美國(guó)政要第19課

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Challenges to U.S. Military in the Next Century
--Interview with Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Dr. James N. Miller, Jr. 訪美國(guó)國(guó)防部助理國(guó)防部長(zhǎng)幫辦小詹姆斯•米勒博士
MR. CHEN BOJIANG: How do you view challenges to US military in the next century? What will be the toughest1 challenges? What will be the most likely future challenge that is different from that faced today?
DR. MILLER: That is a very good question. Many aspects of the early part of the next century are not hard to project, because many of the challenges that we face today will still be with us not just the next couple of years but for the next decade or more. One of those that the QDR2 emphasized and that I believe the RMA is very important in dealing with is the problem of so-called “asymmetric warfare3.” And that would include the threat of chemical and biological or potentially nuclear, but particularly chemical and biological weapons against U.S. forces, allies and possibly the United States territory.
Terrorism4 is another element of asymmetric warfare, as is information operations. The possibility of attacks on U.S. theater communications or on the U.S. infrastructure5, whether military, more broadly governmental or including private as well. And we've seen some hacker6 activity lately that I think is a reminder that this could be a very serious problem, indeed .
Those are very serious challenges. Others that I would add would be some¬thing the Marine Corps7 is very much em¬phasizing with Army participation, military operations in urban terrain8. This could come in the context of anything from peacekeeping in a somewhat hostile9 envi¬ronment-even small numbers of hostile people can make that quite difficult, as you know-to large-scale military operations in which an adversary10 might decide to go to the cities in order to gain sanctuary11. This is a very difficult problem and a very different type of conflict from what it looked like in Desert Storm.
The U.S. is, I expect, and the de¬fense strategy would say that the U.S. is going to retain its power projection capabil¬ities12, and projecting power has a number of difficulties. The possibility of access denial13 by chemical or biological weapons, or even sufficient numbers of conventional missiles is certainly an area of concern.
And I can imagine a number of new challenges. Some project extended prolif¬eration14 of cruise missile15 to countries that today don' t have them, which married with chemical and biological agents would pose a very, very difficult threat. Contin¬ued work in bioengineering could produce new types of viruses16-as difficult as it is to imagine why people would do this, but to the extent17 that a terrorist group or a nation puts sufficient resources to such an effort that is a challenge that, again, could be very daunting18. The bio threat is one we see today, but with fundamentally new pieces or agents in the mix the challenge would increase.
To some extent the challenges of the future depend on the success of the Shap¬ing portion of our strategy, and I hope very much that the focus that's been put on that will help. Getting beyond the op¬erational level, and thinking for a moment about global politics-you have to look, for example, at whether we are improving re¬lationships with Russia, since the Cold War end. It's been a great power histori¬cally and our success with that relationship is critical. The same is true of China. If we face a resurgent19 China that doesn't like the United States, then that will be a challenge that none of us should even want to consider. The point is that the nature of U.S. relations today with China, Russia, and also other countries, will affect the challenge faced by the U.S. military in the future. So the “shape” part of our strate¬gy is very, very important.
MR. CHEN: Secretary Cohen raised the “Shape-Respond-Prepare Strategy” in his report of the Quadrennial Defense Re¬view last May. What is the essence and main points of this new strategy?
DR. MILLER: As we have already talked about, it' s extremely straightfor¬ward20. First, the department should sup¬port national efforts to shape the interna¬tional environment in ways favorable to United States interests. Second, the mili¬tary must have the capacity to respond to crises when they occur. And third, we must prepare now for an uncertain future--in other words, we must ensure that we have the capacity to shape and respond in the future as well as in the present. Within the Shape portion, and I know you've read the QDR so know the main pieces, the leadership of the department has been very active with military to mili¬tary contacts at many levels as well. And one of the recent things that happened since the QDR is that each of the commanders-in-chief, each of the regional CINCs21, has been asked to create a theater engage¬ment22 plan that specifies the CINC' s ob¬jectives23 in the region and how that CINC will work with regional partners, including joint combined exercises and other activi¬ties with all of the players in the region. Systematically planning engagement is an important part of implementing24 the Shap¬ing Strategy.
