中國人口流動(dòng)的決定因素

Planned economies attempt to control not only the “commanding heights” of industry, but also the movement of their people. The transformation of China’s economy into the powerhouse it is today came about only after Chinese were allowed to leave subsistence farms for factories and cities.

實(shí)行計(jì)劃經(jīng)濟(jì)的國家不僅試圖控制產(chǎn)業(yè)“制高點(diǎn)”，還試圖控制本國人民的流動(dòng)。中國轉(zhuǎn)變成如今的經(jīng)濟(jì)強(qiáng)國，是在國人被準(zhǔn)許離開只夠維持溫飽的農(nóng)田、進(jìn)入工廠和城市之后才實(shí)現(xiàn)的。

Two big developments in China in the last few weeks show that the planners’ instinct to channel population flows and the labour force has not disappeared, despite the power of market forces in the world’s largest economy.

過去幾周中國發(fā)生的兩大事件表明，在這個(gè)世界最大的經(jīng)濟(jì)體，盡管市場力量很強(qiáng)大，規(guī)劃者們想要引導(dǎo)人口流動(dòng)和勞動(dòng)力的本能仍沒有消失。

Apple’s primary manufacturer Foxconn last week announced it would take “immediate action” to stop students working overtime to produce the iPhone X after a Financial Times investigation revealed the practice in its vast factory in the interior city of Zhengzhou.

蘋果(Apple)的主要代工商富士康(Foxconn)最近宣布，將“立即采取行動(dòng)”停止讓學(xué)生加班生產(chǎn)iPhone X的做法，英國《金融時(shí)報(bào)》此前的一項(xiàng)調(diào)查曝光了富士康位于中國內(nèi)陸城市鄭州的一家大型工廠的這一行為。

This is not the first time this has happened. Five years ago, under nearly identical circumstances, Foxconn was criticised for pulling in students to work overtime at Zhengzhou and other plants to produce the iPhone 5. In both cases, cheap overtime labour was needed to get Apple’s hot new product into stores before Christmas.

這種事情不是第一次發(fā)生。五年前就出現(xiàn)過幾乎同樣的一幕：富士康因在鄭州等地的工廠使用學(xué)生加班生產(chǎn)iPhone 5而受到指責(zé)。在這兩起事件中，為了趕在圣誕節(jié)前將蘋果熱銷的新產(chǎn)品送上貨架，富士康需要廉價(jià)且愿意加班的勞動(dòng)力。

Foxconn opened the Zhengzhou plant in part because the Henan provincial government promised lower wage costs. No-one considered that workers had already left for places where wages are higher. When Foxconn and other manufacturers require sudden production peaks inland China’s lower wages do not attract enough temporary workers. Luckily for the companies, they can turn to the vocational technology schools, which function as concentrated pools of low-cost labour. Students can be paid less than the adult workforce. Moreover, students can be returned to “school” without an expensive lay-off process, since they were never formally “employees”.

富士康之所以在鄭州開設(shè)工廠，部分原因是河南省政府承諾讓其工資成本保持在較低水平。但沒人想到，工人們大多都去了工資更高的地方。當(dāng)富士康等制造商驟然需要達(dá)到生產(chǎn)峰值時(shí)，中國內(nèi)陸地區(qū)較低的工資水平無法吸引到足夠多的臨時(shí)勞動(dòng)力。幸運(yùn)的是，這些企業(yè)可以從職業(yè)技術(shù)學(xué)校招人，那里是低成本勞動(dòng)力的集中地。學(xué)生拿的工資低于成年勞動(dòng)力。此外，企業(yè)無需支付高昂遣散費(fèi)就可以讓學(xué)生們返回“學(xué)校”，因?yàn)樗麄儾皇钦?ldquo;雇員”。

If students refuse “work experience” on assembly lines, schools can withhold graduation certificates. Not graduating would be a terrible waste of tuition paid by parents hoping the qualification will put their children in better jobs than assembly line work. It is a credible threat for teenagers who have already disappointed family hopes by failing tough high school or college entrance exams.

