目，而且在你擔(dān)任美國國防部長期間，又對推動(dòng)軍事革命的討論發(fā)揮了重要作用。非常感謝您所給予我的這個(gè)能聽取您對上述問題意見的機(jī)會。
首先我想知道的是，推動(dòng)著美國這場軍事革命討論的原因是什么？你曾經(jīng)長期領(lǐng)導(dǎo)過防務(wù)研究和工程項(xiàng)目，你怎樣看待這場軍事革命的重點(diǎn)和實(shí)質(zhì)？
佩里：美國的軍事革命只不過是將商業(yè)領(lǐng)域所用的相同的技術(shù)和相同的管理方法運(yùn)用于軍事。當(dāng)今世界正在進(jìn)行著一場技術(shù)革命。這場棱柱革命不僅提供了一個(gè)制造更新更好產(chǎn)品的基礎(chǔ)，而且提供了一個(gè)能越來越有效地進(jìn)行管理的基礎(chǔ)。軍事革命就是要考慮哪些產(chǎn)品對于軍隊(duì)最為有效，哪些管理過程和方法能改進(jìn)軍隊(duì)的效率，因此，能提高效率的管理過程和方法與技術(shù)在軍事的運(yùn)用并無要本上的不同。一旦新的產(chǎn)品(軍事裝備)被研制出來和新的管理方式出現(xiàn)，就會對技術(shù)、作戰(zhàn)理論和編制產(chǎn)生重大影響?，F(xiàn)在在工業(yè)上也是這們，但在軍事上更為明顯，因?yàn)檐婈?duì)趨向于一定的形式規(guī)范他們的作戰(zhàn)理論。例如拿陸軍來說，就是以類似FM—100這樣的條令來說明有關(guān)的作戰(zhàn)理論。然而某些新的技術(shù)和作戰(zhàn)理論就很重要。這方面的一個(gè)很好的例子就是海灣戰(zhàn)爭。在這場戰(zhàn)爭中，我們首次使用了隱形技術(shù)，并首次將現(xiàn)代偵察技術(shù)用于戰(zhàn)場。這些技術(shù)具有很強(qiáng)的能力，我們不得不研究如何運(yùn)用這些核技術(shù)的戰(zhàn)術(shù)。我認(rèn)為，當(dāng)時(shí)美國軍事領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的莫大功績在于，盡管他們并沒有運(yùn)用那些技術(shù)的新手冊，然而他們卻能在戰(zhàn)爭進(jìn)程中那些技術(shù)。最了不起的是運(yùn)用隱形飛機(jī)的方式。他們選擇了將隱形飛機(jī)用于對方防御最嚴(yán)密的地區(qū)上空，因?yàn)殡[形技術(shù)將全產(chǎn)生事半功倍的杠桿作用。如果我們能用它去極大地挫敗對方的防御系統(tǒng)，那么其它飛機(jī)的作戰(zhàn)運(yùn)用就會容易得多。所以，統(tǒng)籌進(jìn)行戰(zhàn)役規(guī)劃的軍事領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人必須想出一種辦法，能最有效地作用他們所擁有的飛機(jī)，包括非隱形飛機(jī)，從而使非隱形飛機(jī)能從隱形飛機(jī)的使用中得到好處。這就是一個(gè)關(guān)于需要采用新的戰(zhàn)術(shù)和作戰(zhàn)理論使之適應(yīng)新武器系統(tǒng)和新技術(shù)要求的例子。
陳：與歷史上發(fā)生過的軍事革命相比，對于當(dāng)前這場軍事革命，特別值得注意的特點(diǎn)是什么？
佩里：從歷史上發(fā)生的軍事革命來看，例如與火藥和燧發(fā)槍的發(fā)明以及其它引起戰(zhàn)術(shù)和作戰(zhàn)理論變化的主要變革相比，這次軍事革命最不同于其他各次的特點(diǎn)，是其演進(jìn)的速度。以往的發(fā)明也曾改變過我們進(jìn)行戰(zhàn)爭的方式，使我們遠(yuǎn)離了塹壕戰(zhàn)。但是以往的變化歷時(shí)幾十年，而當(dāng)今的技術(shù)每幾年就會發(fā)生變化。因此，軍事領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人如果想使用最有效的技術(shù)，就不得不在幾年的時(shí)間內(nèi)放棄已有的武器，并在相應(yīng)的短時(shí)間內(nèi)更換其戰(zhàn)術(shù)和作戰(zhàn)理論。這是一項(xiàng)極其困難的任務(wù)。最困難的一個(gè)領(lǐng)域就是電子制一種新飛機(jī)需要10~12年時(shí)間，并且當(dāng)新飛機(jī)進(jìn)入部隊(duì)，還要服役20或30年。這就意味著你得找到一種辦法，來決定哪些技術(shù)是最重要的，并把它們引入到現(xiàn)有的武器系統(tǒng)中去，而無需等到下一代武器系統(tǒng)。這將對我們的武器系統(tǒng)發(fā)展工作帶來挑戰(zhàn)，因?yàn)樗且圆煌姆绞?即以12年為周期)動(dòng)作的。對整個(gè)系統(tǒng)有著最大影響的最重要特點(diǎn)，是技術(shù)進(jìn)步的速度。
陳：在你看來，美國軍事革命所帶來的最生要的成果和理論上的突破是什么？
佩里：最重要的突破當(dāng)然是隱形技術(shù)----它是一種巨大的突破。但是我要說在一個(gè)完全不同的領(lǐng)域，同樣重要的是信息核技術(shù)的發(fā)明。信息核技術(shù)解決了士兵們幾個(gè)世紀(jì)以來一直要求解決的問題，這就是“在下一卒山的后面有什么”？幾個(gè)世紀(jì)以來，解決這一問題進(jìn)展甚慢。最近10年，技術(shù)的進(jìn)展非常之快。使解決這一問題有了革命性的辦法。
陳：美國國防的未來發(fā)展無疑將與軍事革命密切相關(guān)。你怎樣看待軍事革命對國防的影響？當(dāng)前美國正處在這場軍事革命的開始、中期還是后期？軍事革命發(fā)展的主要真摯是什么？
佩里：如果側(cè)重從信息技術(shù)來說，我們確實(shí)已經(jīng)不在軍事革命的開始階段，因?yàn)槲覀兩踔猎诤硲?zhàn)爭之前就已開始使用目前這些技術(shù)。但進(jìn)化論從哪方面看，我們也不在后期階段。我們正處在這場軍事革命的中間階段。然而，信息核技術(shù)仍在以一種很快的速度發(fā)展。跾技術(shù)的發(fā)展已有50年，并還將經(jīng)歷一個(gè)漫長的過程。迄今為止我們尚未接近軍事革命發(fā)展的盡頭，因?yàn)槲覀兩形唇咏夹g(shù)變化的盡頭，尤其是在信息技術(shù)領(lǐng)域。