Having American forces prepared, about 100,000 in Europe and 100,000 in Asia, is an important part of forward pres¬ence25. The capacity to deter26 conflict by that presence, if necessary, and by the continuing military capabilities that we have at home that could be brought to bear is also a part of Shaping, so is the capaci¬ty to deter as well as to interact with peo¬ple in a region.
Now to the Response capacity. The U.S. military must have response capabili¬ties across the full spectrum27 of possible operations, from very small scale humani¬tarian28 and peace operations, to a major theater war. And again, the deterrence aspect of the Shaping portion of the strat¬egy requires the capacity to respond along the full spectrum, up to and including the nuclear deterrence provided by our nuclear weapons.
The Prepare now for the future por¬tion of the strategy. We've talked about a core element of it in talking about the RMA. In addition, one of the things that the department is working hard to do is to operate more efficiently internally29, to conduct a “revolution in business affairs.” For example, take the Defense Reform Ini¬tiative30 that reduced the Office of the Sec¬retary of Defense and other parts of the de¬partment, and the ongoing effort to streamline31 the department at all levels. Also consider the desire to reduce military infrastructure, the bases in the United States and overseas, as appropriate. These steps are part of being sure that the de¬partment can live within the resource con¬straints it has and is efficient enough to be prepared for the future.
And as I said before, the RMA ef¬forts, including not only experimentation but also science and technology development is a very important part of the Prepare Now. Finally, continuous intelligence projections and assessments32, though very difficult, provide necessary pieces in considering what possible future capabilities we may need. All of these are important pieces of the Prepare portion of the strategy.

Practise Listening to Words 詞匯聽(tīng)力練習(xí):
1.tough [] adj. 艱難的
2.QDR:Quadrennial Defense Review《四年防務(wù)審查報(bào)告》
3.asymmetric warfare非對(duì)稱戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)
4.terrorism[]n.恐怖主義
5.infrastructure [] n. 基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施
6.hacker [] n.電腦黑客
7.Marine Corps（美國(guó)）海軍陸戰(zhàn)隊(duì)
8.urban terrain城區(qū)地形
9.hostile [] adj. 敵對(duì)的
10.adversary [] n. 敵人，對(duì)手
11.sanctuary [] n. 避難所
12.power projection capability力量投送能力
13.denial [] n. 否定，否認(rèn)
14.proliferation [] n. 擴(kuò)散
15.cruise missile 巡航導(dǎo)彈
16.virus [] n. 病毒
17.to the extent 到……程度
18.daunt [] vt. 威嚇
19.resurgent [] adj. 重新崛起的
20.straightforward [] adj. 直截了當(dāng)?shù)?
21.CINC:commanders-in -chief 總司令
22.engagement [] vt. 接觸
23.objective [] n. 目標(biāo)
24.implement [] vt. 執(zhí)行
25.forward presence 前沿存在
26.deter [] vt. 阻止
27.spectrum [] n. 頻譜
28.humanitarian [] n. 人道主義
29.internally [] adv. 在內(nèi)部
30.Defense Reform Initiative《國(guó)防改革倡議》
31.streamline [] vt. 精簡(jiǎn)
32.assessment [] n. 評(píng)估

【參考譯文】
美國(guó)下個(gè)世紀(jì)的軍事挑戰(zhàn)
陳伯江：你對(duì)下個(gè)世紀(jì)美國(guó)面臨的軍事挑戰(zhàn)有何看法?在美國(guó)今后面臨的挑戰(zhàn)中，什么挑戰(zhàn)可能與今天所面臨的最為不同?