如果學(xué)生們拒絕在裝配線上積累“工作經(jīng)驗(yàn)”，學(xué)校可以不發(fā)給他們畢業(yè)證書。無法畢業(yè)就白白浪費(fèi)了學(xué)費(fèi)，花錢供子女上學(xué)的父母希望有張文憑孩子能找到比裝配線崗位更好的工作。對于那些已經(jīng)因在殘酷的高中或大學(xué)入學(xué)考試中落榜而令家人失望的青少年學(xué)生而言，這是一個(gè)確實(shí)有效的威脅。

Essentially, the vocational technology schools allow China to keep manufacturing wages lower for longer, despite demographic shifts that would otherwise make its products more expensive.

實(shí)際上，雖然人口結(jié)構(gòu)變化本應(yīng)推高中國制造的成本，但職業(yè)技術(shù)學(xué)校使得中國可以在更長時(shí)間內(nèi)將制造業(yè)工資維持在較低水平。

One shift that has drawn cheap casual labor away from inland manufacturing bases such as Zhengzhou is that China’s growing prosperity has created a vibrant service industry. In wealthy cities like Beijing and Shanghai, a comfortable middle class now depends on nannies, rapid home deliveries and $4 lattes served by chic baristas.

將廉價(jià)臨時(shí)勞動(dòng)力從鄭州等內(nèi)陸制造業(yè)基地吸引走的一大轉(zhuǎn)變是，中國日益繁榮的社會(huì)創(chuàng)造了一個(gè)充滿活力的服務(wù)業(yè)。在北京、上海等富裕城市，一個(gè)生活舒適的中產(chǎn)家庭如今離不開保姆、送貨上門的快遞服務(wù)以及由穿著光鮮的侍者奉上的一杯4美元的拿鐵咖啡。

These booming services have lured an army of migrants to the slums that ring Beijing. Others cram into basement rooms underneath expensive apartment blocks and shopping malls. But the city government regards them as “low-level people” who are a drag on public services, like transportation, schools and hospitals. It wants to move them out and limit the population to 23m.

欣欣向榮的服務(wù)業(yè)吸引了大批外來務(wù)工人員搬進(jìn)環(huán)繞北京的廉價(jià)住宅區(qū)。還有一些人擠在昂貴公寓樓和購物中心的地下室居住。但市政府將他們視為“低端人口”，認(rèn)為他們增加了交通、學(xué)校、醫(yī)院等公共服務(wù)的負(fù)擔(dān)。政府希望把他們清走，將北京的人口限制在2300萬。

For two years the city has made it harder for migrant children to attend school and demolished cheap housing. This month, a fire in an over-crowded building killed 19 people, including children. That tragedy triggered a massive slum clearance campaign, displacing tens of thousands into the winter cold. The idea is clearly that they will just “go home”.

兩年來，北京市提高了外來務(wù)工人員的子女入學(xué)的難度，并不停拆除廉價(jià)住房。本月，一棟擁擠不堪的建筑發(fā)生火災(zāi)，導(dǎo)致包括兒童在內(nèi)的19人死亡。這起悲劇引發(fā)了一場對群租房的大規(guī)模清理行動(dòng)，導(dǎo)致數(shù)萬人在嚴(yán)冬中流離失所。此舉發(fā)出的信號很明確，他們只能“回老家”。

But home to where? Most migrants under the age of 35 have no idea how to farm, and anyway, the farms are being reconsolidated into agribusinesses.

但回老家能干什么?35歲以下的外出務(wù)工者大多不懂耕種，再說農(nóng)地已被整合用于發(fā)展農(nóng)業(yè)綜合企業(yè)。

Instead China’s new plan is to keep its vast population out of the biggest, wealthiest cities, and encourage them to settle in small provincial cities. But public resources are concentrated in the main cities. Provincial towns and cities do not have a surfeit of decent jobs. What they have is over-crowded, underfunded schools and sub-standard hospitals — and assembly-line manufacturers assured of plentiful cheap labour in the hinterland.

中國的新計(jì)劃是讓大批人口離開一線城市，鼓勵(lì)他們到各省較小的城市定居下來。但中國的公共資源主要集中在大城市。一般的城鎮(zhèn)沒有太多好工作，有的只是學(xué)生數(shù)量過多經(jīng)費(fèi)卻不足的學(xué)校、條件簡陋的醫(yī)院，以及在內(nèi)陸地區(qū)被保證能獲得充足廉價(jià)勞動(dòng)力的從事裝配業(yè)務(wù)的制造商。