米勒：這是一個(gè)很好的問(wèn)題。下個(gè)世紀(jì)頭幾年的許多方面不難預(yù)測(cè)，因?yàn)槲覀兘裉烀媾R的許多挑戰(zhàn)不僅在今后幾年仍然存在，而且將在今后10年或更長(zhǎng)的時(shí)間繼續(xù)伴隨著我們。《四年防務(wù)審查報(bào)告》所強(qiáng)調(diào)的挑戰(zhàn)之一，并且我認(rèn)為也是需要軍事革命特別關(guān)注的挑戰(zhàn)，就是所謂的“非對(duì)稱作戰(zhàn)”問(wèn)題。它將包括化學(xué)和生物武器的威脅，或潛在的核威脅，特別是對(duì)美軍、盟國(guó)、甚至美國(guó)本土使用化學(xué)和生物武器的威脅。
恐怖主義是非對(duì)稱作戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的另一個(gè)內(nèi)容，各種信息作戰(zhàn)也是。信息戰(zhàn)包括對(duì)美國(guó)戰(zhàn)區(qū)通訊系統(tǒng)或美國(guó)的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施(無(wú)論是軍用的還是更廣泛的政府或者私人擁有的)進(jìn)行攻擊。近來(lái)我們已看到某些計(jì)算機(jī)“黑客”的活動(dòng)，我覺(jué)得這種信息戰(zhàn)確實(shí)有可能成為嚴(yán)重問(wèn)題。
這些都是非常嚴(yán)重的挑戰(zhàn)。其它方面我想補(bǔ)充的是，在美國(guó)陸軍的參與下，海軍陸戰(zhàn)隊(duì)非常重視城市地形條件下的軍事行動(dòng)。這種挑戰(zhàn)可出現(xiàn)在各種情況中，如在敵對(duì)環(huán)境中執(zhí)行任務(wù)，只要有少數(shù)的敵對(duì)分子，就可能造成相當(dāng)大的困難；再如大規(guī)模軍事行動(dòng)中，為了尋求庇護(hù)，也叫飛皂決定到城市去。這是一個(gè)非常棘手的問(wèn)題，也是一個(gè)與“沙漠風(fēng)暴”截然不同的沖突類型。
我認(rèn)為，美國(guó)的國(guó)防戰(zhàn)略應(yīng)當(dāng)明確它將繼續(xù)保持力量投送能力。但投送力量有許多困難。用各種化學(xué)或生物武器、或者甚至足夠數(shù)量的常規(guī)導(dǎo)彈，就有可能阻止美國(guó)的進(jìn)入，這確實(shí)是-種令人擔(dān)心的情況。
我還能想出其它一些挑戰(zhàn)。有些國(guó)家打算將巡航導(dǎo)彈大量擴(kuò)散到目前尚未擁有這種武器的國(guó)家中去，巡航導(dǎo)彈與化學(xué)和生物武器結(jié)合起來(lái)，將會(huì)是非常、非常難以對(duì)付的威脅。生物工程的持續(xù)發(fā)展可能產(chǎn)生新的病毒類型。和這些病毒一樣難以想象的是，人們?yōu)槭裁匆芯克鼈?。但是，只要某個(gè)恐怖主義集團(tuán)或國(guó)家投入足夠的資源研究新的病毒，這就會(huì)成為令人不寒而栗的挑戰(zhàn)。生物威脅現(xiàn)在已經(jīng)存在，但是若出現(xiàn)新的生物戰(zhàn)劑，挑戰(zhàn)會(huì)更加難對(duì)付。
在-定程度上，能否迎接未來(lái)的挑戰(zhàn)取決于我們戰(zhàn)略中“塑造”部分能否成功，我非常希望把重點(diǎn)放在“塑造”上將會(huì)帶來(lái)好處。讓我們超越作戰(zhàn)的范圍，想-想全球的政治，例如，你應(yīng)當(dāng)看-看冷戰(zhàn)結(jié)束以來(lái)，我們是否在改善與俄羅斯的關(guān)系。俄羅斯歷史上是個(gè)大國(guó)，能否改善與它的關(guān)系是很重要的。中國(guó)也是這樣。如果我們面對(duì)一個(gè)重新崛起而又不喜歡美國(guó)的中國(guó)，那么這將是一個(gè)挑戰(zhàn)，我們沒(méi)有人愿意面對(duì)這樣的挑戰(zhàn)。我要說(shuō)的是，口前美國(guó)與中國(guó)、俄羅斯、還有其它國(guó)家關(guān)系的狀況，將會(huì)影響到未來(lái)美軍所面臨的挑戰(zhàn)。因此，我們戰(zhàn)略中的“塑造”部分是非常、非常重要的。
陳：說(shuō)到《四年防務(wù)審查報(bào)告》中提出的“塑造一反應(yīng)一準(zhǔn)備”戰(zhàn)略，這種新戰(zhàn)略的實(shí)質(zhì)和主要內(nèi)容是什么?
米勒：正如我們已經(jīng)談到的，這個(gè)戰(zhàn)略的意思是非常直截了當(dāng)?shù)?。?，國(guó)防部應(yīng)當(dāng)支持國(guó)家以對(duì)美國(guó)利益有利的方式“塑造”國(guó)際環(huán)境。第二，當(dāng)危機(jī)發(fā)生時(shí)，軍隊(duì)必須具有對(duì)危機(jī)做出反應(yīng)的能力。第三，我們現(xiàn)在必須為一個(gè)不確定的未來(lái)進(jìn)行準(zhǔn)備。換句活說(shuō)，我們必須確保在今后和在當(dāng)前有能力進(jìn)行“塑造和反應(yīng)”。
就“塑造”部分來(lái)說(shuō)，我知道你已看過(guò)《四年防務(wù)審查報(bào)告》，因此知道其主要內(nèi)容。美國(guó)國(guó)防部領(lǐng)導(dǎo)一直非常積極地進(jìn)行軍隊(duì)之間多層次的接觸?！端哪攴绖?wù)審查報(bào)告》之后出現(xiàn)的一個(gè)情況，就是要求每個(gè)地區(qū)性總部司令制訂戰(zhàn)區(qū)接觸計(jì)劃，詳細(xì)說(shuō)明總部司令在本地區(qū)的目標(biāo)和將如何與該地區(qū)的伙伴國(guó)家進(jìn)行合作，包括與該地區(qū)各方共同舉行聯(lián)合演習(xí)和其它活動(dòng)。為接觸制定全面系統(tǒng)的計(jì)劃是執(zhí)行“塑造”戰(zhàn)略的重要組成部分。
使駐在歐洲的10萬(wàn)美軍和駐在亞洲的10萬(wàn)美軍作好準(zhǔn)備，是前沿存在的重要部分。通過(guò)這種軍事存在(如果必要的話通過(guò)繼續(xù)運(yùn)用美國(guó)本土的軍事力量施加影響)制止沖突的能力也是“塑造”戰(zhàn)略的組成部分。所以“塑造”包括威懾能力和在本地區(qū)與其它方打交道的能力。
現(xiàn)在來(lái)談?wù)?ldquo;反應(yīng)”能力。美軍必須具有對(duì)整個(gè)沖突頻譜可能發(fā)生的沖突做出反應(yīng)的能力，從規(guī)模很小的人道主義援助和維和行動(dòng)，一直到大規(guī)模戰(zhàn)區(qū)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)。同樣，“塑造”戰(zhàn)略所具有的威懾內(nèi)容也要求具有對(duì)整個(gè)沖突頻譜做出反應(yīng)的能力，而且包括由我們的核武器提供的核威懾能力。
下面談?wù)剳?zhàn)略中為未來(lái)而進(jìn)行“準(zhǔn)備”的部分。我們?cè)谡務(wù)撚嘘P(guān)軍事革命問(wèn)題時(shí)，已經(jīng)談到廠“準(zhǔn)備”的一個(gè)核心因素。另外，國(guó)防部現(xiàn)在努力做的另一件事是使自己更有效地運(yùn)作，進(jìn)行一場(chǎng)“商業(yè)革命”。例如，《國(guó)防改革倡議》已提出了削減國(guó)防部長(zhǎng)辦公廳和國(guó)防部其他部門的人員，目前正在努力對(duì)國(guó)防部各級(jí)進(jìn)行精簡(jiǎn)。還有，我們希望對(duì)美國(guó)及其海外的軍事基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施和基地進(jìn)行適當(dāng)?shù)南鳒p。這些舉措都是要確保國(guó)防部能在資源有限的條件下生存，并能足以有效地為未來(lái)作好準(zhǔn)備。
正如我在前面已講到的，目前軍事革命的種種努力(不僅包括試驗(yàn)，而且包括科學(xué)和技術(shù)發(fā)展)也是“準(zhǔn)備”戰(zhàn)略非常重要的組成部分。最后，做出各種情報(bào)預(yù)測(cè)與評(píng)估盡管很困難，但卻有助于我們考慮未來(lái)可能需要什么能力。所有這一切都是“準(zhǔn)備”戰(zhàn)略的重要組成部分。